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 1 
Introduction 
As the People‘s Republic of China continues to develop as the subject of intense 
economic, political and cultural interest, this study examines the place ‗China‘ has held 
in the parliamentary imagination. It achieves this by exploring the history of the 
Australian Parliament‘s dealings with China. The monograph‘s period of historical 
focus is broad: it begins with an analysis of Federation debates over immigration 
restriction and concludes with a detailed assessment of the bilateral relationship during 
the 41
st
 Parliament (November 2004–November 2007). While the monograph provides 
extensive coverage of the changing nature of Australia–China relations, it does not 
attempt a full narrative history of the period with which it is concerned; rather, it offers 
an analysis of a series of foundational moments in the development of the relationship.
1
 
Such a methodological approach enables the research to document the profound 
transformation that has taken place in Australian parliamentary attitudes towards China.  
In seeking to establish how parliamentary attitudes have been formed through a 
complex and interactive series of cultural, historical and ideological processes, the 
overarching goal of the monograph is to examine specific moments when China has 
become the object of parliamentary interest and the subject of parliamentary analysis, 
for example: the formation of the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949; 
recognition of the People‘s Republic in 1972; Hu Jintao‘s address to the Parliament in 
2003. Through identifying the historical continuities and discontinuities in 
parliamentary attitudes, the study also documents how Australian parliamentarians have 
appropriated ‗China‘ to serve a variety of political and nationalist ends. While China 
has been used to define Australia‘s place in the world—variously emerging as an 
‗other‘ to Australia and as integral to Australia‘s economic, political and strategic 
future—China has also been manipulated for domestic political purposes. At 
Federation, parliamentarians drew upon the Chinese presence in Australia to assist in 
the cultivation of a white nationalist identity; during the Cold War the Liberal-Country 
                                                 
1. For more extensive histories of the Australia–China relationship see: E. S. K. Fung, and 
Colin Mackerras, From Fear to Friendship: Australian Policies towards the People’s 
Republic of China 1966–1982, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1985; Lachlan 
Strahan, Australia’s China: Changing Perceptions from the 1930s to the 1990s, 
Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1996; Thomas, Nicholas (ed.), Re-orientating 
Australia–China Relations: 1972 to the Present, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004; Timothy 
Kendall, Ways of Seeing China: From Yellow Peril to Shangrila, Curtin University 
Books/Fremantle Press, Fremantle, 2005. 
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Party exploited the fear of Chinese communism as a potent political mobiliser which 
would help it retain power for 23 years; and in the period following recognition, both 
major parties have drawn upon the bilateral relationship for purposes of political 
differentiation, each claiming itself best placed to manage the relationship. 
A concomitant goal of the research is to examine the specific contribution made by the 
Parliament to the development of bilateral relations. In the first instance, this involves 
identifying the way the relationship has been advanced through the processes, practices 
and outputs of the Parliament—policy and legislative debates, the activities of 
parliamentary friendship groups, the visits of delegations, the work of the committees 
of the Parliament. Beyond this, the monograph is also interested in exploring the 
importance of the Parliament as a powerful knowledge-producing institution, one which 
has played a critical role in the formation of Australian attitudes. In claiming that the 
Parliament has operated as an originating site for many popular Australian 
understandings of China, the monograph suggests that the Parliament‘s fears and hopes 
for China have contributed to the creation of some enduring and pervasive social and 
political visions—the yellow peril, the red menace, the land of sublime opportunity. 
The monograph begins by offering an account of the evolution of the Australia–China 
relationship through exploring three binding themes: immigration, political economy 
and foreign policy. This is followed by an analysis of the spectacular growth in 
Australia–China relations at the start of the 21st century. To achieve this the monograph 
utilises a diverse range of material: parliamentary reports and debates, personal papers, 
archival documents, policy and legislative outputs, committee reports and data from 
surveys and interviews conducted with members of the 41
st
 Parliament. As a whole, the 
research provides the most extensive history of the Australian Parliament‘s engagement 
with China that is currently available. Each of the four chapters gives priority to those 
themes, events and debates which have hitherto received limited critical analysis—
J. G. Latham‘s visit to China in 1934, Hu Jintao‘s address to the Australian Parliament 
in 2003, and the attitudes of parliamentarians to subjects ranging from Chinese ‗soft 
power‘, to human rights in China to the political status of Taiwan. 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter One explores the way the Chinese presence in the colonies of Australia during 
the 19
th
 century provided one of the central motivations for Federation and played a 
significant role in the development of an early Australian national identity. Antipathy 
towards the Chinese—fears about miscegenation, contamination and anxiety about the 
degradation of the white type—manifests itself in discriminatory legislation which 
Introduction 
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included one of the first acts of the new Federal Parliament, the Immigration 
Restriction Act of 1901. In offering an account of Federation attitudes towards the 
Chinese, this chapter is particularly concerned with examining how Victorian racial 
theory and fears about racial intermingling, blood-mixing and degeneration came to 
inform parliamentary debate to produce an immigration policy which would help 
cultivate a white Australia. 
Chapter Two turns to examine how the Australia that was imagined at Federation—
racially pure, separate from Asia and committed to pursuing imperial interests—was 
gradually replaced by a nation which began to imagine China as part of its economic 
future. In outlining the activities of Australia‘s first diplomatic mission to Asia, the 
Australian Eastern Mission of 1934, the chapter investigates how the effects of the 
Great Depression prompted Australian policy makers, still committed to the policy of a 
white Australia, to seek engagement with the peoples and nations of Asia. Following an 
assessment of the shift that took place in Australian self-perceptions during this period, 
the chapter turns to identify parliamentary reaction to the establishment of the People‘s 
Republic. After exploring how the fears of Chinese communist expansionism led to 
calls for the containment and isolation of China during the Cold War, the chapter 
concludes by examining the way China was resituated in the parliamentary imagination 
following Gough Whitlam‘s recognition of the People‘s Republic in 1972. 
Chapter Three documents a landmark event in the recent history of the Australian 
Parliament‘s engagement with China: President Hu Jintao‘s address to a joint meeting 
of the Parliament in 2003. After examining the reaction to the prospect of an address to 
the Parliament by a non-democratically elected head of state, the chapter charts the 
development of the bilateral relationship during the Howard years. A discussion of the 
speeches by Prime Minister Howard and President Hu, which reveals differences in the 
way the two nations seek to engage diplomatically, concludes with a discussion of how 
John Howard employed a model for Asian engagement which sought to differentiate 
him from his political rivals. The chapter also reveals why President Hu Jintao‘s 
address to a simultaneous and co-located meeting of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives of the Australian Parliament would be the last by a visiting head of 
state. 
Chapter Four offers a detailed discussion of the specific contributions of the 
41
st
 Parliament to the development of bilateral relations. It achieves this through 
examining the major China-related outputs of the Parliament—committee and 
delegation reports, parliamentary debates and policy and legislative material—while 
Introduction 
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also drawing on the results from a survey and interviews with members of the 41
st
 
Parliament. The survey and interview materials provide unique insights into the 
attitudes of contemporary parliamentarians. Based on this information, the chapter 
explores a range of subjects including the activities of parliamentary friendship groups, 
influential historical milestones in the relationship, attitudes towards the current state of 
economic relations, sources of information about China, travel to China, and relations 
between the Chinese Embassy and Members of the Australian Parliament.  
In its entirety, the monograph tells the story of profound social, political, economic and 
attitudinal transformation. In telling this story, it is argued that ‗China‘ has held a 
critical place in the parliamentary imagination and played an integral role in modern 
Australian political history. The anxieties about economic competition and genetic 
corruption, which prompted the first Parliament to pass legislation that sought to 
exclude the Chinese (and other non-white people) from Australia, are replaced by a 
China which emerges as an indispensable economic and strategic partner, positioned 
near the centre of Australia‘s foreign policy. Perhaps the full extent of the 
transformation is evidenced by the fact that at the start of the 42
nd
 Parliament, Australia 
has both a Chinese-speaking Prime Minister and the first overseas-born, ethnic Chinese, 
member of the Federal Ministry, Senator Penny Wong.  
In a study which canvasses the Parliament‘s fears and hopes for China, the monograph 
seeks to look beyond many of the laudatory statements that are often made about 
China‘s burgeoning economy, to provide an historically informed and critical account 
of the evolving attitudes of the Australian Parliament towards China. In such a quest it 
is useful to note J. G. Latham‘s caution to the House of Representatives in 1934: 
It has been usual in Australia to regard China as offering great potentialities for the 
marketing of Australian goods. This arises, no doubt, from our habit of thinking of 
China in terms of China‘s population … But perhaps no other market offers more 
difficulties, and no other market requires such specialized knowledge of local 
conditions and sales procedure. It can also be said that in no other eastern market is 
competition so keen, or is there such a concentration of international commercial 
representation, both business and official. Most countries have recognized the 
necessity for official trade representation, and the trade representatives are, generally 
speaking, men of extraordinary ability and acumen.
2
 
Some seventy years after Latham offered this advice, it would appear appropriate to 
investigate the intellectual, cultural and strategic capacity of the Australian Parliament 
                                                 
2. J. G. Latham, ‗The Australian Eastern Mission, 1934: Report of the Right Honourable 
J. G. Latham‘, Parliamentary Papers for 1932–34, Number 236, p. 12. 
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to manage the gravitational pulls and influences—the shifting forces of attraction and 
repulsion—which now keep the Australia–China relationship in orbit.  
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Chapter One: Federation and the Geographies of Whiteness 
Let us keep before us the noble idea of a white Australia—snow-white Australia if 
you will. Let it be pure and spotless.
1
 
 
1. Chinese Arch Melbourne, 1901, Australian Federation celebrations, National Library of 
Australia Picture Collection (nla.pic-an13117280-23) 
Taken on 7 May 1901, this is a photograph of Federation street celebrations in 
Melbourne. Onlookers observe a carriage transporting Chinese dignitaries along a 
crowded Swanston Street festooned with flags, lanterns and other street decorations. 
The featured Chinese arch, comprising two pagoda-style tiered towers, had been 
recently erected to celebrate the arrival of the Duke and Duchess of York to Melbourne. 
The Chinese community had raised the funds to construct the arch and the residents of 
                                                 
1. James Black Ronald, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
11 September 1901, p. 4666. 
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Little Bourke Street had donated the Chinese silks to decorate the arch‘s timbers. On 
the day of the photograph, taken two days before the Duke of York opened the first 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Chinese eagerly participated in the 
city-wide celebrations. A procession of Chinese standard-bearers, musicians and 
dancers weaved their way through the streets of Melbourne pursued by two traditional 
Chinese dragons.  
An article published in the Melbourne Argus, on the following day, offers an example 
of how Chinese participation in the parade was reported. The sense of antipathy and 
condescension which pervades the opening statements gives way to a sense of curiosity 
and fascination. The novelty of the dragon parade, the quality of the music and the 
‗prettiness‘ of the ‗half-caste women‘ prompts the anonymous reporter to describe the 
Chinese as a skilful and diligent people capable of creating processions of great beauty. 
According to the description, the energy and artistry of the performers and the 
enthusiasm displayed for Federation celebrations stirred the interest and admiration of 
onlookers; so much so, that at the conclusion to the parade the spectators rose ‗and gave 
the clever Chinese the cheers they deserved‘, ‗forgetting for the nonce White 
Australia‘.2  
In between the two towers of the photographed arch and upon the central span is a 
banner welcoming the monarchs to Melbourne: ‗Welcome by the Chinese Citizens‘. 
The usage of the term ‗Chinese citizens‘ suggests that the Chinese understood 
citizenship to have a lived or experiential aspect—citizenship was demonstrated 
through a civic commitment to Australian nationhood and a Chinese citizen‘s arch 
acted as a material symbol of this lived citizenship. However, while the Chinese sought 
to position themselves within the civic ‗tapestry‘ of the new nation-state, the concept of 
citizenship via participation did not afford any legal entitlement. Australian citizenship 
was not legally defined until the Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1948, which 
subsequently became the Australian Citizenship Act.
3
 Up until this time, a non-British 
subject acquired British subject status by naturalisation. In most instances this entitled a 
person to all the rights and privileges, as well as the obligations, of a British-born 
                                                 
2. ‗The Chinese Procession: Novel and Picturesque Display‘, Argus, 8 May 1901, p. 8.  
3. For a discussion of citizenship at Federation see Kim Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship 
Law in Context, Lawbook Co., Sydney, 2002. It should be noted that sections of the 
Commonwealth and colonial legislation dealing with matters of immigration and 
naturalisation were regularly, or continuously, amended.  
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subject.
4
 In the pre-Federation period this was regulated by the colonies through a raft 
of legislation prohibiting the Chinese from becoming naturalised.
5
 After Federation, 
naturalisation would be governed by the Naturalisation Act of 1903, under which 
indigenous people from Asia, Africa and the Pacific Islands (excepting New Zealand) 
were prohibited from becoming British subjects. While naturalisations granted prior to 
Federation were valid under Commonwealth law, those Chinese who did not, or could 
not, become naturalised had no claim upon the state, and as such faced uncertain 
futures.  
Using this account of Chinese civic patriotism as a starting point, this chapter examines 
the debates associated with the passage of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901. It 
offers a counterpoint to Keith Windschuttle‘s recent critique of the ‗White Australia 
policy‘, in which he argues that the parliamentary debate over the legislation was 
primarily focused upon the economic motivations for immigration restriction. The 
chapter suggests that the debate over the Immigration Restriction Bill was mediated by 
a pervasive and incontrovertible racism which had at its heart the assertion of white 
genetic and cultural superiority. This is demonstrated by exploring how the debate, 
which was governed by anxieties about racial intermingling, blood-mixing, 
contamination, and the dilution and degeneration of the white race, was committed to 
producing legislation which would maintain racial purity. Central to the argument is 
that during the Federation period whiteness operated as a cultural ideal critical to the 
formation of an Australian national identity. Through propagating fears about the loss 
of the white nation-self, the Parliament sought to transform whiteness into a normative 
national category; Federation sought to indigenise whiteness. 
Motivations for Federation  
There were at least four motivations for Federation: removing the divisions that 
separated the colonies; creating unified immigration legislation that would restrict the 
entry of non-Europeans; the establishment of tariff barriers to protect Australian 
                                                 
4. In New South Wales, a naturalised citizen could not sit in Parliament (until after the 1858 
Electoral Act) and could only lease land for fixed periods. See Shirley Fitzgerald, Red 
Tape, Gold Scissors, State Library of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 1996, p. 189. 
5. In New South Wales, for example, the legislation regularly changed and for extended 
periods there were laws which prevented the Chinese from becoming naturalised—from 
1850 to 1856, between 1862 and 1867 and again after 1888 with the passing of the 
Chinese Restriction Act. By this time, 889 Chinese had taken advantage of the non-
exclusionary periods and became naturalised in New South Wales. See Shirley 
Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 189. 
Chapter One: Federation and the Geographies of Whiteness 
10 
workers and manufacturers from foreign competition; and the creation of a nation that 
would provide the citizenry with the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of a democratic 
political life. While the protectionist platform extended from barring the entry of cheap 
manufactured goods to barring the entry of cheap labour, at the heart of the federalist 
movement was the intention to establish a new nation defined in racial terms.  
There was a determined sense that Federation presented an unparalleled nation building 
opportunity. The pervasive mood of optimism, the spirit of hope and nationalist 
ambition promoted many of the first parliamentarians to experiment with different 
social and political visions. When speaking to the Immigration Restriction Bill, 
parliamentarians commended to the people of Australia a vision of a progressive, young 
and pure nation defined in racial terms. The racial character of the new nation was 
deemed critical to preserving Australia‘s British heritage and it was largely considered 
part of one‘s patriotic or imperial duty to keep the nation snowy white. Commonly, the 
white nation, or anthropomorphised self, was represented as being threatened with 
imminent extinction, and as such, the legislation restricting the immigration of non-
Europeans was considered ‗a matter of life and death to the purity of our race and the 
future of our nation‘.6   
The first Parliament consisted of 111 parliamentarians and three major political parties: 
the Protectionists, the Free Trade Party and Labour (who were largely divided between 
free traders and protectionists).
7
 There were 75 Members of the House of 
Representatives: 31 Protectionists (who formed Government under Edmund Barton), 28 
Free Traders (who formed Opposition under George Reid), 14 Labour (who were led 
by Chris Watson) and two ‗others‘.8 The majority had served in colonial parliaments. In 
                                                 
6. William McMillan, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
6 September 1901, p. 4629. Alfred Deakin spoke of the threat to the ‗national manhood‘: 
‗We here find ourselves touching the profoundest instinct of individual or nation—the 
instinct of self-preservation—for it is nothing less than the national manhood, the 
national character and the national future that are at stake‘. ‗Immigration Restriction 
Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 12 September 1901, p. 4804. 
7. In 1908, the ALP adopted the formal name Australian Labour Party. In 1912, as a result 
of the influence of the American ‗labor‘ movement, the Party adopted the American 
spelling, Labor; see ‗History of Australian Labor Party‘, 
http://www.alp.org.au/about/history.php (accessed 17 July 2007). Therefore, when 
talking about the period pre-1912, I use the term ‗Labour‘. 
8. See Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, Library Committee of 
the Commonwealth Parliament, 1915, and Geoffrey Hawker, Politicians All: The 
Candidates for the Australian Commonwealth Election—A Collective Biography, Wild 
and Woolley, Sydney, 2002. 
Chapter One: Federation and the Geographies of Whiteness 
11 
the Upper House, the Free Trade Opposition had 17 of the 36 Senate seats, the 
Protectionists 11 and Labour 8.
9
 It was a requirement that all Federation 
parliamentarians were British subjects. This prerequisite resulted in two 
parliamentarians inventing a British heritage: Labour Leader John Christian Watson 
was born Johan Cristian Tanck in Valparaiso, Chile. His father was a Chilean of 
German descent and his mother was Irish-born. To this day, Watson remains the only 
prime minister of Australia (27 April 1904–17 August 1904) who was neither English-
born nor of Anglo-Celtic descent. The second non-British subject was American-born 
King O‘Malley. O‘Malley‘s origin is uncertain but his biographer tentatively places his 
birth in Kansas, United States.
10
  
The Immigration Restriction Bill, which enacted the white Australia policy, was 
initiated in the House of Representatives by Prime Minister Edmund Barton on 5 June 
1901, nine sitting days after the Duke of York had opened the Australian Parliament on 
9 May 1901. The Bill was one of the first substantive pieces of legislation to be 
introduced to the new Commonwealth Parliament and was debated in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate from August to December 1901. Possibly one of the 
most extensively debated pieces of legislation ever to come before the Parliament, it 
occupies 600 pages of Hansard and more than half a million words.
11
 As there was 
almost universal support for the immigration restriction of non-Europeans to Australia, 
much of the parliamentary debate focused on the character of the bill—not whether or 
not it should be enacted. The debate explored the best method of exclusion and whether 
exclusion was best achieved through the introduction of an education or dictation test. 
The majority of parliamentarians advocated absolute exclusion; others supported the 
admission of small numbers of coloured labourers to work in the tropical regions of the 
north, while a minority argued for admitting a limited number of educated ‗coloured 
aliens‘.12 The Protectionist Government was unified in its support for the Bill. Labour 
politicians, who were vociferous in their opposition to coloured labour, offered strong 
                                                 
9. See Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1915. 
10. As cited in A. J. Grassby and Sylvia Ordonez, The Man Time Forgot: the life and times 
of John Christian Watson, Australia‘s first Labor prime minister, Pluto Press, 
Annandale, pp. 18, 63. 
11. Keith Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy: Race and Shame in the Australian 
History Wars, Macleay Press, Sydney, p. 286. 
12. For example, Thomas Macdonald-Paterson (Member for Brisbane), ‗Immigration 
Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 6 November 1901, p. 6937.  
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support to the Government. Dissent from the dominant position was extremely rare and 
when opposition was expressed it came from members of the Free Trade Party. 
It was widely considered that unified immigration legislation would provide, in Alfred 
Deakin‘s terms, the ‗statutory armour‘ that would stop all ‗leakages‘ between the states: 
… there are considerable differences between the restrictions imposed in the various 
States. We find ourselves to-day, it may be said, with, at all events, a half-open door 
for all Asiatics and African peoples, through which entry is not difficult … It was 
with a full recognition of those facts that the first plank in the Government platform 
… was the plank which for ease of reference was called the declaration for a ‗White 
Australia‘. It was for this reason that so much stress was laid on this issue, and it was 
for this reason that since the Government took office, no question has more 
frequently or more seriously occupied their attention, not only because of this one 
proposal before the House, but with regard to executive acts that have been and will 
be necessary.
13
  
As Deakin suggests, there were other pieces of legislation that sought to supplement the 
Immigration Restriction Act. The Pacific Islanders Labourers Act 1901, limited import 
licences for Pacific island labourers (or ‗Kanakas‘) and laid the platform to deport 
many of the Pacific islanders in Queensland and northern New South Wales after 1906. 
The Post and Telegraph Act 1901 attempted to keep the seas white through the 
provision that ships subsidised to carry Australian mail only employ white labour. 
Together these three acts formed a package of legislation to exclude, and if necessary 
remove, non-Europeans from Australia. 
Interpreting the Legacy of Immigration Restriction 
In recent years there has been renewed debate over how historians have interpreted the 
legacy of the Immigration Restriction Act. In The White Australia Policy, Keith 
Windschuttle suggests the historical claims about the inherent racism of the policy have 
been exaggerated by a generation of historians too eager to please ‗modern, racially-
sensitive readers‘ and too eager to condemn the first Parliament for its racism. 
Windschuttle suggests that such interpretations have been informed by a narrow, 
cultural orthodoxy and facilitated by a methodology which favours plucking a few lines 
out of Hansard and producing the most ‗cavalier generalisations‘ about the legislation. 
Windschuttle argues that as a result of these politicised generalisations, we have 
                                                 
13. Alfred Deakin, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
12 September 1901, p. 4805. Deakin uses this armour/leakage metaphor, p. 4806. Such 
an argument was also offered in the Senate—see Senator James Drake (Queensland), 
‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, Senate, Debates, 15 November 1901, pp. 7335–7336. 
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become ‗saddled with myth and half truths about the debate and about the opinions of 
those who spoke it‘.14 In endeavouring to restore the balance, Windschuttle‘s revisionist 
history focuses on economic motivations for immigration restriction, arguing that 
concerns expressed over racial matters represented a minority view: 
Rather than being ‗pervaded with ideas of race and blood‘, the majority of 
parliamentary opinion wanted to exclude Asian immigrants because they would 
potentially undermine the standard of living of Australian working people. Of almost 
equal concern was the politicians‘ fear that the creation of a racially-based political 
underclass would inhibit Australia‘s attempt to create an egalitarian democracy. Far 
from being fixed on ‗racial contamination‘, most politicians supported the Bill for 
economic and political reasons.
15
  
As Windschuttle suggests, many parliamentarians promoted economic arguments in 
support of the legislation: upholding labour practices, reducing the competition of 
coloured labour, maintaining wages and protecting white Australia‘s standard of living. 
The debate against coloured labour was led by Labour leader Chris Watson, who 
offered forceful statements about the threat posed by the Chinese:  
We know that a few years ago business men—speaking by and large—looked upon 
the Chinese or other coloured undesirables as men who could be very well tolerated, 
because they took the place of labourers, of men who might be unreliable, or not quite 
so cheap, but when it was found that these Orientals possessed all the cunning and 
acumen necessary to fit them for conducting business affairs, and that their cheapness 
of living was carried into business matters as well as into ordinary labouring work, a 
marked alteration of opinion took place among business men, so far as the 
competition of the ‗heathen Chinese‘ was concerned.16 
From the 1870s, the labour union movement had protested against foreign labour. 
Frequently, the labour movement identified the Chinese as the greatest threat to 
Australian work practices: their industriousness, their ability to live frugally and what 
was perceived as their ‗imitative‘ capacities were considered to increase competition 
and drive down wages.
17
 Numerous members of the Free Trade Party were also wary of 
the competitive threat posed by coloured labour. Vaiben Solomon, the importer with 
                                                 
14. Keith Windschuttle, op. cit., pp. 287, 289. 
15. Keith Windschuttle, op. cit., p. 8.  
16. Chris Watson, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
6 September 1901, p. 4633.  
17. Vaiben Solomon (Member for South Australia), refers to the Chinese as ‗a most 
industrious and imitative people‘, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of 
Representatives, Debates, 26 September 1901, p. 5239. 
Chapter One: Federation and the Geographies of Whiteness 
14 
mining interests and former owner-editor of the Northern Territory Times, offered an 
alternative perspective on industriousness of coloured labour: 
My experience of these different races has shown me that it is not so much the vices 
or the uncleanliness of the Japanese, Chinese and the Malays that we have to fear, but 
rather their virtues, if I may put it so, their industry, their indomitable perseverance, 
their frugality, and their ability to compete against European labour.
18
  
While Windschuttle‘s detailed analysis is useful for the way it challenges readers to 
reengage with the primary material, it is important to locate Windschuttle‘s argument 
within a broader and intensely ideological debate about contemporary Australian 
historiography. In speaking to this debate (the so-called ‗Australian history wars‘), 
Windschuttle claims that, so determined to assert that deep-seated racism is central to 
the Australian psyche, Australian historians have misinterpreted and misrepresented the 
debate over the Immigration Restriction Bill. This argument is encapsulated by the 
description on the back cover of The White Australia Policy, ‗Australia is not, and has 
never been, the racist country its academic historians have condemned‘. 
Yet ironically, Windschuttle—like so many of the contributors to the ‗history wars‘—
produces the same type of ideologically-based history that he criticises. Windschuttle‘s 
ideological stridency results in the creation of an erroneous and artificial binary. In 
claiming that there was a single motivation for immigration restriction and that this was 
economic, not racial, Windschuttle falls into the trap of considering the motivations 
exclusive to one another—something akin to suggesting that the history of slavery was 
not predicated upon racism. As we will see, the arguments identifying the negative 
effect of coloured labour and the arguments about blood or racial contamination operate 
concurrently, cross-referentially and in support of one another. Further, it becomes 
evident that even when the debate about immigration restriction related to the 
protection of labour rights, it was presented in a quasi-scientific, racist language.  
Windschuttle‘s failure to recognise the depth of the racism that frames the 
parliamentary debate appears to stem from his restrictive definition of racism. In 
utilising a definition that is exclusively connected to discrimination against biological 
or genetic difference, Windschuttle fails to fully engage with the way racism was 
constituted and practiced at the time.
19
 As it was, and often is, widely perceived that 
                                                 
18. ibid. 
19. Windschuttle argues that biologically-based racial theories, like social Darwinism, had 
little impact on Australians who were influenced by a Scottish Enlightenment model 
which emphasised the historical rather than biological differences between the races. 
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race and culture are inextricably linked, the debates over the Immigration Restriction 
Bill extend well beyond the notion of the biological or genetic. In fact, the evolutionary 
biological theories that were employed in parliamentary debates relied upon identifying 
the social pathology of ‗degenerative‘ cultures.  
Before turning to examine the way the parliamentary debate focused on matters of 
contamination and racial purity, it is worth briefly identifying other rationales that were 
drawn upon to supplement the arguments for economic and racial protection. These 
might loosely be categorised as the social and the political. It was widely believed that 
any colouring of Australia would inevitably result in moral and social degeneration. 
Since the 1870s, nationalist publications like the Bulletin, the Boomerang, Punch, 
Queensland Figaro and the Illustrated Australian News consistently warned Europeans 
that Chinese immigration would result in moral degradation and spiritual corruption. 
The animosity felt towards the Chinese is rather infamously depicted in the Phillip May 
cartoon of 1886—‘The Mongolian Octopus‘. 
 
2. Phillip May, ‗The Mongolian Octopus—his grip on Australia‘, Bulletin, 21 August 1886; 
May depicts the range of stereotypes that were popularly used to represent the Chinese. 
Unambiguously associated with various forms of disease, vice and immorality, the pig-tailed 
and buck-toothed Chinaman ensnares naïve and unsuspecting Europeans. 
As if echoing elements of the Phillip May cartoon, the Labour Member for Southern 
Melbourne, James Ronald, utilises the metaphors of elevation and degeneration to 
identify the effect that contact with ‗inferior‘ races has upon white women:  
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We do not object to these aliens because of their colour. We object to them because 
they are repugnant to us from our moral and social stand-points … I want to say, 
however that our intention in regard to these alien races is perfectly honourable, and 
that we have no racial hatred or antipathy towards them. We wish them all well; we 
desire to do them good, but we do not believe that by allowing them to come among 
us we shall do any thing to elevate them. It is just like that which very often happens. 
Some pure-minded, noble woman marries some degenerate debauchee, with the hope 
of reclaiming him; but the almost inevitable result is that the man drags her down to 
his level. So with these inferior races.
20
  
Another argument advanced for immigration restriction was that racial homogeneity 
was required for the establishment of a democratic society—a notion predicated upon 
the belief that democracy was a political state which was only really possible for 
Europeans. The Chinese, it was argued, had been exposed to non-democratic or 
despotic regimes of governance which had rendered them unable to participate in 
modern democratic political life. It was considered, therefore, that the Chinese presence 
would stifle the new nation‘s democratic political development.  
Debate over the Immigration Restriction Bill 
The position of the Protectionist Government was clearly articulated by Prime Minister 
Edmund Barton. In introducing the Immigration Restriction Bill to the House of 
Representatives on 7 August 1901, Barton identified the Bill as ‗… one of the most 
important matters with regard to the future of Australia that can engage the attention of 
this House‘.21 He then proceeded to draw a connection between the Chinese presence in 
Australia and the need for the legislation. Barton quotes Professor Charles Henry 
Pearson‘s National Life and Character: A Forecast: 
The fear of Chinese immigration which the Australian democracy cherishes, and 
which Englishmen at home find it hard to understand is, in fact, the instinct of self-
preservation, quickened by experience. We know that coloured and white labour 
cannot exist side by side; we are well aware that China can swamp us with a single 
year‘s surplus of population …22  
                                                 
20. James Ronald, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
6 September 1901, p. 4665.  
21. Edmund Barton, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
7 August 1901, p. 3497. 
22. Edmund Barton, op. cit., 1901, p. 3503, quoting from Pearson‘s National Life and 
Character: A Forecast, p. 36. In National Life and Character, Pearson also forecasts 
China‘s emergence as a world power. 
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Barton also argued, in unequivocally discriminatory terms, that there was nothing that 
the British-born subject has in common with the Chinaman.  
I do not think either that the doctrine of the equality of man was really ever intended 
to include racial equality. There is no racial equality. There is basic inequality. These 
races are, in comparison with white races—I think no one wants convincing of this 
fact—unequal and inferior. The doctrine of the equality of man was never intended to 
apply to the equality of the Englishman and the Chinaman. There is deep-set 
difference, and we see no prospect and no promise of its ever being effaced. Nothing 
in this world can put these two races upon an equality. Nothing we can do by 
cultivation, by refinement, or by anything else will make some races equal to others.
23
  
Attorney-General, Alfred Deakin, who was largely responsible for the Bill in the 
House, spoke at length on its character. On 12 September 1901, Deakin raised the 
question of how the Commonwealth will define non-European aliens once the program 
of a white Australia has been implemented: 
The programme of a ‗white Australia‘ means not merely its preservation for the 
future—it means the consideration of those who cannot be classed within the 
category of whites, but who have found their way into our midst … We find on our 
hands this not inconsiderable number of aliens who have found admission to these 
States … There have been determinations which hereafter may have important 
consequences arising out of our administration, as well as other measures submitted 
to Parliament, all having in view the accomplishment of the same end. That end, put 
in plain and unequivocal terms, as the House and the country are entitled to have it 
put, means the prohibition of all alien coloured immigration, and more, it means at 
the earliest time, by reasonable and just means, the deportation or reduction of the 
number of aliens now in our midst. The two things go hand in hand, and are the 
necessary complement of a single policy—the policy of securing a ‗white 
Australia‘.24 
The two things that Deakin identified as going hand in hand, as a ‗necessary 
complement of a single policy‘, were the repatriation of existing coloured labour 
currently domiciled in Australia, under the Pacific Islanders Labourers Act, and the 
prevention of any non-whites from settling in Australian in the future, via the 
Immigration Restriction Act.  
When speaking to the Immigration Restriction Bill on 26 of September 1901, the 
merchant and Independent Member for Capricornia, Alexander Paterson, presented a 
                                                 
23. Edmund Barton, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
26 September 1901, p. 5233. 
24. Alfred Deakin, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
12 September 1901, pp. 4805–4806. 
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personal narrative which attests to the way in which the perception of the economic 
threat posed by coloured labour was expressed in racialised and racist terms.  
The first time the magnitude of this Asiatic pestilence really arrested my attention 
was under the following circumstances:—I had been making a little unostentatious 
tour through a central section of Queensland, and when I arrived home I found, 
standing at the back gate of my house, a vegetable cart owned by a Chinaman and 
driven by a Chinaman. There was trouble in the domestic establishment that day. I 
said, ‗Why is this? I shall lose my election if this sort of thing goes on. I shall go 
down to the grave unwept, unhonoured, and unsung, instead of speaking in the halls 
of Parliament. This must be altered.‘ The reply which was made to me was this: ‗It is 
all very well for you to talk in that strain, but we live 6 miles from town, and how on 
earth we are to get vegetables from anyone excepting a Chinaman I cannot tell.‘ I 
said—‘While the world standeth I shall eat no soup made from vegetables grown by 
Chinamen, you must get vegetables grown by Europeans.‘ The result was that the 
custom of the establishment was transferred to a German, with which arrangement I 
was perfectly satisfied. But I may tell honourable members that it broke me all up 
when I afterwards found that the German bought his vegetables from a Chinaman. 
While this question has its humorous side, it also has a very painful aspect. How is it 
that we ever allowed Chinamen to interfere so much with our trade as to put them in 
the position of being able to dictate to us? … I look on the [education or dictation] 
test as a moral anaesthetic. We have to pull a tooth out of the wolf that would destroy 
us, and we want to do it painlessly if possible; and the educational test gives us an 
excellent means.
25
 
Determined not to eat soup made with vegetables grown by a Chinaman, Alexander 
Paterson transferred the custom of his establishment from a Chinaman to a German 
only to find that the German he so recently engaged, had himself purchased his 
vegetables from a Chinaman. The self-deprecating humour that was attached to 
Paterson‘s frustrated domestic intervention was quickly replaced by a genuine sense of 
dread or moral panic. Upon arriving at the ‗painful aspect‘ of the story, Paterson shifted 
from the comical to the cautionary to the Sinophobic. In suggesting that it had become 
near impossible for any well-intentioned European to avoid any commercial dealings 
with a Chinaman, Paterson drew upon this personal narrative to advocate for legislative 
change. He concluded his address by offering his unequivocal support for the Bill, 
explaining that he ‗is just as anxious for a ―snowflake‖ Australia as anyone else in the 
House‘. In commending the Bill to the House, he explained that he approaches the 
question of the Immigration Restriction Bill ‗without any feeling of party spirit‘ and 
that he would vote with the Government in order to stop this ‗objectionable alien 
                                                 
25. Alexander Paterson, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
26 September 1901, pp. 5273–5274. Scottish-born Paterson was narrowly elected with 
51% of the vote.  
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traffic‘. He therefore endorsed the ‗moral anaesthetic‘ that was the education or 
dictation test.
26
 
While motivated as much by pride and ambition, as by any perception of public good, 
Paterson drew upon the two major rationales for immigration restriction: those related 
to protecting white labour and those related to protecting the ethnic (and moral) purity 
of the nation. Paterson argued that the ‗objectionable races‘ had begun to control the 
agricultural sector of regional Australia. The regional sector to which he was referring 
was his federal seat of Capricornia. Capricornia, whose very name acts as a reminder of 
Australia‘s geographic proximity to Southeast Asia, was settled later than many of the 
southern and costal regions of Australia, and as such, was home to large numbers of 
indigenous and non-indigenous people-of-colour; a racial frontier upon which the 
struggle for racial purity and ethnic unity was most evident.  
Paterson‘s comments about his seat intersect with two issues which dominated 
parliamentary debate about labour conditions in Queensland: the question of whether 
white men could acclimatise in the tropics, without degeneration, and the practice of 
‗blackbirding‘—recruiting and exploiting cheap non-white ‗Kanaka‘ or Pacific Islander 
labour. Many considered the tropics a poor habitat for white men. Senator Sir Josiah 
Symon claimed, for example: ‗Providence never meant tropical countries to be peopled 
by the Anglo-Saxon race‘.27 With regard to the practice of blackbirding, Senator 
George Pearce suggested that the coloured man‘s domination of the labour market in 
northern Queensland resulted in no continuity of employment for the white man who 
often found himself itinerant and a mere supplement to coloured labour during peak 
periods.
28
 
Paterson‘s speech suggests that he was an early advocate of what would emerge as a 
‗Buy White‘ campaign, through which Anglo traders urged Australians to refrain from 
purchasing the product of coloured labour. The corollary of this was that buying white 
would help keep Australia white.  
                                                 
26. Paterson uses the expressions: ‗objectionable races‘ and ‗objectionable alien traffic‘, 
House of Representatives, Debates, 26 September 1901, p. 5274.  
27. Senator Josiah Symon, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, Senate, Debates, 27 November 
1901, p. 7988. 
28. Senator George Pearce, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, Senate, Debates, 26 November 
1901, p. 7830. 
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3. White Australian Pineapples, M. Finucan Bros., Brisbane, 191029 
Beyond what it says about federation anxieties concerning matters of trade—or for the 
insights it offers about our first parliamentarians eschewing contact with the Chinese—
the extract is of interest for the way it employs a dental or medical metaphor. 
Metonymically, this is exemplified by the figure of the impacted or toxic tooth. By 
extension, parliamentarians are the practitioners, or in this instance the extractors, who 
have the power and moral authority to inoculate the new nation against this singularly 
sly and predatory Chinese ‗pestilence‘. Echoing the comments by Deakin about the 
deportation of coloured aliens, Paterson‘s uneasy central metaphor is also suggestive of 
not simply restriction but extraction—the removal of Chinese from Australia. The 
range of imagery also exposes Paterson‘s overarching anxiety about disease or 
contamination. The general fear of contact with the Chinaman unifies Paterson‘s 
various anxieties: the presence of coloured labour, the capacity of the Chinese to embed 
themselves as local traders throughout Central Queensland and the moral (if not 
physical) contamination that may occur from eating soup made from Chinese-grown 
vegetables. Together these fears coalesce around the notion of moral degradation and 
the fear of the dilution or devolution of the white nation-self.  
                                                 
29. White Australian Pineapples appears on the Migration Heritage Centre website and the 
Making Multicultural Australia for the 21st Century website. It is also available at the 
National Museum of Australia. Mimmo Cozzolino and Fysh Rutherford‘s Symbols of 
Australia (Penguin, Melbourne, 1980) includes a range of early nineteenth century 
advertisements which champion white Australia and promote products which are deemed 
to help whiten the nation. 
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Fear of Degeneration and the Dilution of Whiteness 
The late nineteenth century concept of race was powerful and pervasive and resulted in 
actively discriminatory social practices. Popular understandings about the hierarchy of 
the races borrowed heavily from evolutionary models. Whites were placed at the apex 
of the racial hierarchy (while ties to Britain offered a heightened sense of racial and 
imperial legitimacy). ‗Asiatics‘ were clearly inferior to whites, Pacific islanders were 
inferior to Asiatics and indigenous Australians were considered little more than a dying 
breed—an example of predestined extinction. Unease about maintaining racial purity 
resulted in anxieties about the degradation of the white type as the fear of biological, 
cultural, social and political degeneracy manifest in a myriad of parliamentary 
statements about miscegenation, contamination and contagion. Within this culture of 
whiteness, the Chinese became the most obvious and identifiable ‗other‘. This had 
parallel effects: while the Chinese were identified as an impediment to realising the 
cultural ideal of whiteness, the creation of ‗Chineseness‘ also helped to stabilise 
whiteness as a privileged racial, social and moral category.  
Throughout the nineteenth century a series of socio-biological/medical theories were 
assembled to legitimise white power: phrenology, social Darwinism or social 
evolutionism, and eugenics. The science of phrenology (in which the physiology of the 
brain and the study of the cranium enabled the indexation of human or racial 
development) was replaced by the logic of social Darwinism (in which Charles 
Darwin‘s theories of evolutionary biology were attached to the social and racial realm), 
which in turn was replaced by the ideology used to promote the advancement of 
whites—eugenics (the deliberate interfering with human breeding in the hope of halting 
or reversing biological or racial degeneration).  
The degree to which federation politicians drew upon these social and scientific 
theories of human difference, these forms of scientific racism, is open to debate. While 
it is true that only some supporters of the Immigration Restriction Bill made explicit 
reference to these bio-medical theories, or to popular racial theorists, such theories were 
critical to informing many nineteenth century assumptions about race and provided a 
framework which was employed to justify attitudes about non-European immigrants.
30
 
                                                 
30. Popular racial theorists of the time included: Arthur de Gobineau, Herbert Spencer and 
Francis Galton. Often described as the sire of modern racism, Frenchman de Gobineau 
provided a ‗scientific‘ rationale for white supremacy. In The Inequality of the Human 
Races (1853) he identifies physiological or phrenological differences between ‗white‘, 
‗black‘ and ‗yellow‘, arguing that if the races were not kept separate miscegenation 
would result in social chaos. The founder of social Darwinism, Herbert Spencer believed 
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Certainly, that Barton quoted from Charles Pearson reminds us that parliamentarians 
did not exist in an ideological or critical vacuum but rather that they were informed by 
contemporary debates about race. Charles Pearson distinguished between the 
‗evanescent‘ races (the Australian Aborigine, the Kanakas and the American Indians) 
who he claimed would disappear and the ‗lower‘ races who were beyond extinction (the 
Chinese, the Hindu and the Negro).
31
 Such a claim is further supported by the fact that 
Protectionist Samuel Mauger quotes from the English racial theorist, Karl Pearson, and 
his National Life from the Standpoint of Science (1900), invoking social Darwinism and 
evolutionary theory, in an attempt to demonstrate the danger of the ‗Kanaka‘: 
If you bring the white man into contact with the black you too often suspend the very 
process of natural selection on which the evolution of the higher type depends. You 
get superior and inferior races living on the same soil and that co-existence is 
demoralising to both. They naturally sink into the position of master and servant, if 
not admittedly into that of slave-owner and slave.
32
  
Free Trader, and ardent advocate of the prohibition of coloured immigration, Senator 
Staniforth Smith similarly argued that exclusion was necessary on scientific and 
ethnological grounds:  
All anthropologists agree that the Caucasian races cannot mingle with the Mongolian, 
the Hindoo, or the negro. Nott says—‘The mulattos are the shortest lived of any of 
the Branch races, and are very unprolific.‘ Warren tells us that—‘The half-cast of 
India comes to a premature end without reproduction, and if there are any offspring 
they are always wretched and miserable.‘33  
                                                                                                                                              
that the evolution of races takes place through natural selection. It was Spencer, rather 
than Charles Darwin, who coined the phrase ‗the survival of the fittest‘. Founder of the 
British eugenics movement, Francis Galton was committed to improving the collective 
human condition through ‗breeding-up‘ and is remembered for establishing 
anthropometric or biometric laboratories across Britain. Australia was represented at the 
First International Eugenics conference in London in 1912 by South Australian politician 
and medical practitioner, Sir John Cockburn, National Archives of Australia, 
‗International Eugenic Congress‘, A11804, 1912/209. 
31. For a fuller description of Pearson‘s perspectives on racial character see David Walker, 
Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850–1939, University of Queensland 
Press, St Lucia, pp. 44–47. 
32. Samuel Mauger, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
15 November 1901, p. 6823. 
33. Senator Staniforth Smith, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, Senate, Debates, 14 November 
1901, p. 7246. 
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Senator Smith proceeded, ‗We know from the teachings of science‘ that the ‗Chinese 
and other coloured races cannot mix with us‘. Notions of evolution and progress were 
also carried over to the political domain and used to support the ability of different 
races to participate in democracy. In fact, the evolution or whitening of Australia 
symbolised the transformation of the colonial settler society into a nation. 
Correspondingly, the marginalisation and objectification of the Chinese became an 
expression of Australia‘s national modernity. 
Victorian racial anxieties, combined with a fin-de-siecle optimism, prompted some 
parliamentarians to speak like social and racial engineers, each with an image of the 
future which held at its centre the ideal of whiteness. The debate that took place 
between August and December 1901 was peppered with comments about racial 
admixture and the commingling of blood. Free Trader, Sir William McMillan, spoke of 
the dangers inherent in allowing for ‗alien or servile races‘ to mix or ‗interfuse‘ among 
themselves and among the Australian people
34
. Leader of the Opposition and future 
prime minister, Free Trader George Reid, suggested that there was unanimity that ‗the 
current of Australian blood shall not assume the darker hues‘35, while the soup-eating 
Alexander Paterson claimed, ‗the Bill before us … deals with the protection of blood‘.36 
Member for Bland, Chris Watson, imagined the national challenge in terms of 
maintaining blood purity and resisting contamination: 
… the objection I have to the mixing of these coloured people with the white people 
of Australia … lies in the main with the possibility and probability of racial 
contamination … The question is whether we would desire that our sisters or our 
brothers should be married into any of these races to which we object. If these people 
are not such as we can meet upon an equality, and not such that we can feel that it is 
no disgrace to intermarry with, and not such as we can expect to give us an infusion 
of blood that will tend to the raising of our standard of life, and to the improvement of 
the race, we should be foolish in the extreme if we did not exhaust every means of 
preventing them from coming to this land, which we have made our own. The racial 
                                                 
34. Born in England, Sir William McMillan was the Member for Wentworth representing the 
Free Trade Party, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
6 September 1901, p. 4626.  
35. George Reid, (Free Trade Member for East Sydney), ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, 
House of Representatives, Debates, 25 September 1901, p. 5168. Here he also speaks of 
‗highly civilised nations—who share our blood‘ …  
36. Alexander Paterson, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
26 September 1901, p. 5275. 
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aspect of the question, in my opinion, is the larger and more important one; but the 
industrial aspect also has to be considered.
37
  
Samuel Mauger, Member for Melbourne Ports and the author of A White Man’s World 
(Melbourne 1901), was obsessed by the possibility of contamination. Here he issued a 
warning about the struggle to protect bloodlines and propagate whiteness in 
Queensland: 
When I visited the northern part of Queensland recently, I was alarmed not only at the 
great number of aliens who are making inroads in all trades, but who are 
intermingling with the European races there. One only has to visit the public schools 
to see that the very contamination and deterioration that my honourable friend speaks 
of is actually taking place in Queensland to an alarming extent … We have 
something like 800,000,000 Chinese and Japanese, within easy distance of Australia, 
from whom we have to fear contamination.
38
    
Associated with this notion of contamination was the prospect of an Asiatic invasion. 
Within the context of the debate, invasion most often referred to uncontrolled 
settlement of Asians or the domination of the Chinese in local trading and agricultural 
sectors, rather than any planned military offensive.
39
 
Such concerns over blood contamination manifest in an anxiety about miscegenation 
and the possibility of a multiracial or mixed-race future. Labour‘s Member for 
Kennedy, Charles McDonald, imagined the prospect of a region he ineloquently 
identifies as—Mongrelia. Echoing Herbert Spencer, McDonald suggested that the 
‗former‘ white man has become piebald: 
Through the promiscuous intercourse with aboriginal women, a hybrid race is being 
established in that fair corner of the continent, such as the world has never before 
witnessed. To describe some of the children to be seen in the Broome district would 
utterly puzzle the cleverest ethnologist. The Malay, Japanese, Philipino have crossed 
with blacks. The union of former white men [emphasis added] and aboriginal 
women have produced half-castes, who in turn have bred from Chinese, Malays and 
Manillamen. Half-castes may have crossed with Quadroons, or Octoroons, and so the 
mixing up of the nationalities and hybrids continues until ‗Mongrelia‘ is literally the 
                                                 
37. Chris Watson, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
6 September 1901, p. 4633.  
38. Samuel Mauger, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
6 September 1901, p. 4631. 
39. See, for example, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
6 September 1901, p. 4631; 12 September 1901, p. 4804; 26 September 1901, p. 5239. 
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name that should be applied to the region. This rising generation inherits all the vices 
and physical infirmities of the Eastern coolie, who at best is a low type of humanity.
40
 
McDonald‘s comments reveal the way in which the anxiety attached to attempting to 
control sexual relations between Aboriginal women and members of other ethnic 
groups was related to a fear of racial devolution. McDonald‘s account of the 
degradation of the white man in Broome or ‗Mongrelia‘, which is buttressed by 
contagionist notions of social pathology, provides a chilling example of the way in 
which miscegenation was considered to result in the contamination, the deterioration, 
the dilution and ultimately the death of whiteness.
41
 McDonald‘s comments offer an 
example of how, to borrow his racist nomenclature, the Half-caste, the Quadroon and 
the Octoroon become feared and despised because they destabilise fixed racial identity. 
 
4. Livingstone Hopkins, ‗Piebald Possibilities—a little Australian Christmas family party of the 
future‘, Bulletin, 13 December 1902. Interracial sexuality is considered to threaten the borders 
of white identity and mix-raced people become the embodiment of that threat. Ironically, many 
speakers to the debate fail to comprehend the way the objectification and marginalisation of 
non-white people resulted in forcing them together.  
                                                 
40. Charles McDonald reading an extract from the Melbourne Age, 16 August 1899, 
‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 1 October 1901, 
p. 5379. In 1892 Herbert Spencer claimed, ‗It is not at the root a question of social 
philosophy; it is at root a question of biology. There is abundant proof alike furnished by 
the intermarriages of human races and the interbreeding of animals, that when varieties 
mingle, diverge beyond a certain slight degree, the result is inevitably a bad one in the 
long run‘. As quoted in Richard Hall, Black Armband Days: Truth from the Dark Side of 
Australia’s Past, Vintage, Milsons Point, 1988, p. 120. 
41. The Protectionist Member for Darling Downs, Littleton Ernest Groom, compares the 
coloured races to rapidly multiplying pests like rabbits and prickly pear. L. E. Groom, 
‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 25 September 1901, 
p. 5173. 
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The Member for Maranoa, James Page, quoting from an unidentified newspaper 
claimed that an irreversible racial contamination had taken place in Townsville. In so 
doing, he introduced the brutal metaphor of bleaching:  
Mr. Mauger went into the Cathedral in Townsville on a Sunday, and met 13 half-
castes and no others. The first man the speculator met in Townsville was a Chinese, 
the second was a Chinese. ‗I went a little further,‘ he said, ‗and met a kanaka, then 
three yellowy-brown children passed me at a trot. Then came a Jap, with a black wife, 
and two children of a dirty drab colour. An aboriginal was standing at the next corner 
begging, and a half-caste Chinese girl gave him a penny. I had counted sixteen 
different complexions within the space of three blocks. At the hotel there were white 
people of course, and we talked the matter over. To one man I ventured to express the 
opinion that we would have a white Australia in twelve months. ‗May-be you‘ll have 
it white enough down south‘ he said, ‗but it‘ll take a thousand years to bleach 
Townsville.‘42   
Bleaching is of course suggestive of removing or striping away colour—or even ethnic 
cleansing. Attendant to the idea of bleaching is the eugenicist imperative of ‗breeding-
up‘, halting or reversing degeneration through the inter-generational introduction of 
whiteness and the dilution and elimination of colour. It is here that we perceive the 
merging of the project of Federation governance and Victorian racial theory as we 
observe the way the debate was framed around notions of social evolutionary 
progression and the eugenicists imperative to halt or reverse degeneration.  
Page‘s apocalyptic vision was accompanied by other alchemistic metaphors. Sounding 
like a concerned apothecary, Labour Senator for Queensland, James Stewart warned: 
With regard to race, we cannot mix with them. There is no natural affinity between 
them and us. If an attempt were made to confine them and us within one bottle, so to 
speak, one or the other must be precipitated to the bottom. A compact and 
homogeneous community cannot be formed out of such heterogeneous compounds.
43
  
                                                 
42. James Page, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
1 October 1901, p. 5378. 
43. James Stewart, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, Senate, Debates, 15 November 1901, 
p. 7331. 
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5. Parsons‘ Starch: A White Australian—Parson Bros. & Co Pty Ltd, Sydney, 190344 
Matters of race and colour had become embedded in the national consciousness and 
were indispensable to the formation of a modern Australian identity. Whiteness became 
a bio-medical, legislative, commercial and even a popular cultural category. Here are 
examples of two agents of whiteness that emerged in the post-Federation period—each 
aspiring to the national ideal. In the first instance we observe the conflation of 
discourses of hygiene (cleanliness) and race in the commercial sphere, as the gendered 
female subject becomes critical to this process of whitening. In the second we find a 
‗game‘ through which ‗white men‘ seek to remove ‗coloured men‘ from Australia. The 
whitening of Australia became performed and embodied in recreational activity as 
players attempted to ‗Get the Coloured Men Out and the White Men In‘. These 
examples testify to the formation and production of white subjectivity through 
commercial and recreational form.  
                                                 
44. Parsons’ Starch: A White Australian is available at the Macquarie University Australian 
History Museum. It also appears in Mimmo Cozzolino and Fysh Rutherford‘s Symbols of 
Australia. 
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6. The White Australia Game 1914, National Archives of Australia: A 1336, 3368 (Author: 
Francis James Shaw) 
Alternative Voices  
While the deliberately discriminatory policy had near unanimous parliamentary 
support, there were parliamentarians who dissented from the majority position. Two 
Members of the House of Representatives expressed strong opposition to the 
Immigration Restriction Bill: the Member for Parkes, Arthur Bruce Smith of the Free 
Trade Party, and the Member for Tasmania, Donald Cameron, also of the Free Trade 
Party. Bruce Smith opened his address to the Parliament with the following caveat: ‗I 
am very much afraid that the remarks I intend to make will seem exceedingly heterodox 
after the very continuous flow of advocacy for a white Australia … [and the] 
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determination to keep Australia white and pure …‘45 In identifying some of the ‗glib 
phrases‘ that have been used throughout the debate—‘white and pure‘, ‗The equality of 
man‘ (as used by Edmund Barton), ‗too beastly virtuous‘—Smith suggested that ‗the 
legislation is founded upon hysteria‘,46 before offering the following assessment of the 
debate: 
The public have been told over and over again that the purity and whiteness of the 
Australian Commonwealth is being endangered by the incursion of these hordes of 
Asiatics. I say that it is a fable; that it is altogether a fairy story.
47
  
However, while Smith favoured the admission of ‗educated aliens‘ he certainly did not 
wish to see Australia populated by uneducated coloured labour.  
Donald Cameron offered historical context for his rationale of ‗fair play‘: 
I say without fear of contradiction that no race on the face of this earth has been 
treated in a more shameful manner than have the Chinese. They are about the most 
conservative race in the world, and up to late years they had no desire whatever for 
any intercourse with what they called the outer barbarians, but they were forced at the 
point of the bayonet to admit Englishmen and other Europeans into China. Now if we 
compel them to admit our people into their land, why in the name of justice should 
we refuse to receive them here? … Therefore I say most empathetically that we are 
responsible to a certain extent for forcing an entrance into China, and that we should, 
in a spirit of fair play, allow the Chinese to come into Australia in reasonable 
numbers.
48
  
Cameron was correct to point out that the Chinese passage to Australia had been 
facilitated by the European occupation of China. Once Chinese ports fell under the 
control of various European powers, as a result of the Opium Wars (1839–42, 1856–
60), more Chinese would leave China‘s shores than ever before. It is also worth noting 
that in the months prior to Federation, the states of New South Wales, Victoria and 
South Australia had supplied personnel to support the British and European nations to 
suppress the Boxer rebellion—an anti-imperial uprising in China. 
                                                 
45. Bruce Smith, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
25 September 1901, p. 5153. 
46. Bruce Smith, op. cit., pp. 5153, 5154, and 5158. 
47. Bruce Smith, op. cit., p. 5160. 
48. Donald Cameron, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
12 September 1901, p. 4839. 
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Dictation Test  
Under the Immigration Restriction Bill, the mechanism intended to restrict immigration 
of undesirable persons was the dictation test. The test was to be administered by 
Customs officers at ports across Australia. While some parliamentarians favoured a test 
in the English language, including Prime Minister Barton, the British were concerned 
that such a test would offend non-English speaking British subjects. Others in the 
House argued that such a test would also offend non-English speaking Europeans and 
affect the small emigration from Europe.
49
 Advocates of absolute exclusion opposed an 
education or dictation test. One of the most strident critics of the test, George Reid, 
spoke repeatedly about the hypocrisy of a test which permitted a Customs officer to 
apply a test, in any European language, to any immigrant he considers undesirable or 
distasteful. Reid claimed, ‗It is bad enough even for some of us to have to write our 
own language from dictation, but if we were asked to put into French on the spur of the 
moment some English read by a Customs officer, I think we should all have to be 
expatriated.‘50 Reid would later describe it as ‗a test which will reflect ignominy and 
discredit upon Australian legislation‘.51 Giving consideration to Britain‘s multi-racial 
Empire, British Colonial Secretary Chamberlain recommended that Australia adopt the 
type of European language test that was in operation in the British colony of Natal. 
While there was intense debate over whether the test should be applied in English, and 
only in English, or in a variety of European languages, in order to appease the British, 
the Parliament adopted a similar Natal-type test that had been previously used in 
Western Australia, New South Wales and Tasmania. 
Labour called for absolute exclusion and Chris Watson moved an (ultimately 
unsuccessful) amendment which sought the exclusion of ‗any person who is an 
Aboriginal native of Asia, Africa or the islands thereof‘. Watson‘s opposition to the test 
was based on the belief that the more educated an Oriental the greater threat he became:  
With the Oriental, as a rule, the more he is educated the worse man he is likely to be 
from our point of view. The more educated, the more cunning he becomes, and the 
more able, with his peculiar ideas of social and business morality, to cope with the 
                                                 
49. See, for example, Senator James Stewart, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, Senate, 
Debates, 15 November 1901, pp. 7331–7332.  
50. George Reid, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
25 September 1901, p. 5168. 
51. George Reid, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
9 October 1901, p. 5812.  
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people here. I do not think there is any advantage in restricting the admission of 
coloured people to those who are educated; and, in any case, I contend that the 
number which will filter through under the Government‘s proposal will still be 
sufficiently large to constitute a great menace to the well-being of the people as a 
whole.
52
  
This sentiment was echoed by King O‘Malley who claimed the educated Chinaman 
‗the very worst man we can have in the community‘.53 
While the test could theoretically be given to any person arriving in Australia, in 
practice it was administered selectively and applied to those deemed ‗unwanted or 
undesirable‘: the ‗idiot or insane person‘, the ill, the criminal, the deviant and the 
coloured. The test was, of course, a ruse and various Australian governments employed 
it to conceal their real motivation for excluding ‗coloured undesirables‘ who inevitably 
failed a test which could be delivered in any number of European languages. Section 
3(a) of the Immigration Restriction Act reads: 
Any person who when asked to do so by an officer fails to write out and sign in the 
presence of the officer a passage of fifty words in length in a European language 
directed by the officer.  
The test would be no less than fifty words, and the passage chosen could often be 
difficult and obscure, so that even if the test was given in English, a person was likely 
to fail. An example of a test given in Western Australia on 1 May 1908 reveals how 
arcane, elliptical and impenetrable the test could be:  
Very many considerations lead to the conclusion that life began on sea, first as single 
cells, then as groups of cells held together by a secretion of mucilage, then as filament 
and tissues. For a very long time low-grade marine organisms are simply hollow 
cylinders, through which salt water streams.
54
 
Natural phenomena, business affairs, design of sea craft, book-keeping practices and 
animal behaviours were popular sources for content. Here is an example from August 
1926: 
                                                 
52. Chris Watson, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
6 September 1901, p. 4636. 
53. King O‘Malley, ‗Immigration Restriction Bill‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
6 September 1901, p. 4639.  
54. Myra Willard, History of the White Australia Policy, Melbourne University Press, 
Melbourne, 1923, p. 126.  
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The butcher bird is known to all. He is a robber and the chief of feathered ruffians. He 
usually has a stronghold in the glade in the bush, which for him is home during at 
least two or three months of the year, whence he sallies forth over the surrounding 
country plundering and pillaging.
55
  
The Dictation Test was administered 805 times in 1902–03 with 46 candidates passing 
the test and 554 times in 1904–09 with only six people successful. After 1909 no 
person passed the dictation test.
56
 While the numbers of those who sat the test is 
relatively low, the test clearly had a deterrent effect. Applicants became fewer as the 
nature of the test became more widely known. Its mere existence kept uneducated 
classes from attempting it. The test was ultimately abolished by the Commonwealth 
Migration Act 1958.
57
  
Chinese residents who wished to travel abroad could gain exemption from the test by 
applying for a Certificate of Domicile. This Certificate was required to ensure that a 
shipping company would give passage to a Chinese returning to Australia. The Act 
reads:  
Anyone who is domiciled in the Commonwealth, and is leaving the Commonwealth 
temporarily, and who desires on his return to be excepted from the Act under 
                                                 
55. National Archives of Australia, Test Passages: Immigration Act 1901–33, A1, 1935/704. 
56. Making Multicultural Australia for the 21st Century, 
 http://www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/hotwords/hottext.php?id=78 (accessed 25 May 
2007). 
57. Comparisons have recently been made between the dictation test and today‘s Australian 
Citizenship Test. However, the two tests have different objectives: the dictation test was 
employed to limit the entry of non-Europeans into Australia, whereas the Citizenship 
Test seeks to achieve civic integration through testing an individuals English language 
skills and understanding of Australian ‗values‘. Nevertheless, in spite of this distinction 
there is at least a perception of a historical link. The Report of the Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs into Citizenship Testing claims: ‗This test 
might also suffer from historical perceptions of previous practice in immigration during 
the ―White Australia‖ era‘, (Australian Citizenship Amendment (Citizenship Testing) Act 
2007 [Provisions], p. 14). The Dissenting Report of the Australian Greens also identifies 
this historical parallel suggesting that the people of Australia ‗have had to stand up for a 
vision of Australia based on openness and generosity—not one based on fear and a 
closed door‘ (Australian Citizenship Amendment (Citizenship Testing) Act 2007 
[Provisions], p. 61). The effect of the two pieces of legislation might also be dissimilar. 
For while the Immigration Restriction Act was successful policy in its (albeit brutal) 
capacity to restrict coloured immigration, the intended citizenship test is unlikely to 
become an effective instrument for instilling Australian ‗values‘. 
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paragraph (a), subsection 3 thereof (that is the test), may apply to the Collector of 
Customs at the port of departure for a certificate of domicile.  
After Federation these certificates were only given to Chinese who owned property in 
Australia and while the issue of certificates allowing for readmission increased after 
1903, as A. T. Yarwood suggests, every encouragement was given to the Chinese to 
visit China ‗in the hope that they would be tempted to remain‘.58  
In the fifty years following the introduction of the Immigration Restriction Act the 
numbers of Chinese living in Australia reduced substantially, from 32,700 in 1901 to 
12,100 in 1947.
59
 
Conclusion  
Federation was a moment of self-determination which presented the new nation with a 
unique opportunity to reflect upon matters of identity, citizenship and nationhood. In its 
attempt to construct the ‗statutory armour‘ that would keep the nation white, the first 
Parliament of Australia drew upon this opportunity—this moment of sovereignty—to 
construct deliberately discriminatory and racially exclusive legislation. As the White 
Australia Game of 1914 suggests, the Immigration Restriction Act announced that it 
was now time to—‘Get the Coloured Men Out and the White Men In‘. Yet, for a white 
nation on the edge of Asia, surrounded by seas of yellow (as depicted in the White 
Australia Game), the challenge of building a snowy white Australia had only just 
begun. 
In the observations of the Federation celebrations that were reported in the Argus on 
8 May 1901, we find that the public image of the Chinese became transfigured by their 
participation in the Federation parade. For the duration of the parade citizens, who were 
typically separated by race and class, were able to partake in new kinds of social 
interaction. This enabled the Chinese to escape from the racist objectifications that 
often shadowed them, allowing them to demonstrate a different type of civic identity—
an identity which challenged the way they were represented in the nationalist press and 
in the parliamentary debate. Indeed, with a people brimful with optimism, and guided 
by nationalist idealism, such a moment hinted at the possibility of a more tolerant, more 
inclusive—even multi-racial—national future. 
                                                 
58. A. T. Yarwood and M. J. Knowing, Race Relations in Australia: A History, Methuen, 
Sydney, 1982, p. 238. 
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7. Wong Ah See‘s Certificate of Domicile, National Archives of Australia (Queensland): 
J2482, 1903/163. Certificates of Domicile included the recipient‘s biographical data (physical 
description, dates of arrival and departure and names and addresses of references in Australia), 
a left hand impression, and a photograph of the full face and profile. Certificates of Domicile 
were issued by the Collector of Customs in each State or port of departure and hand prints were 
used by Customs officials to identify Chinese residents of Australia returning from overseas.  
A native of Canton, Wong Ah See had lived in Townsville since 1895. Wong was an unmarried 
gardener who owned a 1/3 share in a garden at Mundingburra, valued at £150. Wong departed 
Australia on the Taiyuan for Hong Kong on 23 November 1903. 
The passivity of the regulated non-citizen contrasts the energy exhibited by the Chinese during 
the Federation celebrations. Certificates of Domicile testify to the elaborate system of 
registration, compliance and surveillance that shadowed the Chinese in the post-Federation 
period. 
                                                                                                                                              
59. 1911: 25,800; 1921: 20,800; 1933: 14,000; see Arthur Huck, The Chinese in Australia, 
Melbourne, Longmans, 1968, p. 5. 
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8. Choy Yee‘s Certificate of Exemption from the Dictation Test, National Archives of Australia 
(Sydney): ST84/1, 1918/246/91. In the decade after Federation the legislation was amended to 
contain provisions to admit particular categories of desirable coloured labour to Australia on a 
non-permanent basis. A native of Canton, Choy Yee departed Sydney for China on the 
Changsha on 31 December 1918; he was temporally exempted from the dictation test providing 
he returned to Australia within three years. 
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Chapter Two: Facing Asia: Changing Parliamentary 
Attitudes towards China 1934–1989 
In the previous chapter it was observed how Australia‘s Federation identity was 
considered to be indivisibly British; Australia was imagined as a permanent and 
prosperous home for a white race and a nation which would benefit from the best of 
British culture and tradition. Australia‘s physical distance from Britain, and 
corresponding contiguity with Asia, gave added impetus to this identification. 
Federation parliamentarians considered Australia to have little in common with Asia 
and believed that Australia‘s future prosperity would be realised through its bond to 
Europe and not through its proximity to Asia. By contrast, this chapter documents the 
critical role that China played in transforming parliamentary attitudes towards Asia 
throughout the twentieth century. It begins by examining an important precursor to 
regional engagement: Australia‘s first diplomatic mission to Asia—the Australian 
Eastern Mission of 1934. An analysis of this landmark event is followed by a critique 
of parliamentary responses to the changes that occurred across Asia in the post-war 
years. The chapter then concludes by examining the development of the Australia–
China relationship in the post-recognition years (1972–1989). In examining these three 
distinct periods, the chapter reveals how a self-conscious nation, which was primarily 
committed to pursuing British imperial interests, developed into a nation capable of 
making an independent assessment of its economic and strategic interests. The chapter 
will tell the story of how a nation, having once turned its back on Asia and its people, 
emerged to consider Asia critical to its future. 
The Australian Eastern Mission 1934 
In Australian Foreign Relations: Contemporary Perspectives (1998) Derek McDougall 
suggests that in the post-Federation period Australia had little control over its 
international affairs: 
‗Australia‘ as a political entity came into existence in 1901 following the enactment 
of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act by the British Parliament in 1900. 
Although Section 51 (xxix) of the Constitution gave the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth power over ‗External affairs‘, this meant essentially relations 
between Australia and the United Kingdom. Foreign policy remained under the 
control of Britain since it was Britain that acted on behalf of the British Empire, and 
Australia was a self-governing country within the British Empire. When Australia 
had foreign policy concerns these were normally expressed by bringing the matter to 
the attention of the government in London … As far as Australia‘s independent status 
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was concerned, the passage of the Statute of Westminster by the British Parliament in 
1931 was in effect a proclamation of Dominion independence, but Australia was slow 
to take advantage of the new situation. The Australian Parliament only ratified the 
Statute of Westminster in 1942, and then largely for technical reasons to do with 
wartime conditions, rather than as an ‗act of independence.1  
The fact that Australia did not choose to exercise its right to Dominion independence 
until 1942 might suggest that Australian policy makers were largely satisfied with the 
arrangements under which its international affairs were managed. Australian interests 
were largely considered an extension of British interests and it seemed unnecessary for 
Australia to duplicate the administrative structures required to manage its own 
international relations. However here, in examining the activities of the Australian 
Eastern Mission of 1934, this chapter argues that Australia was more proactive in its 
foreign relations than this line of argument would suggest. The Australian Eastern 
Mission marked a turning point in the history of Australia‘s external relations where a 
more self-confident and assertive nation began to distinguish Australian from British 
interests.
2
  
During April–May 1934, the Deputy Prime Minister, Attorney-General and Minister 
for External Affairs, J. G. Latham, led Australia‘s first mission of a diplomatic 
character to foreign countries. Latham travelled to seven countries/colonial territories 
including: the Dutch East Indies, Singapore and Malaya, French Indochina, Hong 
Kong, China, Japan and the Philippines.
3
 The declared purpose of the Mission was to 
develop ‗friendly relations‘ with the region. Because Australia did not have diplomatic 
representation in Southeast Asia, the Mission was undertaken with the assistance and 
support of British diplomatic officials.
4
 Latham travelled with an Advisor from the 
                                                 
1. Derek McDougall, Australian Foreign Relations: Contemporary Perspectives, Longman, 
Melbourne 1998, p. 20. 
2. Prime Minister Stanley Bruce appointed R. G. Casey as Australia‘s first diplomat in 
1925. Casey operated as an Australian Liaison Officer within the Foreign and Colonial 
Office, acting as a point of liaison for communications between Britain and Australia. 
Casey‘s appointment did not, as such, represent the origins of an autonomous foreign 
policy. 
3. Latham spent twelve days in China visiting Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin, Peiping and 
Canton. He also spent twelve days in Japan, ten days in the Dutch East Indies, three days 
in French Indochina and two days in each Hong Kong and the Philippines. 
4. The Eastern Mission was approved by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
Shannon L. Smith claims that the British had given ‗reluctant approval‘ for the Mission, 
see David Goldsworthy (ed.), Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with 
Asia, Volume 1: 1901 to the 1970s, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 2001, p. 72. 
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Attorney-General‘s Department (Eric Lloyd), an Information Officer from the 
Department of Trade and Customs (Arthur Moore), a Secretary (Henry Standish), an 
Assistant Secretary (John Ferguson), and a Stenographer (Marjory Grosvenor). Latham 
was also accompanied by his wife and daughter.  
In reporting on the activities of the Mission to the House of Representatives on 6 July 
1934, Latham claimed that the Eastern Mission was intended as ‗a Mission of 
friendship to our neighbours‘.5 This message was reiterated in each country Latham 
visited, ‗This is not the visit of a trade delegation; it is a complimentary call for the 
purposes of demonstrating our goodwill and friendship‘.6 While the Eastern Mission 
was unique in the history of Australia‘s external relations, Latham‘s speech to the 
House could also be considered as operating as an originating point for a different type 
of Australian thinking about Asia:  
Our next nearest neighbours (after New Zealand), if one may use the phrase, are to be 
found in those countries which make up what is known as the Far East. I am glad that 
we are essentially a European community, and are not confronted with the problems 
that arise from mixed races in other parts of the world. We have adopted European 
phrases and the ideas that correspond to them. From our childhood we have been 
accustomed to read, think, and speak of the ‗Far East‘. It is the Far East to Europe, to 
the old centres of civilisation, but we must realise that it is the ‗Near East‘ to 
Australia … It is inevitable that the relations between Australia and the Near East will 
become closer and more intimate as the years pass. Therefore, it is important that we 
should endeavour to develop and improve our relations with our near neighbours, 
whose fortunes are so important to us, not only in economic matters, but also in 
relation to the vital issues of peace and war.
7
 
Latham communicates a respect for Empire or the old centres of civilisation, and 
maintains a commitment to the policies of white Australia. He also attempts to recast 
Asia as Australia‘s ‗Near East‘, a Near East which is critical to Australia‘s economic 
and strategic future. In seeking to re-situate Asia in the parliamentary imagination, he 
communicates a powerfully symbolic message—Australia needed to replace British 
geographic descriptors with terms reflecting Australian realities. Over the course of the 
Mission, Latham made dozens of speeches in which he reiterated that while Australia 
                                                 
5. J. G. Latham, ‗Australian Eastern Mission: Report‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
6 July 1934, p. 329. 
6. J. G. Latham, ‗The Australian Eastern Mission, 1934: Report of the Right Honourable 
J. G. Latham‘, Parliamentary Papers for 1932–34, Number 236, p. 26. 
7. J. G. Latham, ‗Australian Eastern Mission: Report‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
6 July 1934, p. 328. 
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was a proud member of the British Empire, Australia was also ‗a nation of the Eastern 
hemisphere‘.8 The Peiping & Tientsin Times reported: 
The declared purpose of his mission is to repair the rather curious omission so far of 
any official visit from the Commonwealth to these neighbouring countries … From 
this point of view it reflects the livelier interest taken of late by the Commonwealth in 
its external relations.
9
 
Yet for all Latham‘s declarations of friendship there is evidence to suggest that the 
Mission was as much about trade as goodwill. Along with the description of the 
activities of the Mission that were presented to Parliament, Latham produced a series of 
companion documents—secret Cabinet reports which examined the opportunities for 
expanding Australia‘s trade to Asia.10 These reports reveal that Latham had actively 
sought information about trading opportunities across Asia, entering into frequent and 
detailed discussions with prime ministers, foreign ministers, premiers and governors 
about Australia‘s trading and commercial interests, custom duties and tariffs. Latham 
also canvassed the possibility of establishing Australian trade commissioners across 
Asia. Latham‘s personal papers, held at the National Library of Australia, also reveal 
that the Mission had been motivated by two reports that had emerged as a strategic 
response to the Great Depression: Herbert Gepp‘s Report on Trade between Australia 
and the Far East (1932) and A. C. V. Melbourne‘s Report on Australian Intercourse 
with Japan and China (1932). Both reports recommended that an official economic 
mission visit China and Japan to determine the opportunities for increasing Australian 
trade to the ‗Far East‘ and both Gepp and Melbourne recommended the appointment of 
Australian trade representatives across the region.
11
  
While Australia‘s turn to Asia was motivated by economic and commercial 
imperatives, there are a number of reasons why Latham intended the Mission be 
interpreted as one of friendship and goodwill. Latham, who had clearly reflected on the 
                                                 
8. Latham made this comment during a radio broadcast in Japan, J. G. Latham, ‗The 
Australian Eastern Mission, 1934: Report of the Right Honourable J. G. Latham‘, 
Parliamentary Papers for 1932–34, Number 236, p. 26. 
9. ‗An Australian Argosy‘, Peiping & Tientsin Times, 3 May 1934, as it appears in Sir John 
Latham Papers, National Library of Australia, MS 1009, Series 58, Box 96. 
10. National Archives of Australia, A981, FAR 5 PART 16, ‗Far East. Australian Eastern 
Mission 1934‘. The secret report of the Eastern Mission, dated 30 July 1934, can also be 
found in the papers of Sir Earl Page, National Library of Australia, MS 1633. 
11. Sir John Latham Papers, National Library of Australia, MS 1009, Series 58, Box 96. 
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way his visits would be received, considered it important that matters of friendship be 
seen to precede matters of trade. Latham made this clear in his speech to the House: 
At the outset it was difficult for some to understand that any object would be served 
by sending a Mission of friendship to our neighbours. Hitherto, the general 
intercourse of Australia with these countries has been almost purely economic in 
character … The Western mind does not always realize that in the East there are 
many people who appreciate a compliment even more highly than a bargain, and who 
see a genuine significance in a sincere act of courtesy.
12
  
Beyond the diplomatic value that was attached to a goodwill Mission, Latham had 
another motivation for representing the tour in these terms. From 1932, Australia was 
bound by the imperial preferences system (later to become the Commonwealth 
preferences system). The British had established the imperial preferences system with 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa and India following the Great 
Depression, at a time when many nations had imposed protective tariffs for their 
domestic industries. Through inventing a system of preferential trade duties, signatory 
countries could increase intra-empire trade and Britain, through securing trade 
preferences, could maintain access to goods from overseas markets. Because of these 
various preference deals, which became known as the Ottawa Agreement, Australia 
could only enter into limited negotiations with trading partners outside the British 
imperial system—in this instance, the Dutch (East-Indies), the French (Indo-China), the 
Chinese and the Japanese. 
In his speech to Parliament Latham restated Australia‘s commitment to intra-empire 
trade, claiming that Australia‘s relations with Great Britain were ‗closer than they have 
ever been‘. He also suggested that ‗a more urgent effort is being made to maintain and 
extend trade between Australia and other parts of the Empire‘, before gesturing towards 
a hierarchy of interests: 
As part of the British Empire we then naturally and properly consider the interests of 
the British Empire and its various parts. We are then [emphasis added] prepared to 
make trade arrangements with the countries which trade generously with ourselves.
13
  
                                                 
12. J. G. Latham, ‗The Australian Eastern Mission, 1934: Report of the Right Honourable 
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13. J. G. Latham, ‗The Australian Eastern Mission: Report‘, House of Representatives, 
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What is less clear, however, is whether the Eastern Mission was deliberately testing the 
implications of the Ottawa Agreement.  
In his public statements, Latham suggested that the Mission served both imperial and 
Australian interests; he claimed that in all his deliberations he ‗frankly put the 
Australian point of view‘, but he was also mindful to speak of the interests of the 
British Empire.
14
 However, in the secret reports prepared for Cabinet, Latham almost 
exclusively identified Australian interests. Together these two positions suggest that the 
Eastern Mission of 1934 represented a transitional moment for Australia. While the 
Great Depression had prompted Australian policy makers to look towards Asia, and 
think more independently about Australia‘s external affairs, Australia was still 
operating under the administrative umbrella of the British Empire. The transitional 
nature of the moment was also reflected in the qualified position Latham took on 
Australian representation in Asia. Latham suggested that the desirability of appointing 
trade commissioners in ‗Eastern countries‘ was ‗almost beyond question‘, but he did 
not see any need for recommending the appointment of Australian diplomats to the 
region.
15
 When in Shanghai, Latham offered the following statement about diplomatic 
representation: 
As far as diplomatic representation is concerned Great Britain has provided for us, 
and at present I cannot see that any advantage would be gained by separate 
representation. I would stress however that Australia is a self governing country and, 
as such, could appoint diplomatic representatives as she so desired. But both the 
interests of my country and our natural loyalty to Great Britain makes it desirable that 
there should be unity in matters of major importance.
16
  
Nevertheless, Latham remained a strong advocate for establishing trade representation 
across Asia, arguing that British diplomatic and consular representatives lacked the 
knowledge of Australia (and quite possibly the impetus) to adequately represent 
Australian trading interests.
17
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17. He also wanted representatives on the ground to manage any misinformation about 
Australia, for example, questions he encountered about Australia‘s coastline being 
fortified by 16-inch guns.  
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Over the course of the Mission a number of representations were made to Latham about 
the administration of the Immigration Restriction Act. Latham‘s report does not attach 
much significance to these representations and he implies that they were distractions 
from more important discussions. Each time the policy of immigration restriction was 
raised, Latham sought to justify Australia‘s position by attempting to identify a 
protectionist policy employed by the government raising the objection.
18
 Because 
Latham downplayed the significance of these discussions, newspaper reports better 
illustrate the attention that was, in actual fact, accorded to the matter. Reports in the 
Sydney Morning Herald suggest that discussions over the Immigration Restriction Act 
dominated the meeting with Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Wang Ching-wei. 
The Sydney Morning Herald reported that the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs 
‗eagerly asked many questions about immigration restriction‘ before suggesting:  
He [Wang Ching-wei] had hoped that the Australian Government would find means 
to allow admission to the Commonwealth of particular individuals, such as the sons 
and other close relatives of established Chinese merchants in Australia, who were 
dying there or past the age of continuing business and wished their heirs to carry one 
[sic] their enterprises.
19
 
It is further reported that Latham suggested to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs 
that he was prepared to make sympathetic representations to Cabinet, noting that 
immigration concessions might assist in the development of trade with China.
20
 
In his public statements Latham noted that the Chinese Minster for Foreign Affairs had 
concerns about immigration restriction; however, he failed to record them. Rather, he 
suggested that the Chinese and the Japanese had objections to the administration—and 
not the principle of the policy—adding that the Minister‘s concerns had been 
previously raised by the Chinese Consul-General and ‗were under the consideration of 
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19. F. M. Cutlack, ‗Australian Mission: Strange Scenes in China‘, Sydney Morning Herald, 
3 May 1934, p. 9. The significance of the Mission is further underscored by the fact that 
it was accompanied by two Australia journalists, Frank Murray of the Sydney Sun and 
F. M. Cutlack from the Sydney Morning Herald. 
20. F. M. Cutlack, ‗Australian Mission: Strange Scenes in China‘, Sydney Morning Herald, 
3 May 1934, p. 9 and ‗Our Restrictions on Asiatics: Exemptions Sought in Certain 
Cases‘, Argus, 3 May 1934, p. 12. The Japanese would also raise their concerns about 
immigration policy requesting that the restrictions placed on Japanese labourers be lifted; 
see National Archives of Australia, A981, FAR 5 PART 16, ‗Far East. Australian Eastern 
Mission 1934‘. 
Chapter Two: Facing Asia 
44 
the Cabinet‘.21 Latham also claimed that he advised the Minister that the ‗rigidity in 
administration had been the outcome of attempted deception by Chinese‘.22 While 
Latham, rather self-consciously, looked to avoid the subject of immigration restriction 
when negotiating with foreign counterparts, it was clear that immigration restriction 
continued to take priority over all other policy considerations—Australia‘s commercial 
turn to Asia did not alter the commitment to a white Australia. 
The Mission presented an opportunity for the Chinese and Japanese governments to 
make direct representations to Australia about immigration restriction and provided 
early evidence that Asian nations did not consider matters of immigration and trade as 
isolated from one another. In spite of his public protestations, it would appear that 
Latham was aware that the policy of immigration restriction may have implications for 
Australia‘s engagement with new trading partners. This is reflected in his 
acknowledgement that immigration concessions might assist in the development of 
trade with China and was reinforced by the fact that his confidential reports gave more 
consideration to the immigration concerns expressed to him.
23
 
Considering the unique nature of the Mission, it is surprising that the tabling of the 
report to Parliament inspired little debate. The few questions that were asked about the 
activities of the Mission would suggest that the Parliament was slow to realise its 
significance. One question related to the nature and names of the titles bestowed upon 
Latham and the members of the delegation to Japan, another related to the total cost of 
the Mission, a third concerned the cost of cables made by Latham to Australia.
24
 While 
it is possible that any potential debate may have been interrupted by the dissolving of 
Parliament on 7 August 1934, the fact that the report was not debated in the 11 sitting 
days available might suggest that the Parliament was yet to develop any significantly 
independent perspective on foreign affairs, and that parliamentarians considered 
matters of external affairs far removed from their legislative responsibilities. Yet the 
parliamentary reticence also reinforces the fact that Latham was a politician ahead of 
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his time, a pioneer who sought to build a conceptual and practical framework that 
would develop Australian relations with the region. The Eastern Mission paved the way 
for Australian trade commissioners to be appointed in Shanghai, Tokyo and Batavia in 
1935 and provided the impetus for an Australian Department of External Affairs, with a 
dedicated Minister, to be established in 1936.  
The creation of a Department of External Affairs assisted in the development of a series 
of important bilateral relationships. In 1940 Australian legations were established in 
Washington (headed by R. G. Casey) and Tokyo (headed by J. G. Latham, and which 
was terminated with the outbreak of war), while in the following year (1941), Australia 
established full diplomatic relations with the Government of the Republic of China. 
Frederic Eggleston was appointed Australia‘s first Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary to China and a legation was established in the war-time capital of 
Chungking. Keith Waller, who served as Second Secretary at the Chungking Legation, 
claims the legation was established in Chungking ‗partly to balance the fact that 
(Australia) had just opened one in Tokyo, and partly to show some support for the 
Chinese Government‘ who were at war with the Japanese.25 A further motivation for 
establishing the legation was that it was believed that it would help to build a 
foundation which might be of considerable benefit to Australia in the future.
26
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Australia’s Cold War 
On 5 March 1946, while visiting the town of Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill made 
the speech that is often considered to have signalled the start of the Cold War. 
Churchill‘s call for the containment of the Soviet Union and the end to the communist 
advance popularised the term ‗iron curtain‘. It also suggested that the two world powers 
and former allies, the Soviet Union and the United States, had become polarised. With 
the iron curtain drawn, communism and anti-communism became the two dominant 
ideologies of the post-war era. A few years after the 1946 Missouri speech, Churchill‘s 
iron curtain metaphor was reshaped to include the spread of communism to Asia. By 
the time Mao Zedong stood at the Gate of Celestial Peace overlooking Tiananmen 
Square and proclaimed the establishment of the People‘s Republic of China, on 
1 October 1949, a ‗bamboo curtain‘ was said to have emerged, dividing communist 
from non-communist Asia.  
This section of the chapter examines the Australian Parliament‘s reaction to the events 
which signalled the start of the Cold War across Asia. It first explores parliamentary 
attitudes to the establishment of the People‘s Republic of China and the question of 
recognition. It then examines two critical foreign policy speeches from the early Cold 
War period. First it discusses Percy Spender‘s inaugural speech as Minister for External 
Affairs, made shortly after the establishment of the PRC and outlining the objectives of 
the Colombo Plan (9 March 1950). Secondly it considers Prime Minister Menzies‘ first 
speech to the 21
st
 Parliament, in which he speaks about the character of the communist 
menace and signals Australia‘s commitment to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(5 August 1954). In documenting the Parliament‘s growing anxiety about the rise of 
Chinese communism, the discussion provides an outline of the security architecture 
developed to support one of the most important foreign policy commitments of the 
time, the policy of containing China.  
Throughout 1947 and 1948 parliamentary statements about the Chinese civil war were 
rare. Both major parties were slow to appreciate the full implications of the war in 
China and were unclear how they should regard the competing forces. Towards the end 
of the civil war, however, there was growing anti-Nationalist sentiment in some sectors 
of Parliament. In December 1948, Prime Minister Chifley claimed, ‗from the point of 
view of the allied nations, the organization in China (the Nationalists) has not been such 
to inspire great confidence‘.27 In comments more explicit in their condemnation, Labor 
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Senator for New South Wales, Donald Grant, spoke repeatedly about the corruption and 
nepotism of the Chiang regime, while the Labor Member for Hoddle, Jack Cremean, 
referred to the ‗ex-generalissimo‘ as a ‗grafter‘ and ‗the embodiment of the Chinese 
desire for squeeze‘.28 Labor Member for Watson, Max Falstein, stated that ‗it is well to 
remember that the Chinese, being Orientals, have an entirely different conception of 
political morality from that of Western nations‘ and called for the Nationalists to be 
removed from their permanent seat at the Security Council.
29
 Three months before the 
formation of the People‘s Republic, the Minister for External Affairs, H. V. Evatt, 
offered an assessment of events in China, suggesting that it was incumbent on the 
democracies of the world not to isolate a new communist government:  
Predictions about what will happen in China are always liable, perhaps certain, to be 
wrong. China is a country that is able to suffer tremendous cataclysms and shocks 
and to recover from them and absorb them, the situation becoming, after a time, 
completely changed. Therefore, dogmatism about the present situation in China is, in 
my opinion, dangerous. It is hard to see how the present Chinese Government can 
prevent the Chinese Communists from extending their hold over the greater part of 
China within the next year … I submit for consideration the view that it would be 
tragic if, through any failure or neglect on the part of the democracies towards the 
Chinese, an honourable and long-established association with the freedom-loving 
peoples should be abruptly terminated. If, at this stage, we were to give the Chinese 
Government of the north, the Chinese Communists, any ground for thinking that they 
can never expect international co-operation from the West in the future, that very 
declaration might lead them to adopt an extreme course and to sever all their 
traditional contacts with the democracies …30   
Evatt added that China could be a stabilising force in the region, but that if the Chinese 
communists were to become expansionary, a United Nations force would be likely to 
repel them. 
It took eighteen days, or nine sitting days, after the formation of the People‘s Republic 
before China was mentioned in Parliament. The aforementioned Labor Senator for New 
South Wales, Donald Grant, again condemned the Nationalists, while recommending to 
the House that Australia recognise the new government in China: 
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I believe that we shall have to recognize the Republican Government in China. That 
country presents an unlimited market for Australian trade. I do not believe that Mao 
and his followers will immediately establish a communist state. The task of restoring 
government that confronts them will take decades to complete. I know the 
topography of China. Rivers have to be harnessed, and for the general work of 
reconstruction China will require millions of pounds worth of capital goods, 
including machinery. If we are wise we shall cultivate the goodwill of the Chinese 
people. It is time that we realized once and for all that the domination of the Asiatic 
people by the white man is finished. The sooner we realize that fact the better it will 
be for us.
31
 
Grant, who clearly foresaw opportunity attached to Australia‘s recognition of the 
People‘s Republic, also tried to dispel the myth of communism rising to a position of 
power in Australia.
32
 He was firmly of the belief that communism would struggle to 
survive when confronted with good democratic governance. Grant‘s comment about 
cultivating the goodwill of the Chinese people was the only comment made in the 
Parliament between 1 October 1949 and the final sitting day of the 18
th
 Parliament on 
27 October 1949. 
While the federal election of December 1949 took place against the background of the 
developing Cold War, little attention was given to foreign policy and little concern was 
expressed about international communism. When Menzies argued that the Chifley 
Government took a soft line on communism, he was largely referring to domestic 
communism. Throughout the campaign, Menzies exploited fears of communist 
influence in the trade union movement and suggested that Chifley‘s plan to bring the 
banks under government control was essentially socialist. After eight years in office, 
the Labor Government would go on to be defeated at the polls, a victory which marked 
the start of the ALP‘s twenty-three years in Opposition. 
On the second sitting day for the new Parliament (23 February 1950) Labor Senator for 
Western Australia, Donald Willesee, was the first parliamentarian to ask whether the 
new Government intended to recognise communist China. Senator Willesee was told to 
place his question on the notice paper for the Minister for External Affairs (Percy 
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Spender).
33
 On the following day, the Labor Member for East Sydney, Edward (Eddie) 
Ward, raised the question of recognition, asking the Minister for External Affairs 
directly if he had recently been involved in a dispute with Jawaharlal Nehru over the 
recognition of communist China. The Minister for External Affairs replied that he 
would respond to questions about recognition of China in his foreign affairs statement 
to the House.  
Six sitting days into the new Parliament, Labor Senator for South Australia, Sidney 
O‘Flaherty, described the communist victory in China as a victory for the common man 
over a corrupt and oppressive regime: 
China is going through a stage of revolution because the serfs and peons of China 
have turned on the people who were controlling them for years … A revolution has 
taken place and the people themselves have formed a government … We should not 
concern ourselves with the ideologies of other nations and such things as shadows 
and the Iron Curtain … The working people of the world are awakening to the fact 
that they can rule nations.
34
 
Labor Member for Blaxland, James Harrison, recommended aiding China as integral to 
any security strategy:  
Our whole approach to this problem has been wrong. Having regard for the global 
situation, it would be much better for us to assist the starving millions of China, 
irrespective of the type of government they may have established in that country, and 
to aid Burma and other friendly nations to withstand the onrush of communism, than 
an attempt to build up a worthwhile military force. We should do everything possible 
to assist to provide the wherewithal to keep together the bodies and souls of 
200,000,000 starving Chinese, rather than prepare to send another army to France or 
Flanders …35  
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The question of recognition would be used by both sides of politics for point-scoring. 
Evatt, now speaking from Opposition, claimed that the question of the recognition of 
the People‘s Republic of China could not be deferred indefinitely. The Leader of the 
Opposition (Chifley) argued that the Government ‗will inevitably be compelled to 
recognise some government in China‘.36 Typically, the Government responded to such 
comments by suggesting that the ALP had let pass their opportunity to recognise China. 
To this charge, Chifley explained why the Labor Party had delayed on the question of 
recognition: 
There can be no question about the mind of my Government with respect to the 
recognition of the government. Although honourable members opposite may not 
believe me, I say frankly that at the time I considered the subject to be of such 
importance that with a general election pending it should be decided by the incoming 
government.
37
  
Chifley may have considered the issue of recognition sufficiently important that it be 
given the full consideration of Parliament; however, he had clearly been concerned 
about the effect recognition would have on a domestic audience increasingly concerned 
about the communist influence in Australian unions. Prior to the December election, no 
non-communist country had recognised China and it was extremely unlikely that 
Australia would be the first. On the question of recognition, Australia would find itself 
wedged between the historically-grounded tendency to follow the British—who 
recognised the People‘s Republic in January 1950—and the desire to establish a China 
policy consistent with the United States—with whom they were about to sign the 
ANZUS security treaty.  
Between March and June 1950, the Menzies Government made it clear that it intended 
to closely observe events in communist China:  
… to ascertain to what degree the new regime in Peking intends to live up to 
international obligations in both its internal treatment of foreigners and its external 
non-interference in the affairs of neighbouring states. Several Opposition members 
have advocated early recognition of the new regime as the Government of China. The 
Government has no present intention of so doing.
38
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Two and a half weeks after Spender made this comment about Peking living up to its 
international obligations, the North Korean People‘s Army crossed the 38th parallel and 
entered the Republic of Korea. The outbreak of hostilities in Korea, which would 
ultimately result in Australia becoming engaged in hostilities against China, saw the 
Menzies government dispense with the prospect of recognition.
39
  
Up until the outbreak of the Korean War, which clearly fuelled fear about Chinese 
communist expansionism, the Parliament‘s reaction to communism was predominately 
influenced by domestic factors.
40
 To this point, Prime Minister Menzies, who offered 
no early comment on the recognition of China, was almost exclusively concerned with 
domestic communism. Once he replaced Chifley as prime minister, one of Menzies‘ 
first actions was to introduce legislation that sought to ban the thirty-year-old 
Communist Party of Australia (CPA) and other organisations that the Government 
thought to be substantially communist.
41
 The Communist Party Dissolution Bill was 
introduced to the Parliament in April 1950 and debated for 39 sitting days between 
April and October 1950. It was one of the most contentious pieces of legislation to be 
considered by Parliament. The Bill, which was passed on 19 October 1950, sought to 
render the CPA and associated organisations unlawful and members of the Communist 
Party were to be ‗declared‘ making them ineligible for employment in the public 
service, a trade union or a defence-related industry.
42
 When the High Court of Australia 
ruled the Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950 unconstitutional, on 9 March 1951 (6 
to 1), Menzies tried to change the constitution by putting the question of abolition to a 
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referendum. This second attempt to ban the CPA, via referendum (September 1951), 
was also defeated.
43
 Following a series of allegations about espionage activity that were 
made by Vladimir Petrov—the Soviet intelligence officer who was granted political 
asylum in April 1954—the Parliament, by a unanimous vote of both Houses, passed a 
bill to authorise the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into Petrov‘s 
allegations. Lasting fifteen months, the Royal Commission failed to reveal a Soviet spy 
network in Australia, yet was pivotal in determining the outcome of the 1954 Federal 
Election.
44
 Five years after taking office, Menzies had failed in his pledge to make 
communism unlawful.  
A Very Great Burden of Responsibility: Spender and the Colombo 
Plan  
On 9 March 1950 Percy Spender gave his first foreign policy address to Parliament. 
Occupying twenty pages of Hansard, Spender‘s speech offers a detailed outline of the 
new Government‘s foreign policy commitments. Spender began by describing foreign 
policy as ‗a projection of domestic politics into world politics‘ before reiterating 
Australia‘s ‗self-evident and unchanging‘ foreign policy objectives—to seek the 
‗closest possible cooperation‘ with nations of the Commonwealth, the United States 
and the United Nations.
45
 The speech addressed the issue of the establishment of 
communist China and it represented the point at which Cold War era security concerns 
would begin to dominate Australia‘s external relations. Beyond this, the speech offered 
an outline for what would later become a key instrument of Australian foreign policy, 
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the Colombo Plan. The Colombo Plan represented the moment when Asia‘s social well-
being and national development was deemed critical to Australia‘s regional security.46 
Claiming that the ‗centre of gravity of world affairs‘ had shifted to this area, Spender 
proceeded to offer an appraisal of Australia‘s changing security predicament: 
We could many years ago reasonably regard ourselves as isolated from the main 
threats to our national security. Our security, however, has become an immediate and 
vital issue because changes since the war have resulted in a shifting of potential 
aggression from the European to the Asian area, and our traditional British 
Commonwealth and United States of America friends have not yet completed their 
adjustments to the new situation. A very great burden of responsibility rests 
especially on us, but also upon the other British Commonwealth countries of this 
area.
47
 
Spender‘s central contention was that two factors had combined to alter the geo-
strategic character of Asia. China had fallen under the control of a government which 
was communist in form and indigenous nationalist movements had emerged across 
Southeast Asia. In outlining the possible consequences of the communist victory in 
China, Spender offered a scenario in which the newly established post-colonial 
administrations, which he believed to be experiencing varying degrees of political 
instability, would fall one after another to the forces of communism. Spender spoke of 
the possibility of the Vietminh and Ho Chi Minh taking control of Vietnam and of the 
implications this would have for the new states of Laos and Cambodia. Envisaging that 
Laos and Cambodia would be unable to offer much resistance to communism, Spender 
identified Thailand as the next target of communist pressure. Communist guerrilla 
activity in Malaya and the Philippines; the challenge of a newly independent 
                                                 
46. Spender also explains that the time has come when the occasional statement made by the 
Minister for External Affairs, ‗no matter how frank and detailed‘, is insufficient in 
providing members and the people they represent with the ‗continuous flow of 
information which is essential to an appreciation of Foreign Affairs‘. Spender announces, 
therefore, that the Government proposes to establish a standing committee on foreign 
affairs which can give constant attention to issues of foreign policy. Spender claimed that 
the great value of the committee would lie in ‗its ability to give detailed study to the great 
problems of the day and to pass on to the Parliament the expert knowledge which it will, 
in the course of time, acquire‘. Percy Spender, ‗International Affairs‘, House of 
Representatives, Debates, 9 March, 1950, p. 622. The Committee was formally 
established in 1952. Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley explain that ‗because of its in 
camera discussions and direct subordination to the Minister for External Affairs, it was 
boycotted by the ALP until 1967‘, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p. 176. 
47. Percy Spender, ‗International Affairs‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 9 March, 
1950, p. 623. 
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government of Indonesia and the ‗instrument‘ of millions of Chinese scattered 
throughout Southeast Asia, were each considered to have rendered the region extremely 
vulnerable to the advance of communism.  
Spender suggested that the capacity for communism to spread throughout the newly 
independent states had created a ‗very great burden of responsibility‘ and that, because 
Australia has special interests in Southeast Asia, it was critical that it work with these 
states to help them maintain their newly won independence. In turning to the central 
focus of his address, Spender then provided the Parliament with the outlines of the 
Colombo Plan.
48
 The recommendations for the plan had been drafted at a meeting of 
Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in Colombo in January 1950. Spender explained that 
while the recommendations were yet to be accepted, he believed that the plan would 
stimulate the productive capacities of vulnerable states.
49
 He argued that stabilising 
governments through bilateral aid, infrastructure projects and technical assistance 
programs, would help create the conditions of economic life under which ‗the false 
ideological attraction which communism excites will lose its force‘.50  
Spender‘s speech invoked images of falling dominos across Southeast Asia. However, 
while speaking of ‗the ever-increasing thrust of communism‘ and ‗territorial 
aggrandizement‘, Spender moderated his comments with statements indicating that the 
government does not ‗accept the inevitability of a clash between the democratic and 
communist way of life‘. He also restated his commitment to maintaining ‗the traditional 
contact‘ between China and the Western world.51 Spender reiterated that while ‗It is not 
for us to question the kind of government the Chinese people choose to live under‘; the 
Government remains concerned that China will conduct itself in accordance with the 
principles of international law.
52
 
                                                 
48. Otherwise referred to as the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in 
South and Southeast Asia. 
49. Despite the fact that Spender had only been appointed as Foreign Minister a fortnight 
before the January meeting he was one of the plan‘s chief architects. Spender resigned 
from politics in 1951 and was appointed Australia‘s second ambassador to the United 
States. 
50. Percy Spender, ‗International Affairs‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 9 March 
1950, p. 629. 
51. Percy Spender, op. cit., p. 626. 
52. Percy Spender, ‗International Affairs‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 9 March 
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The idea of containing the spread of communism through an economic and 
development assistance scheme to bolster the resistance of the vulnerable ‗free‘ 
countries was given broad parliamentary support. There was an understanding that 
Australia, as a nation of the Asia-Pacific, had a clear role to play and it was agreed that 
the economic and social benefits of such a program would help Australia meet its 
strategic and geopolitical objectives. While there was occasional concern about the cost 
of development aid, such concerns were accompanied by statements, noting with pride, 
the leading role Australia was taking in ‗Pacific‘ affairs.53 In 1955, some four years 
after the introduction of the Colombo Plan, the Liberal Member for Robertson, Roger 
Dean, would claim:  
Visitors from countries which benefit from the Colombo plan have been taken to 
various parts of Australia and have been entertained in the homes of the people, and 
by small groups and organizations of people. In that way, they have learned to know 
us much more easily. There is need for us to encourage greater numbers of people 
from South-East Asian countries to visit this country so that the flow of people across 
the bridge to Australia may be greater … If it were possible for people in the 
countries to our near north to visit Australia, a greater number of South-East Asians 
would have the opportunity of seeing democracy at work in this country.
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In Dean‘s terms, the Colombo Plan had contributed to the flow of people across the 
bridge. This had allowed those from ‗our near north‘ to see democracy at work and 
provided an opportunity for them to learn to know us much more easily. In seeking to 
insulate Southeast Asian nations from communism, the Colombo Plan represented the 
origins of Australia‘s soft power diplomacy; the Menzies Government would project its 
foreign policy objectives and promote the values of democracy through cultural, 
political and educational programs.
55
  
                                                 
53. See, for example, K. E. Beazley, ‗International Affairs‘, House of Representatives, 
Debates, 21 March 1950, p. 978; Senator d Murray, ‗South and South-East Asia‘, Senate, 
Debates, 21 June 1950, p. 4578; Edward Ward, ‗International Affairs‘, House of 
Representatives, Debates, 27 September 1950, p. 45; H. V. Evatt, ‗International Affairs‘, 
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55. The father of Australia‘s first ethnically Chinese, overseas born Minister, Senator Penny 
Wong, was a student of the Colombo Plan. In her first speech to the Parliament Senator 
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Because the educational scholarship programs which became integral to Australia‘s 
Colombo commitment were not intended to result in the permanent settlement of 
participants in Australia, the program of seeing democracy at work did not interfere 
with the objectives of white Australia. In fact, rather than representing any diminution 
of the policy of immigration restriction, the Colombo Plan resulted in its rearticulation. 
When Spender was in Jakarta, en route to the conference of Commonwealth nations at 
Colombo, he was asked at a press conference whether there was to be a more liberal 
administration of the white Australia policy, to which he replied: ‗there could be no 
compromise upon the white Australia policy by this or any other Australian 
government … No alteration of the Immigration Act is contemplated‘.56 That Spender 
stated that there could be no compromise, implied a lack of choice, or even, a state of 
impossibility. 
However, in spite of this renewed commitment, Australia‘s changing security 
predicament had begun to alter the way some parliamentarians viewed immigration and 
calls were made for Australia to recruit large numbers of Europeans to help Australia 
defend itself. Senator Grant argued: 
I emphasize that Australia is in a precarious position by reason of the fact that as a 
white people we are surrounded by Asiatics. Therefore, we must increase our 
population as quickly as possible. I believe that if we fail to increase our population to 
the maximum within the next twenty years we shall lose this country altogether … It 
is our duty to welcome migrants and to educate them to the Australian way of life so 
that, should the necessity arise, they will be prepared to fight alongside us. We must 
get the best people of the world to migrate to this country.
57
 
The expression ‗populate or perish‘ was first used by the longest-serving member of the 
Australian Parliament, W. M. (Billy) Hughes, before being revived after the Second 
World War by the Minister for Immigration, Arthur Calwell, when there was increased 
incentive to grow the Australian population. 
In developing the metaphor which would come to govern Australia‘s experience of the 
Cold War, Spender outlines a strategy for preventing the dominos from falling across 
Southeast Asia, opening-up a communist path to Australia. While Spender‘s speech 
                                                                                                                                              
of the poverty he experienced as a child in Malaysia. It is a large part of how I come to 
be here today.‘, ‗First Speech‘, Senate, Debates, 21 August 2002, pp. 3498–9. 
56. Percy Spender, ‗White Australia Policy‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
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offered a new metaphoric template for speaking about the Cold War, Australia‘s Cold 
War anxieties would find fuller expression in Menzies‘ speech of August 1954. In what 
follows, we can observe the way Australia‘s fight against communism became not just 
an economic, but a spiritual undertaking.  
A Battle for the Spirit of Man: Menzies, SEATO and the Communist 
Menace  
At 8:00pm on 5 August 1954, the second sitting day of the 21
st
 Parliament, Prime 
Minister Menzies gave one of the most important speeches on international affairs that 
the Parliament had heard in years.
58
 The speech identified a number of the key 
international events which had occurred during the interregnum and provided an outline 
of the new government‘s foreign policy commitments.59 Fighting in Indo-China had 
resulted in Ho Chi Minh‘s Vietnamese communists overtaking the French stronghold of 
Dien Bien Phu (7 May 1954). This had in turn led to the Geneva Conference of 21 July 
1954, at which it was settled that Laos and Cambodia would remain independent and 
sovereign states while Vietnam would be divided allowing for communist 
administration in the north and non-communist administration in the south. Menzies 
reported to Parliament that the increased communist presence in Southeast Asia had 
made Australia‘s problems of security ‗more visible and acute than before‘, rendering 
Australia, ‗a democratic nation vitally at risk in these seas‘.60 Menzies‘ attention then 
turned to the political conference which had been planned to establish a ‗Southeast Asia 
defence organization‘. While Menzies did not elaborate at any great length on the 
character of the organisation which would become the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), or John Foster Dulles‘ commitment to expanding America‘s 
                                                 
58. E. G. Whitlam claimed that the government had not permitted parliamentary debate on 
foreign affairs for more than three years, or during the period of the 20th Parliament. 
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military presence in Southeast Asia, he gestured that a multilateral organisation for 
collective defence would be created in order to oppose further communist gains.
61
  
Menzies used the opportunity of the speech to distinguish between the character of 
democracy and the character of communism. Democracy was identified as ‗the noblest 
system of government yet devised‘, because it promoted the ‗significance and well-
being of the individual‘. Beyond this, Menzies suggested that democracy is 
correspondingly ‗complex‘, for it required a citizenry with ‗educated intelligence, self-
discipline, a community conception, and a capacity for selection and judgement‘. It is 
for this reason that Menzies believed that it is ‗idle‘ to suppose that communities with 
‗high levels of illiteracy‘, ‗primitive civic organisations‘ and ‗little acquaintance with 
the art and science of democracy‘ can be readily transformed into democracies.  
Menzies proceeded to highlight the differences between the two political philosophies 
through distinguishing the ‗materialist‘ from the ‗spiritualist‘ tradition: 
Communists, wherever they may be grouped, are confessed and clamant materialists. 
The conceptions of the rights and spiritual dignity of man which inhere in the 
genuinely-held religions of the world, and which feed these noble aspirations which 
have led to democracy and national freedom, have no meaning or reality in the 
Communist mind. That is why Communist aggression uses cunning or bloodshed, 
fraud and fury, with callous indifference to all moral and spiritual considerations. The 
one objective is the enlargement of the boundaries of dictatorial and materialist 
power. All of us who live in free countries, lifted to noble issues by religious faith, 
will forget these grim truths at our peril … It is desperately important that the world 
should see this as a moral contest; a battle for the spirit of man.
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In suggesting the war had become a moral contest between the ‗noble‘ spiritualists and 
the ‗dictatorial‘ materialists, Menzies had begun to develop a political language more 
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forceful than anything he had used since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. In 
claiming a spiritual dimension to ideological conflict, Menzies developed an 
evangelical rhetoric that spoke of ‗faith‘, ‗moral revolution‘ and of converting the 
workers chained by their communist masters, back to truth.
63
  
There was general bipartisanship expressed about the gravity of the events in Southeast 
Asia and both sides of politics supported Menzies‘ arguments for a defence and security 
organisation. However, in suggesting that the Cold War was no longer a contest 
between two economic systems—but that it had become a war of faith—the speech 
became an originating point for a new political vocabulary about the threat of 
communism. Menzies‘ speech inspired a new type of anti-communist rhetoric and an 
avalanche of religiosity. The Liberal Member for Bennelong, John Cramer, claimed 
that Menzies‘ sentence about ‗the battle for the spirit of man‘ was one of the most 
important he had spoken (and that Menzies‘ address was the most important he had 
heard in his four and a half years as a member of the House). Cramer then drew upon 
Menzies‘ spiritualist metaphors to claim that communism ‗takes away the soul of man 
and destroys his relationship with God‘.64 Menzies‘ rhetorical flourishes also inspired 
the Country Party Member for Moore, Hugh Leslie, to identify communism as 
‗something that comes from hell‘:  
Communism is the worst evil that the world has ever known. It will undermine 
Western civilization, unless it is checked, because it will take from us the things upon 
which our civilization is founded, such as our religion, our family life, and our belief 
in a Supreme Being. Communism is not a political ideology. It is something that 
comes from hell itself for the purpose of destroying the world, if it possibly can. This 
is how I regard communism, and, because it is so evil, I believe that any means are 
justified to scorch it out, or to make certain that it does not gain a footing here.
65
  
While Menzies spoke of the communists‘ ‗cunning or bloodshed, fraud and fury‘, 
others would employ tidal metaphors to describe China‘s ‗descent into darkness‘, the 
territorial ambitions of the ‗communist commandos‘ and the ‗creeping, dangerous, 
insidious flood‘ of communism throughout the world.66 Yet it is within the climate of 
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growing parliamentary hysteria that the Labor Member for Wilmot, Gilbert (Gil) 
Duthie, provided prescient comment on the lasting effects of European colonialism 
across Asia:  
We sowed the wind, and we are reaping the whirlwind of communism. What have we 
done in Asia over the last 200 years to entitle us to claim its allegiances and co-
operation in the present crisis in that vast area? For centuries we have dominated its 
economy. We have ruled it politically through reactionary governments … We have 
exploited Asia‘s richest resources, not for the benefit of Asia, but for our own benefit. 
We have failed to lift the living standards of the Asians, we have suppressed their 
attempts at self-government, and we have secretly despised their colour. We have 
given no encouragement to education or the improvement of the standard of health. 
Yet now we are astonished that Asia is going Communist!
67
 
Menzies‘ speech remains one of the most significant of the early Cold War period. It 
did not simply generate a new political rhetoric for describing the Cold War but it was 
delivered on the eve of a period of significant political tumult—the ALP split. In 
promoting the battle against communism, as a battle for the spirit of man, Menzies had 
pitched his comments to those anti-communist Catholic voters who would soon desert 
the ALP for the vehemently anticommunist Democratic Labor Party (DLP). That 
Menzies‘ speech was the first of its kind to be filmed for television made the 
communication of this message that much easier.
68
 
The former Labor Member for Fremantle (1994–2007), Carmen Lawrence, testifies to 
the power of the anti-communist message through her memories of the early Cold War 
period. Recalling the way that the Parliament had inspired her childhood fear of 
Chinese communism, she relates her nocturnal battle with slanted-eyed communists 
who cut the tongues from priests and pierced the eardrums of nuns—with chopsticks: 
                                                                                                                                              
Wilfrid Kent Hughes, claimed ‗No great wisdom was needed to forecast that the guns on 
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One of my earliest memories is of a recurrent dream: a vivid ‗night terror‘ I often had 
when I was about eight years old. I would wake in fright—although actually still 
deeply asleep—to see a large man looming in my bedroom door; a uniformed figure, 
complete with red-starred cap and slanted eyes, brandishing a knife. This was my 
childish construction of a Chinese communist, a figure our teachers taught us to fear 
because they tortured nuns and priests, cutting out their tongues and piercing their ear 
drums with chopsticks. While we were almost inured to the Blood of the Martyrs 
pantheon having heard the gory details of their suffering so frequently, the Chinese 
communist bogey was especially potent because it was contemporary and so closely 
linked to the political fears of the day—the ‗yellow peril‘ and the ‗red menace‘. These 
weren‘t ancient stories; they were happening in our time. 
That I was somewhat precociously aware of the threat from the north is testament to 
my father‘s activism in the Liberal Party and his enthusiastic support for Menzies. 
We would listen to Parliament on ABC Radio and often heard the grown-ups talk 
politics. The anti-communist rhetoric became increasingly hysterical as the Cold War 
escalated. In the 1954 election campaign, Menzies‘ Liberals spoke of the ‗communist 
conspiracy‘ … Images of maps bleeding the ‗communist menace‘ from China, the 
Petrov Commission paranoia … For years, I could not sleep with my back to the door 
lest I be stabbed by a Chinese communist.
69
  
Such memories reinforce the way Parliament has operated as a site, even an originating 
site, for shaping popular understandings of China.  
The ‘Other’ China 
Before examining the moment, some decades later, when Australia softened its anti-
communist stance, it is worth noting two significant acts of Cold War diplomacy: the 
visit of a parliamentary delegation to Formosa (Taiwan) in 1956 and the establishment 
of an embassy in Taipei in 1966. An Australian Goodwill Mission, composed largely of 
federal parliamentarians, travelled to Formosa in 1956. The Mission was led by J. G. 
Latham and included eight federal parliamentarians (three from Opposition), one state 
parliamentarian, an academic and a former military officer. The Mission took place at a 
time when both Chinese governments were busily courting Western visitors.
70
 The 
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Nationalists were actively engaged in developing sympathetic ears in the West and the 
Goodwill Mission became part of this effort—at a time when the Australian 
government was attempting to restrict, even prevent, contact with communist China. 
While the Mission sent a strong message of support to the Nationalists, Latham sought 
to temper the significance of the visit claiming: ‗We did not represent any party or 
organisation or government. We were simply a small group of actively interested 
individuals‘.71 Despite Latham‘s declarations, the delegation had access at the highest 
levels, and on 9 August 1956, Latham met with President Chiang for an hour-long 
conference.
72
 The active diplomacy that was being exercised by the Nationalists during 
this period helped foster a number of sympathetic voices within the Parliament. 
‗Friends of Taiwan‘ included the unofficial head of the Taiwan-lobby for much of the 
1950s and 1960s, Liberal Member for Chisholm, Wilfrid Kent Hughes, as well as: 
D. J. Killen, K. E. Beazley, W. C. Wentworth, Stan Keon (who had abandoned the ALP 
for the DLP) and John Gorton.
73
 
The other significant event reflecting Australian Cold War attitudes to China was the 
establishment of an Australian Embassy in Taipei on 11 June 1966. In his history of 
Australia‘s Taiwan policy, Gary Klintworth claims that Australia‘s decision to establish 
an embassy in Taiwan was based on strategic considerations that arose as a result of the 
alliance with the United States and Australia‘s continuing fear of communist China. 
Yet, while the establishment of the Embassy may have been a demonstration of 
Australian loyalty, Klintworth argues that it proved to be of little strategic or economic 
benefit.
74
 The establishment of an Australian Embassy in Taipei was made possible by 
Robert Menzies‘ retirement. Menzies, who is described as having ‗harboured great 
personal contempt for the Kuomintang (and) strongly disapproved of Australia 
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establishing an embassy in Taipei‘, retired in January 1966, allowing for the new Prime 
Minster, Harold Holt, to change the government‘s policy.75  
 
9. Australian parliamentary delegation with Chiang Kai-shek (1956) including ‗Friends of 
Taiwan‘: J. G. Latham, W. C. Wentworth, Donald Willesee, Reginald Turnbull and John 
Gorton. Papers of Sir John Latham, National Library of Australia.
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Prelude to Australia’s Recognition of China 
The prelude to Australia‘s recognition of the People‘s Republic was Gough Whitlam‘s 
visit to China as Leader of the Opposition in July 1971. Because of the antipathy many 
Australians still felt towards China, Whitlam‘s trip to Peking represented a substantial 
political risk and had the potential to derail his 1972 election chances. As the Whitlam-
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led ALP delegation met the Premier Zhou Enlai in Peking, Whitlam was lampooned in 
the Australian press: 
Mr Whitlam has not hesitated to seek Chinese smiles of approval at the cost of 
Australian interests … Examples of Mr Whitlam‘s servility are rife … If Mr Whitlam 
thinks that this wholesale selling out of friends to gain a despot‘s smile is diplomacy, 
then Heaven protect this country if he ever directs its foreign policy.
77
 
Whitlam would go on to be dubbed the ‗Manchurian candidate‘ and was accused of 
betraying the national interest.
78
 Prime Minister McMahon, attempting to draw political 
capital from Whitlam‘s China visit, told 400 cheering Young Liberals in Melbourne: 
‗In no time at all, Mr Zhou had Mr Whitlam on a hook and he played him as a 
fisherman plays a trout‘.79 
The McMahon Government continued to reassert its commitment to the policy of non-
recognition. However, while so doing, it was unaware that Australia‘s major ally was 
preparing to enter secret talks with the Chinese. On 11 July 1971, while the ALP 
delegation was in Shanghai celebrating Whitlam‘s 55th birthday, US presidential 
adviser Henry Kissinger flew from Pakistan to Peking to commence discussions with 
the Chinese leadership. On 15 July President Nixon announced on national television 
that Kissinger had just returned from Peking where he had discussed the possibility of 
establishing diplomatic contact between China and the United States. This represented 
a substantial setback for McMahon, who only hours before, had addressed a Liberal 
Party National Conference in Tasmania and restated the importance of containing 
China. Very quickly Whitlam‘s trip to China had become a huge domestic political 
success as Prime Minister McMahon was left flatfooted, defending a position—the 
isolation and containment of China—which the Americans were abandoning.  
                                                 
77. Sydney Morning Herald, 14 July 1971. The Labor delegation included Mick Young—
Labor Federal Secretary (who had first proposed the plan to go to China), Tom Burns—
Federal President of the Labor Party, Rex Patterson—Shadow Minister for Agriculture, 
Graham Freudenberg—Whitlam‘s Press Secretary and Stephen FitzGerald—China 
specialist from the ANU.  
78. Bob Santamaria used the expression ‗Manchurian candidate‘, he was alluding to the 
novel and Hollywood film, The Manchurian Candidate, in which an American prisoner 
of war becomes ‗brainwashed‘ by the Chinese communists during the Korean War. 
79. As quoted in E. G. Whitlam: ‗Sino-Australian Diplomatic Relations 1972–2002‘, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 323–336, 2002, pp. 329–
330. 
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Never had an Opposition exerted so much pressure on foreign policy. When Parliament 
resumed in August, after the winter recess, Whitlam challenged the McMahon 
Government to recognise China: 
It is open to any Australian Government, even the McMahon Government, to 
normalise relations with China. We do not have to wait until after the elections but it 
can only be done if the McMahon Government is willing to put our national interests 
above what the Prime Minister believes to be smart, short-term political ploys …80 
However, the government remained steadfast in their criticism of Whitlam. Whitlam 
was criticised for bargaining away Taiwan, and for trying to buy the votes of those in 
Australia with wheat interests.
81
 He was accused of kowtowing to Chairman Mao and 
was parodied for his alleged obsequiousness, labelled a ‗performing monkey in Peking‘ 
and ‗the Chinese candidate for the next Australian election‘.82 Three months after 
Whitlam‘s visit to China, the United Nations General Assembly decided by a two-thirds 
majority to recognise the People‘s Republic of China. This resulted in the Republic of 
China being supplanted by the People‘s Republic at the United Nations in October 
1971.  
Recognition 
On 5 December 1972, Whitlam held his first press conference as Prime Minister. 
Whitlam announced that he had instructed Australia‘s Ambassador in Paris, Alan 
Renouf, to open negotiations with his Chinese counterpart, Huang Chen; Australia‘s 
Ambassador to Taiwan was also recalled. On 21 December, Australia recognised the 
People‘s Republic and signed the Joint Communiqué or Paris Agreement stating:  
The two Governments agree to develop diplomatic relations, friendship and co-
operation between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in 
each other‘s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence 
… The Australian Government recognises the Government of the People‘s Republic 
of China as the sole legal Government of China, acknowledges the position of the 
                                                 
80. E. G. Whitlam, ‗International Affairs‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 19 August 
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81. In early 1971 the Chinese Government failed to renew its contract with the Australian 
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82. H. B. Turner, ‗International Affairs‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 19 August 
1971, pp. 323–324 and J. M. Fraser, ‗International Affairs‘, House of Representatives, 
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Chinese Government that Taiwan is a province of the People‘s Republic of China, 
and has decided to remove its official representation from Taiwan before 25 January 
1973.
83
  
 
10. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam at ‗Echo Wall‘, Temple of Heaven, Beijing, 1973. Named 
for its acoustic property, a whisper spoken at one end of the wall can be heard from the other, 
National Archives of Australia, A6180, 14/11/73/209. 
                                                 
83. E. G. Whitlam, ‗Sino-Australian Diplomatic Relations 1972–2002‘, Australian Journal 
of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 323–336, 2002, as quoted pp. 330–331. (New 
Zealand recognised China on the same day.)  
Chapter Two: Facing Asia 
67 
Whitlam‘s recognition of China quickly developed into a source of national pride. The 
Fairfax papers ran articles celebrating Australia‘s independence in international affairs 
and Whitlam‘s ‗new course in Asia‘. However, statements were still being made in 
Parliament which warned about the dangers of recognising China. The Liberal Member 
for Balaclava, Raymond Whittorn, suggested that Whitlam had accepted 23 conditions 
imposed by the People‘s Republic as the price of securing recognition. Whittorn 
suggested that Australia had to toe the Peking line and agree to conditions more 
stringent than those accepted by other states.  
On 31 January 1973 Whitlam sought to clarify Australia‘s diplomatic arrangements 
with China: 
It is nonsense to suggest that we have been discriminated against by the Chinese and 
forced to accept a variety of pre-conditions. The negotiations in Paris covered only 
questions relating to the recognition of China and the status of Taiwan. There was no 
secret agreement or understanding on other matters. The wording of the published 
joint communiqué in which we acknowledged the position of the Chinese 
Government that Taiwan is a province of China is very similar in its wording to the 
Canadian and British formulas. The Maldives‘ formula, which has been described as 
softer than ours was, in fact, harder, as the Maldives ‗recognised‘ Taiwan as an 
‗inalienable part of the territory of the People‘s Republic‘.84 
Whitlam had rejected the Cold War template for distinguishing allies from enemies, 
claiming that the binaries that had determined Australia‘s foreign policy for the past 
twenty-five years had been replaced by a ‗more complex and variable web‘ of 
relationships that cut across ideological barriers.
85
 Whitlam spoke of a new era of 
regional cooperation, and granted diplomatic recognition, not just of communist China 
(1972), but the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (1973) and the Democratic 
People‘s Republic of Korea (1974). He resolved that there would be less emphasis on 
military pacts and withdrew Australian military personnel from Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Singapore; he curtailed Australia‘s colonial policy by establishing a timetable for 
Papua New Guinea‘s independence; and in the week before Christmas 1972 he 
denounced President Richard Nixon‘s decision to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong, making it 
                                                 
84. E. G. Whitlam, ‗Australian recognition of China‘, Press statement No. 49, 31 January 
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clear that the Australian government would no longer offer unconditional support for 
U.S. actions in Indo-China. When in Manila in 1973 Whitlam announced that the white 
Australia policy was now ‗dead‘ and that if someone would hand him a shovel he 
would publicly bury it.
86
 While H. V. Evatt, Percy Spender, R. G. Casey and Paul 
Hasluck had all attempted to develop a distinctive foreign policy, the election of the 
Whitlam Government was something of a watershed. Whitlam acted on the 
presumption that Australia had its own interests and could make an independent 
assessment of what those interests were. He spoke not only of a new course in Asia but 
also of the emergence of a distinctively Australian view of the world.
87
 In December 
1973, after a year in government Whitlam declared to Parliament that Australia had 
changed: 
We are no longer a cipher or a satellite in world affairs. We are no longer stamped 
with the taint of racism. We are no longer a colonial power. We are no longer out of 
step with the world‘s progressive and enlightened movements towards freedom, 
disarmament and cooperation. We are no longer enthralled to bogies and obessions in 
our relations with China or the great powers.
88
  
Post-Recognition 
After recognition Australia‘s China policy assumed a bipartisan quality. When the 
Liberal-National Country Party coalition was elected to office in 1975 Malcolm Fraser 
pledged to continue to build the new relationship and forge closer political, economic 
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88. E. G. Whitlam, ‗Whitlam Government‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
13 December 1973, pp. 4729–4732. A few months earlier Whitlam became the first 
Australian Prime Minister to visit China. He was received with great fanfare and met 
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of the Department of Foreign Affairs between 1969–1973, travelled to China with 
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and cultural ties. Perhaps the greatest measure of how parliamentary attitudes towards 
China had transformed in the period after recognition was the Parliament‘s response to 
the passing of Mao Zedong on 9 September 1976. Following Mao‘s death both Houses 
passed bipartisan motions of condolence stating: 
That this House records its sincere regret at the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, 
expresses to the people of China profound regret and tenders its deep sympathy to his 
family in their bereavement.
89
  
Tributes spoke of Mao‘s achievements—unifying a divided and weak state, liberating 
China from warlords, feudalism and foreign domination and establishing China as a 
self-confident member of the world community. The Labor Member for Reid, Tom 
Uren, described Mao as a ‗brilliant revolutionary thinker, a great military strategist‘. 
Whitlam spoke of his ‗gifts as a writer and interpreter of Chinese philosophy‘. The 
Leader of the Government in the Senate, Senator Reginald Withers claimed: 
Unlike the armies of the Chinese leaders before him, his armies did not loot, pillage 
or rape. He organised great land reform and just government. He was a poet in the 
classical style and a humane head of a government which was the biggest 
bureaucracy on earth …90 
Liberal Member for Mackellar, William Wentworth, was one of the few dissenting 
voices. He spoke of Mao‘s ‗dreadful legacy‘, labelling Mao a mass murderer:  
… Mao murdered a thousand times as many of his own countrymen as Mussolini 
ever did and destroyed ten times as many of their freedoms. He made a prison and 
called it peace … Maoism has subjected the Chinese people to an alien ideology and 
has denied them their traditional life and culture … Will the Chinese people now 
have the wisdom and courage to abandon these moronic aspects of Maoism and 
reassert their historic values?
91
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When the House stood to honour Mao in silence, Wentworth stormed out of the 
chamber exclaiming: ‗Mr Speaker, Mao was a murderer‘.92 
Whitlam, now speaking from Opposition, used the occasion of Mao‘s passing to point 
out that five years ago it would have been ‗unthinkable‘ for a condolence motion such 
as this to be offered by the Australian Parliament:  
It says much for the changing attitudes of Australian politicians as it does for the 
greatness of Mao himself that we are paying tribute in this place to a man and thus to 
a nation and a people who until a short time ago were the objects of widespread 
hostility and suspicion in this country.
93
  
The Fraser years coincided with radical change in China, for the death of Mao would 
open the way for a comprehensive change in foreign policy and the introduction of a 
program of substantial economic liberalisation. After Hua Guofeng‘s brief period of 
leadership, Deng Xiaoping came to power and instituted the policies of modernisation 
and economic liberalisation which would ultimately result in China‘s radical 
transformation. Deng replaced ideological purity with a program of economic 
development, announcing his intention that China become a developed economy by the 
year 2000. 
‘Special Relationship’ 
After the election of the Hawke Labor Government the Australia–China relationship 
developed quickly. After his first trip to China as Prime Minister in 1984, Bob Hawke 
returned to Australia enthusiastically endorsing the reformist leaders Premier Zhao 
Ziyang, General Secretary Hu Yaobang and paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. Hawke 
spoke of reducing Australia‘s economic reliance on Japan and claimed that China 
would provide an immense market for Australian raw materials and manufactured 
goods. Hawke declared that ‗power would be derived from the benefits of economic 
liberalism and not, as Mao had put it, from ―the barrel of a gun‖‗.94  
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During Question Time on 19 April 1985 the Labor Member for Lowe, Michael Maher, 
asked the Prime Minister a ‗dorothy dixer‘ about the significance of Hu Yaobang‘s 
recent visit for the Australian economy. In his reply Hawke spoke of a ‗special 
relationship‘ that was developing between Australia and China.95 After a meeting with 
Deng Xiaoping in the following year, Hawke would confirm that Australia and China 
now shared ‗a very special relationship‘. In promoting the Chinese reforms, Hawke 
suggested that Chinese values, ideas and forms of government were becoming 
compatible with our own: ‗More and more, the Chinese system and its philosophy are 
becoming compatible with our sorts of values‘.96 
Optimism about the Australia–China relationship spread through government, business 
and educational sectors. Australians tried to build China into whatever they did: China 
became almost obligatory for government ministers, China business seminars 
proliferated, tertiary institutions signed up for exchanges with China, PhD scholarships 
were offered to people from China with no degree at all.
97
 Politicians spoke repeatedly 
about the prospect of selling a sock to every Chinese and every Australian was urged to 
understand China in order to take advantage of the new opportunities China presented. 
Australia‘s first Ambassador to China, Stephen FitzGerald, claims that even ‗the most 
conservative anti-communists and covert racists could not stay away from China‘.98 
When the Chinese Communist Party used military force to silence protestors in 
Tiananmen Square during 4–5 June 1989, Hawke‘s vision for Australia–China relations 
came unstuck. In a service at the Great Hall in Parliament House on 9 June, 
commemorating the lives of those killed, Prime Minister Hawke wept as he quoted 
from an Australian embassy cable which described the events in detail. Calling it ‗the 
saddest and the most compelling duty I have had to perform as Prime Minister‘, Hawke 
claimed: 
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… our optimism was shattered as we watched in horror the unyielding forces of 
repression brutally killing the vision of youth. Unarmed young men and women were 
sprayed with bullets and crushed by tanks. Innocent people were shot and beaten in 
the streets and in their homes … Thousands have been killed and injured, victims of a 
leadership that seems determined to hang on to the reins of power at any cost—at 
awful human cost.
99
 
This was followed by a motion in which Parliament expressed: 
… its outrage at the massive and indiscriminate slaughter of thousands of unarmed 
Chinese pro-democracy demonstrators and bystanders by units of the Chinese 
People‘s Liberation Army in Beijing on 4 and 5 June 1989.100 
In the following weeks Cabinet downgraded the relationship and suspended political 
contacts, ‗severely‘ constrained official contacts at the senior level, cancelled all party 
and parliamentary visits and put on hold technical cooperation projects, but did not 
introduce economic sanctions.
101
 In each instance contact was suspended rather than 
terminated and could be seen to represent a ‗symbolic‘ rather than an ‗instrumental‘ 
response.
102
  
The Hawke Government also committed to extending the visas of thousands of Chinese 
students in Australia.
103
 Noting the ‗horrifying abuses of human life and human rights 
which have occurred in China‘, Prime Minister Hawke took the opportunity to reassure 
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‗Chinese students and their Australian friends that the Government of Australia will 
keep their situation under close and sympathetic review‘. No Chinese students would be 
returned to China ‗in its current state‘.104 The Tiananmen Square incident would not 
only see matters of human rights become critical to the bilateral relationship, it 
ultimately resulted in the permanent settlement of more than 40,000 PRC Chinese in 
Australia.
105
 The year 1989 simultaneously embodies the Parliament‘s fears and hopes 
for China: it is the year in which the ‗Garnaut Report‘, Australia and the Northeast 
Asian Ascendancy, laid the foundations for Australia‘s policy for economic engagement 
with Northeast Asia and it is the year the Australian Parliament awoke to the reality of 
engaging with a system that was not going to change in the way some policy makers 
had wished it to.
106
 
This chapter has offered an account of the profound transformation that took place in 
Australian self-perceptions from the 1930s. The type of Australia that was imagined in 
the first decades after Federation—racially pure, separate from Asia and committed to 
pursuing imperial interests—was gradually replaced by an Australia which began to 
imagine Asia as part of its future. For a nation emerging out of the experience of the 
Great Depression, Australian policy makers looked upon Asia to help drag the nation 
out of economic depression. After this initial period of engagement we have observed 
the various shifts that took place in parliamentary perceptions of China during the post-
War period. ‗China‘ was variously imagined as both a threat to Australian political 
sovereignty and a place of great economic opportunity. The next chapter examines a 
different type of Australia–China relationship, a relationship that developed under the 
Howard Government and was predicated upon broad economic complementarity. 
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Chapter Three: Foreign Policy and ‘Identity Stuff’: Hu Jintao 
Addresses the Australian Parliament 
Chinese President Hu Jintao‘s address to a joint meeting of the Australian Parliament in 
October 2003 was a landmark event in the history of Australia–China relations. A 
moment of great ceremonial and symbolic significance, it represented a highpoint in the 
Howard Government‘s engagement with China. This chapter examines President Hu‘s 
address to the Australian Parliament from a range of perspectives. It begins by giving 
consideration to the history of parliamentary addresses by foreign heads of state, before 
turning to examine the addresses of President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Howard. 
Having provided an account of the way that these addresses came to offer some 
unexpected insights into the complexities that underscore the Australia–China 
relationship, it places the two addresses within the context of John Howard‘s regional 
diplomacy.  
Prior to October 2003, only two foreign heads of state had addressed a joint meeting of 
the Australian Parliament: United States President George Bush senior (January 1992) 
and United States President Bill Clinton (November 1996). On each occasion, the 
parliamentary setting had been chosen to honour the shared traditions of representative 
government and parliamentary democracy. When Parliament was recalled in late 
October 2003, in what Prime Minister John Howard referred to as ‗an unprecedented 
sequencing of speeches‘, Parliament would be addressed on consecutive days by the 
United States President, George W. Bush, and the President of the People‘s Republic of 
China, Hu Jintao.
1
  
The British House of Commons and the United States Congress have contrasting 
positions on inviting guests to address their legislative assemblies. British 
parliamentary practice only permits elected representatives to address the House of 
Commons while the United States Congress has a tradition of regularly extending 
invitations to foreign dignitaries. By and large the Australian Parliament has adopted 
the British model. In the fifty years following Federation, the Australian Parliament 
was addressed by only one visiting delegation—a delegation from the British House of 
Commons. The visitors presented the Mace to the Parliament, on the occasion of the 
Parliament‘s jubilee in 1951, and each member of the delegation addressed the House 
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of Representatives.
2
 It was not until the 1990s that the Australian practice began to shift 
more substantially towards the United States model, a change evidenced by the 
addresses made by President George Bush senior and President Bill Clinton.
3
  
The resolutions that were agreed to for the Bush and Hu visits in 2003 were similar to 
those which had been agreed to for the previous presidential visits: 
The House of Representatives by resolution invited the foreign visitor to address it, 
and invited the Senate to meet in the House of Representatives chamber at the same 
time to receive the address. The Senate by resolution then invited the foreign visitor 
to address the Senate, and agreed to meet in the House of Representatives chamber 
for that purpose. The resolutions of the two Houses also provided that the Speaker 
would preside over the joint meeting and that the procedures of the House of 
Representatives would apply to the joint meeting ‗so far as they are applicable‘.4 
Both presidents would therefore address a simultaneous and co-located meeting of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives; these meetings would be presided over by the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and would follow House procedures.
5
 
Prior to the Senate agreeing to these resolutions, Democrats Senator for Victoria, Lyn 
Allison moved two motions that Presidents Bush and Hu be received in the Great Hall 
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at Parliament House, rather than the House of Representatives.
6
 Senator Allison‘s 
motion was defeated (Ayes 9 to Noes 35). However, it resulted in a debate which made 
it clear that there was strong minor party opposition to inviting a non-democratically 
elected head of state to address the Australian Parliament.
7
 Senator for Tasmania, Brian 
Harradine, the longest-serving independent federal parliamentarian in Australia‘s 
history, advanced the following position: 
The proposal is to allow President Hu, who is a dictator—he is not elected and 
certainly not democratic—to address the democratically elected parliament of this 
country in the chamber. I take the view that, if we accept this, it will set a very bad 
precedent indeed and will reflect on the elected chambers.
8
 
Greens Senator for Tasmania, Bob Brown, who identified President Hu as ‗a dictator 
who has blood on his hands‘, concurred with Senator Harradine and argued that in 
offering the podium to the Chinese President, the Parliament had become a supplicant 
to ‗a rich and powerful trading nation‘.9  
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President Bush’s Address 
Senators Brown and Nettle defamed this nation and dishonoured our legislature … 
by heckling the American President. Senator Santo Santoro
10
 
Surely we must have a right to interact with anybody who comes into our parliament.
 Senator Bob Brown
11
 
On 23 October 2003, President Bush stood before the joint meeting of the Australian 
Parliament and spoke of the forces of good and the forces of evil. He suggested that the 
world was a better place without former Iraq President Saddam Hussein‘s prisons, mass 
graves, torture chambers and rape rooms. At the point at which the President suggested 
that no one should mourn the passing of Saddam Hussein‘s regime, Senator Bob Brown 
interjected. The Speaker immediately responded by warning Senator Brown about his 
behaviour. (In practice, interjections that are responded to by the Speaker should be 
documented in Hansard; however, Senator Brown‘s comments have been expurgated 
from the historical record.) Shortly after, Senator Brown interjected a second time. This 
prompted the Speaker to request the Senator excuse himself from the Chamber. Senator 
Brown defied the Chair by failing to comply with the Speaker‘s order. Some minutes 
later, when President Bush‘s attentions had turned to matters of security in the Pacific, 
he was again interrupted, this time by the Greens Senator for New South Wales, Kerry 
Nettle. After Senator Nettle‘s second interjection the Speaker told the Serjeant-at-Arms 
to remove her. By the time President Bush had concluded his speech, the Serjeant-at-
Arms had not been able to remove Senator Nettle. Senator Brown had also failed to 
withdraw from the chamber.
12
 Thereafter, the Speaker ‗named‘ Senators Brown and 
Nettle for defying the Chair and the Liberal Leader of the House of Representatives, 
Tony Abbott, moved ‗that Senators Brown and Nettle be suspended from the service of 
the House‘.13 The question was agreed to and Senators Brown and Nettle were 
                                                 
10. Senator Santoro, ‗Privileges Committee Reference‘, Senate, Debates, p. 17179.  
11. Senator Brown, ‗Address by the President of the People‘s Republic of China‘, Senate, 
Debates, 9 October 2003, p. 16025. 
12. See letter from the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Australian Greens 
submission to the Senate Privileges Committee‘s inquiry into ‗Matters arising from the 
joint meetings of the Senate and the House of Representatives on 23 and 24 October 
2003‘. 
13. ‗Address by the President of the United States of America‘, Senate, Debates, 23 October 
2003, p. 16721. It could be argued that their exclusion prevented Senators Brown and 
Nettle from fulfilling their primary objective—drawing attention to the matter of human 
rights in Tibet during President Hu‘s address on the following day. 
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suspended. The two senators were suspended not because they interjected during 
President Bush‘s speech, but because they defied the orders of the Speaker. Their 24-
hour suspension would prohibit them from attending President Hu‘s address the 
following day. 
On 23 October, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the 
Senate issued an instruction to parliamentary security personnel, informing them of the 
vote to exclude the two Senators. This instruction included the extraordinary, and 
unprecedented, directive that security officers, if necessary, employ ‗preventative force‘ 
to enforce their suspension. 
Senators Brown and Nettle, who had questioned the authority of the Speaker to ban 
them from attending the Chinese President‘s address, approached the chamber on the 
morning of 24 October. As they proceeded through the glass link-way, they were 
spoken to by parliamentary security personnel before they withdrew. They did not 
attempt to enter the chamber.
14
 
The disorder that resulted from the interjections by Senators Brown and Nettle during 
President Bush‘s address raised a number of procedural and jurisdictional anomalies. 
Shortly after the presidential visits, Senator Brian Harradine suggested that the only 
constitutional precedent for a joint sitting was section 57 of the Constitution which 
permits both houses of Parliament to sit together to resolve deadlocks.
15
 Section 57 of 
the Constitution, Disagreement between the Houses, suggests a joint sitting is a specific 
body constituted under the provision that members of both houses may meet to vote on 
legislation which remains in disagreement after a simultaneous or ‗double‘ dissolution. 
There is no other constitutional authorisation permitting senators and members to meet 
together. It would appear, therefore, that some years ago, when the Parliament began to 
replicate the American practice of inviting foreign dignitaries to address Congress, little 
or no consideration was given to the differences between the Australian and the United 
States constitutions.  
                                                 
14. Committee of Privileges, ‗Joint meetings of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
on 23 and 24 October 2003‘, 118th Report, April 2004, pp. 6–7. 
15. ‗Procedure Committee Reference‘, Senate, Debates, 28 October 2003, p. 17015. 
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11. Security Directive—Friday 24 October, 2003, included in the Australian Greens submission 
to the Senate Privileges Committee‘s inquiry into ‗Matters arising from the joint meetings of 
the Senate and the House of Representatives on 23 and 24 October, 2003‘16 
A critical distinction emerged between the status of joint sittings and joint meetings. 
There has only been one joint sitting of the Australian Parliament under section 57 of 
the Constitution. This occurred in August 1974 in order to pass 6 bills that had led to a 
                                                 
16. Australian Greens submission, 118th Report, Senate Standing Committee of Privileges, 
1 April 2004. 
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double dissolution. Since 1992, there have been five occasions when the houses have 
been brought together for joint meetings. In four instances this was to receive addresses 
by foreign heads of state. The fifth joint meeting was held in 2001 in the Royal 
Exhibition Buildings in Melbourne to commemorate the centenary of the first meeting 
of the Commonwealth Parliament on 9 May 1901.
17
 
The suspension of the two senators called into question the legitimacy of the joint 
meeting. It was unclear whether, constitutionally, these were in fact proceedings of 
Parliament. Moreover, there was uncertainty as to whether, in suspending senators from 
a meeting of the Senate, without a vote of the Senate, the Speaker‘s ruling violated the 
principle of the complete autonomy of the Houses. In the months that followed the 
addresses of Presidents Bush and Hu, the Senate Standing Committee on Procedure and 
the Senate Standing Committee of Privileges investigated how the Senate should deal 
with future addresses by foreign heads of state.
18
 The Committee on Procedure‘s Third 
Report of December 2003, ‗Joint Meeting to Receive Addresses by Foreign Heads of 
State‘, argued that the provisions which were made for the joint meetings of the two 
houses made them virtually indistinguishable from joint sittings. Moreover, given that 
there was no constitutional authority for a joint meeting, the authority of the Speaker to 
exercise disciplinary power over Senators was potentially invalid. Both Committees 
therefore agreed that the practice of joint meetings be discontinued. The Committee on 
Procedure argued: 
… the procedure for the occasions be changed so that they [addresses by foreign 
heads of state] would be meetings of the House of Representatives in the House of 
Representatives chamber, which senators would be invited to attend as guests, and 
not formal meetings of the Senate. This would not change the appearance of the 
occasions, but would avoid the problems of the joint meetings. Senators would not be 
under the same obligation to attend as for sittings of the Senate.
19
  
                                                 
17. Committee of Privileges, ‗Joint meetings of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
on 23 and 24 October 2003‘, 118th Report, April 2004, p. 11. 
18. The Senate Standing Committee on Procedure was requested ‗to draw up rules which 
should apply to joint meetings of the Parliament, if any‘, ‗Joint meetings to receive 
addresses by foreign heads of state‘, Third Report of 2003, December 2003, p. 1. The 
Committee of Privileges was to examine a range of supplementary matters arising from 
the joint meetings including: the presence of foreign security personnel, the seating of 
senators‘ and members‘ guests and the implications for the powers, privileges and 
immunities of the Senate which arose as a result of the joint meeting.  
19. Senate Standing Committee on Procedure Committee, Joint meetings to receive 
addresses by foreign heads of state, Third Report of 2003, December 2003, p. 3. 
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The Committee recommended therefore that: 
… the Senate pass a resolution expressing its opinion that future addresses by foreign 
heads of state should be received in this manner and that the resolution be forwarded 
to the House of Representatives so that the government can consider this proposal 
whenever future occasions arise.
20
 
The Committee of Privileges endorsed the recommendation made by the Committee on 
Procedure while making a number of important statements about the powers, privileges 
and immunities of Senators during a joint meeting. The Committee claimed that 
‗serious doubts must remain about the status and validity of arrangements under which 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives purported to exercise the disciplinary 
powers of the House over Senators who were participating in a meeting of the Senate‘. 
It added further, that it is quite possible that the Senate could not constitutionally forego 
or waive any of ‗its powers, privileges and immunities, let alone submit to the 
jurisdiction of the House‘.21 
On the recommendations of the Committee on Procedures and the Committee of 
Privileges an alternative practice for a joint meeting of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate was adopted.
22
 Message no. 297 acquainted the Senate with the 
resolution, agreed to on 2 March 2006, that in the future, senators be invited to attend 
the House as guests. When Tony Blair became the first British Prime Minister to 
address the Australian Parliament on 27 March 2006, he did not address a joint meeting 
of Parliament, but a meeting of the House of Representatives which senators attended 
as guests. Senators also attended the House as guests when the Prime Minister of 
Canada, Stephen Harper, addressed the Australian Parliament on 12 September 2007.
23
 
President Hu‘s address was therefore the last occasion on which the two houses of the 
Australian Parliament would meet for a concurrent sitting. 
                                                 
20. ibid. 
21. Committee of Privileges, ‗Joint meetings of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
on 23 and 24 October 2003‘, 118th Report, April 2004, p. 12. 
22. Harry Evans (ed.), Odgers’ Australian Senate Practice, 11th ed., Department of the 
Senate, Canberra, 2004, Supplementary Updates to 31 December 2006 (2007), p. 4. 
23. Prime Minster Harper was asked to address the Parliament to reciprocate the courtesy 
extended to Prime Minister Howard. In May 2006 John Howard became the first 
Australian Prime Minister to address the Canadian Parliament since John Curtin in 1944. 
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Prelude to President Hu’s Visit 
Much of the parliamentary debate which occurred prior to President Hu‘s visit took 
place in the Senate. It was led by the Democrats, Greens and Independents and 
primarily focused upon China‘s human rights record. In examining aspects of this 
debate we can develop some appreciation of how the voices of both the major and 
minor parties contribute to the operations of Parliament and the activities of multi-
party, parliamentary democracy. The discussion also helps to highlight differences in 
the political and representational functions of different political parties. It emerges that 
while the minor parties can examine issues like human rights in China, as isolated 
concerns, the Government, and even the Opposition, feel obliged to situate such 
concerns within the context of a concert of foreign policy interests. 
Senators Harradine and Brown were the first parliamentarians to request that the 
government use the opportunity of President Hu‘s visit to raise Australian concerns 
about human rights in China. The Greens also took the position that if Hu was to 
address the Parliament then parliamentarians should be permitted to put questions to 
him. Senator Brown suggested: 
If we are to entertain the thought of President Hu coming to the rostrum to address 
the several hundred representatives elected by the people of Australia, for goodness 
sake, let us not even mock the situation in the Great Hall of the People in China, 
where nobody can speak on any subject unless permitted to do so. We are not 
mummies. We are not here just to listen. We are here to take part in debate.
24
 
When pressed about whether the government would use the opportunity of the visit to 
raise concerns over human rights in China, the Leader of the Government in the Senate, 
Senator Robert Hill, spoke of Australia‘s ongoing Human Rights Dialogue with China, 
asserting that as China continues to develop economically, there will be equivalent 
improvement in human rights. Hill added, ‗Certainly Australian foreign affairs 
ministers take the opportunity, when appropriate, to raise these issues with China and 
press upon China our values and also to point out the advantages of a more open and 
liberal society‘.25 In the House, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, 
claimed Australia‘s Human Rights Dialogue with China has given Australia ‗an 
                                                 
24. Senator Brown, ‗Address by the President of the People‘s Republic of China‘, Senate, 
Debates, 9 October, 2003, p. 16025. This position was advanced in the House by Greens 
representative Michael Organ, ‗Address by the President of the People‘s Republic of 
China‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 8 October 2003, p. 20797. 
25. Senator Hill, ‗Human Rights: China‘, Senate, Debates, 14 October 2003, p. 16293. 
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extraordinary opportunity to be able to raise a full range of human rights issues, 
including those related to Tibet‘ adding that ‗The range of issues that are of interest and 
concern between Australia and China will, of course, be discussed‘.26  
Democrats Senator for South Australia, Natasha Stott Despoja, who also described 
President Hu‘s visit as an opportunity to challenge the Chinese Government on its 
human rights record, proposed a motion that the Senate note that wide ranging human 
rights abuses were taking place across China.
27
 The wording of Motion 641 was 
modelled on a similar resolution that was passed by Congress. It included calls for the 
release of prisoners being held in relation to non-violent protest activities, the repeal of 
laws which permit the government to interfere in religious affairs and the call for an 
immediate visit by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Religion.
28
 Senator Stott 
Despoja drew attention to the fact that while the Opposition was prepared to support a 
motion about human rights issues in the United States they were not prepared to 
support a motion expressing similar concerns in relation to China. The Leader of the 
Opposition in the Senate, Senator John Faulkner, offered a response in which he 
reiterated the Opposition‘s support for upholding human rights internationally; he 
reminded the Senate of the Labor Party‘s ‗long and proud history with China‘ and he 
acknowledged that human rights abuses continue to occur in China. However, he added 
that Motion 641 was ‗too broad to be considered seriously without a fully-fledged and 
proper debate‘:  
Motions on foreign policy matters are a blunt instrument that cannot easily express 
the nuances that are necessarily a part of effective international diplomacy. There are 
a number of elements to which we are, of course, naturally sympathetic but there are 
other elements of the motion that do not accurately convey our position on these 
matters. That is why we have not given leave for this motion to be declared formal.
29
  
                                                 
26. Questions without notice, ‗Human Rights‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 
13 October 2003, p. 21177. On the same day Luke Hartsuyker, Trish Worth and Ann 
Corcoran presented petitions to the House drawing attention to the persecution of Falun 
Gong practitioners. Senator Stott Despoja also claimed that many senators had received 
phone calls, faxes and letters requesting that these issues be highlighted. 
27. Senator Stott Despoja, ‗Human Rights: China‘, Senate, Debates, 16 October 2003, 
pp. 16606, 16641–16642. 
28. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Notice Paper No. 105, 14 October 
2003 and Senator Stott Despoja, ‗Human Rights China‘, Senate, Debates, 16 October 
2003, p. 16642. 
29. Senator Faulkner, ‗Human Rights: China‘, Senate, Debates, 16 October 2003, 
pp. 16643–16644. 
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The unsuccessful motion was supported by the Democrats, the Greens and Independent, 
Senator Harradine.  
To coincide with the visit of President Hu Jintao, the Australia Tibet Council prepared 
an advertisement requesting that the Chinese President engage in substantive dialogue 
with the Dalai Lama and his representatives about the future of Tibet. The full-page 
advertisement, appeared in the Australian and was signed by supporters of the Australia 
Tibet Council, including members of federal and state legislatures. China‘s Consul-
General in Melbourne, Junting Tian, wrote to one of the coordinators of the 
advertisement, Victorian parliamentarian Elaine Carbines, with the following message:  
I am now writing to remind you that the Tibet issue is an internal matter of the 
People‘s Republic of China which is very sensitive. Tibet has been part of China 
since the Yuan Dynasty in the mid-12
th
 to the mid-13
th
 century, and it is recognised 
by the whole international community, including the Australian government, that 
Tibet is a part of China.
30
 
The Consul-General then met with the Presiding Officers of the Victorian Parliament. 
After being criticised for his interference in the Australian political process, and for his 
intimidatory behaviour, the Consul-General explained to the Australian newspaper, ‗he 
did not wish to silence parliamentarians. But he felt the advertisement would be 
―disrespectful‖ to the President‘.31  
Following the representations that were made by the Chinese Consulate in Melbourne 
the Chinese Embassy in Canberra made direct representations to the Australian media. 
The Press Counsellor at the Chinese Embassy, Feng Tie, emailed the following 
message to Fairfax newspapers about ‗anti-China forces‘ operating in Australia: 
                                                 
30. ‗Vic MPs say they will persist with pro-Tibet ad‘, The World Today, 17 October 2003.  
31. Steve Lewis, ‗Chinese embassy in bid to ‗silence‘ MPs‘, Australian, 17 October 2003. 
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12. ‗To the President of China‘, Australia Tibet Council, Australian, 24 October 2003—
reproduced with the permission of the Australia Tibet Council Ltd (www.atc.org.au) 
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As you may already know, President Hu Jintao of China will soon come to visit 
Australia. This visit will be a major event in China-Australia relations with profound 
significance. Now both the Chinese and Australian sides are working to ensue [sic] 
the smoothness and success of the visit. However, we have learnt that some anti-
China forces in Australia, such as organizations for independence of Tibet or 
Falungong, are planning to disrupt the visit by issuing an open letter or putting up 
political advertisements in local papers at the time of the Presidents [sic] visit. To 
make sure that the visit will be free from such disruption, we hope that your paper 
will not publish their open letter, carry their political advertisements or any of their 
propaganda. It is our wish that with the success of the visit by President Hu, the 
friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries will grow further.
32
 
To which the editor-in-chief of the Australian Financial Review, Michael Gill, replied: 
I‘m afraid that our policy on accepting or refusing advertisements does not provide 
for such requests. It is, naturally, our wish that relations between Australia and China 
should continue to improve. However, we do not believe that goal would be served 
by censoring advertisements or other legitimate expressions of opinion.
33
 
The Australia Tibet Council advertisement appeared in the Australian newspaper on the 
day of President Hu‘s address and carried the names of the following federal 
parliamentarians: Greens Senator for Tasmania, Bob Brown; the Labor Member for 
Melbourne Ports, Michael Danby; Labor Member for Denison, Duncan Kerr; the 
Greens Member for Cunningham, Michael Organ; the Labor Member for Sydney, 
Tanya Plibersek; the Greens Senator for New South Wales, Kerry Nettle and the Labor 
Member for Melbourne, Lindsay Tanner.  
President Hu Jintao’s Address 
In what was one of his first overseas addresses as President, Hu offered a sweeping 
speech structured around the four principles he considers necessary for smooth state-to-
state relations: mutual political respect, economic complementarity, cultural 
understanding and a commitment to security and world peace. In describing the China–
Australia relationship as one of ‗all-round cooperation‘, an expression which he used 
four times, President Hu outlined the characteristics of the relationship which fulfil 
each of these principles. Yet, within this seemingly benign framework, Hu gestured 
that, while cooperative, the bilateral relationship is by no means unconditional. Hu 
infered that there numerous criteria that must be satisfied for the spirit of economic 
                                                 
32. Margo Kingston, ‗Howard humiliates our Parliament and betrays our democracy for Hu‘, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 25 October 2003. 
33. ibid.  
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cooperation to continue. Australia should recognise Taiwan as ‗an inalienable part of 
Chinese territory‘, oppose the ‗splittist activities‘ of Taiwanese independence forces, 
maintain a position of non-interference in China‘s internal affairs and reaffirm 
Australia‘s commitment to multilateralism. (The full text of President Hu and Prime 
Minister Howard‘s addresses are contained in Appendix A.)  
Hu opened his address with a narrative connecting China with Australia—the 
expeditionary fleets of the Ming Dynasty which travelled to Australian shores in the 
fifteenth century: 
The Chinese people have all along cherished amicable feelings about the Australian 
people. Back in the 1420s, the expeditionary fleets of China‘s Ming dynasty reached 
Australian shores. For centuries, the Chinese sailed across vast seas and settled down 
in what was called ‗the southern land‘, or today‘s Australia. They brought Chinese 
culture here and lived harmoniously with the local people, contributing their proud 
share to Australia‘s economy, society and thriving pluralistic society.  
While Hu avoided the terms discover or discovery, instead choosing the term reached, 
the phrase all along is suggestive of an original or originating point, not simply for 
Chinese contact, but for contact itself—350 years before Cook. In acknowledging that 
this land was identified as ‗the southern land‘, Hu also implied that the land, if not 
regularly visited, existed in the Ming imagination—with the Chinese giving the land 
both a name and a cartographic identity. In each instance, somewhat controversially, 
Hu created a distinctively Chinese counter-narrative of Australia‘s early history. 
The debate about the Chinese discovery of Australia has been revived in recent years 
by the publication of Gavin Menzies‘ book, 1421: The Year China Discovered the 
World (2002). Menzies, a retired British Royal Navy Commanding Officer, who was 
born in China in 1937, claims ‗it is virtually impossible to claim that Columbus 
discovered America, that Cook found Australia or that Magellan was the first to 
circumnavigate the world. You have to be a crank nowadays to believe that‘.34 Instead, 
Menzies argues that Chinese fleets, under the command of the eunuch-admiral Zheng 
He (1371–1433), travelled through Southeast Asia to Africa and beyond. Among the 
objects that Menzies offers as evidence of the Chinese voyages to Australia are a map 
on porcelain showing the coastline of what is now New Guinea, Aboriginal rock 
carvings depicting junks, wreckages of ancient ships, wooden pegs found near Byron 
Bay, provisionally carbon-dated to the mid-fifteenth century, and an ancient Chinese 
                                                 
34. As quoted in ‗Experts hope to emulate Chinese Columbus‘, BBC News, 22 October 
2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/2349929.stm (accessed 20 May 2007). 
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stone head depicting a goddess found at Ulladulla on the New South Wales coast. Since 
its publication, professional historians have called into question the historical accuracy 
of 1421. In establishing a chronology of factual, interpretative and sourcing errors, 
these historians have suggested that Menzies‘ text be best read as a work of alternative 
history or historical fiction.  
Hu Jintao‘s historiography comes into conflict with two historical legacies, two other 
histories.
35
 In suggesting a pre-European, Chinese discovery of ‗the southern land‘, Hu 
challenged the white settlement narrative that Australia, and the Parliament itself, has 
anxiously created to conceal the history of indigenous dispossession—Cook‘s 
discovery of terra nullius, Australia. Yet, while Hu overwrote this legacy he also 
demonstrated complicity with it. In rendering the traditional owners of the land 
invisible, indistinguishable within a culture of pluralism, Hu‘s historiography similarly 
overlooked the legacy of indigenous sovereignty. Potentially offensive to indigenous, 
nationalist and postcolonial sensibilities, the President‘s remarks are made more 
problematic by the fact that he called for, nay demanded, that Australia respect China‘s 
territorial integrity, identify Taiwan ‗an inalienable part of Chinese territory‘ and play a 
‗constructive role in China‘s peaceful reunification‘.  
While foreign policy speechmaking is largely declaratory, public statements on foreign 
policy are, more often than not, the result of a complex and strategic process. Given 
this, how should we interpret Hu‘s appropriation of a nationalist narrative which 
suggests a Chinese discovery of Australia? It could be argued that Hu drew upon the 
story of Zheng He, not simply to situate Australia within the Chinese historical 
consciousness, but to demonstrate that China has a long history of peaceful contact with 
the people of this land. In claiming that the Chinese had ‗lived harmoniously with the 
local people‘, Hu suggested that China has never been an imperial or colonising power, 
and infered, allegorically, that Australians can be reassured—they have nothing to fear 
from China‘s rise. 
                                                 
35. The Chinese–Australian artist, Guan Wei, has drawn upon Menzies‘ account of a Ming 
discovery of Australia to create the exhibition, Other histories: Guan Wei’s fable for a 
contemporary world. In contrast to Menzies, Guan Wei draws upon the legend of Zheng 
He, and the Chinese voyages of 1405–1433, to demonstrate the instability of history and 
the constant exposure of history to the forces of manipulation and fictionalisation. Guan 
Wei employs the notions of historical contestability, palimpsest and invention to 
destabilise or even replace the concept of historical empiricism and remind us of the 
instability of all our historical visions.  
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Hu was not the only Chinese Government official to draw upon Zheng He‘s friendly 
voyages. In her attempt to illustrate the peaceful continuity in China–Australia 
relations, Ambassador Madame Fu Ying would also go on to speak of Zheng He‘s 
expedition to Australia, claiming that ‗Australia has always been on China‘s map of 
world voyage‘.36 Zheng He fever extended beyond the peaceful nationalism of Chinese 
officials and in the days following Hu‘s address, Liberal Senator for Western Australia, 
David Johnston, suggested Zheng He be rightly acknowledged in Australian history:  
Our history books should make greater acknowledgement of their feats [the fleets of 
Zheng He]. Tonight, time prevents me from further detailed discussion of these 
monumental voyages of exploration and discovery. However, I would like to concur 
with President Hu Jintao‘s statement that the Chinese fleets of 1421 did in fact visit 
our shores … I direct senators who have an interest in this area to read the excellent 
work of Gavin Menzies in his book 1421—The Year China Discovered the World. I 
am indebted to Gavin Menzies, Royal Navy submariner, and his outstanding research 
that has greatly assisted me in my understanding of this aspect of our history 
[emphasis added].
37
 
President Hu‘s address was largely delivered without incident. Senator Brian Harradine 
was the only member of Parliament to boycott Hu‘s address. Liberal Senator for New 
South Wales, Bill Heffernan, was described as protesting against President Hu‘s 
presence by refusing to wear his translation-headset, while several other Liberals were 
alleged to have failed to clap at the conclusion of the speech.
38
 The only representative 
of the Australian Greens present, Michael Organ, wore a Tibetan flag on his jacket 
lapel and a black armband to protest against political prisoners held in China. However, 
while President Hu‘s address was largely delivered without incident, the address began 
late. Minutes before the scheduled commencement of the meeting, the Chinese Foreign 
Minister met with the Presiding Officers and insisted that certain guests be removed 
from the public galleries in order to prevent any potential interruptions. This resulted in 
the meeting beginning at 10:04 rather than the scheduled time of 10:00.
39
 
The intervention by the Foreign Minister resulted in claims that the Chinese 
Government had exercised, or sought to exercise, inappropriate influence over 
                                                 
36. Speech to the National Press Club of Australia as quoted in Geoffrey Barker, ‗Diplomacy 
Personified‘, Australian Financial Review, 10 June 2005, p. 20.  
37. Senator Johnston, ‗Foreign Affairs: China‘ Senate, Debates, 27 October 2003, p. 16853. 
38. Margo Kingston, ‗Howard humiliates our Parliament and betrays our democracy for Hu‘, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 25 October 2003.   
39. Committee of Privileges, ‗Joint meetings of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
on 23 and 24 October 2003‘, 118th Report, April 2004, p. 21. 
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parliamentary proceedings. The Committee of Privileges was charged with examining 
two allegations. First, whether the Chinese Government had in fact sought to have the 
guests of the Greens senators removed from the open public galleries and seated in the 
enclosed galleries. Second, whether the Chinese Government had been in any way 
responsible for seeking the exclusion of Senators Brown and Nettle from the House.
40
 
The Committee of Privileges found, somewhat inconclusively: 
The question of Chinese government influences on the exclusion of Senators Brown 
and Nettle from the proceedings and the method by which that exclusion was 
achieved is impossible to determine in the absence of further evidence from the 
Speaker and evidence from the Chinese government.
41
 
The Speaker made the decision to place guests of the Australian Greens in the glazed 
galleries and accepts that Chinese government agents did not directly inappropriately 
influence his decision. The committee is unable to pursue with the Speaker the extent 
to which he may have been influenced by a desire to avoid offending the Chinese and 
whether this amounted to inappropriate influence, albeit indirectly.
42
 
Should Australians be concerned about the Chinese Government‘s attempt to censor 
Australian media content or their efforts to extend influence over Australia‘s 
parliamentary proceedings? Is Hu‘s speech of long-term strategic importance? In 
coupling Hu‘s alternative version of the past, with the conditions he outlines for the 
future, it could be argued that Hu‘s comments signalled a new era in Australia–China 
relations, an era when a more self-assured and assertive China would begin to project 
its influence. For Hu makes clear that if Australia is to continue sharing the yields that 
derive from China‘s ‗socialist modernisation drive‘, then Australia can expect China to 
be more explicit in its attempts to influence public debate and Australian government 
policy.
43
 
                                                 
40. According to Matt Price, ‗Organ‘s invited guests—two Tibetans and a Chinese 
democrat—were ordered out of the open visitor‘s gallery and deposited behind the glass 
high above the chamber, all on the orders of Hu Jintao‘s security‘. ‗Wilting Green a 
wallflower in the house of nil dispute‘, Weekend Australian, 25–26 October 2003, p. 9. 
Michael Organ‘s guests were Democratic China Chairman, Chin Jin and Mr Dhondup 
Phun Tsok and Mrs Tsering Deki Tshokoto. 
41. Committee of Privileges, ‗Joint meetings of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
on 23 and 24 October 2003‘, 118th Report, April 2004, p. 22. 
42. ibid. 
43. For a discussion of the way China envisages the role it can play in international affairs 
see: Jian Zhang‘s Building ‘a harmonious world’? Chinese perceptions of regional order 
and implications for Australia, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 2007. 
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13. President Hu Jintao addresses a joint meeting of the Australian Parliament, image courtesy 
Peter West/Auspic.  
Prime Minister Howard’s Address  
Prime Minister Howard‘s invitation to President Hu to address the Parliament was 
strategic: it fortified a relationship with one of the world‘s most dynamic economies, it 
signalled Australia‘s embrace of China as a regional partner, while also placing China, 
at least symbolically, on a foreign policy footing alongside the United States. Beyond 
this, the opportunity allowed Howard to challenge the longstanding myth that the 
Australian Labor Party, which has perennially considered itself the traditional custodian 
of the Australia–China relationship, was best placed to manage its development. Hu‘s 
appearance before the Parliament would inexorably link Australia‘s burgeoning 
relationship with communist China with the Liberal Party‘s strategy of practical and 
commonsense engagement with Asia. While Howard‘s invitation to Hu confirmed the 
strength of the relationship, it also demonstrated Howard‘s credentials as an effective 
and dominant foreign policy prime minister, at once vindicating his commitment to a 
foreign policy dominated by ‗pragmatic‘ bilateralism.44 
                                                 
44. The Howard Government‘s relationship with China had not always been so trouble free. 
In 1996, the new government supported the dispatch of a United States naval group to 
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In his opening statement to Parliament, Prime Minister Howard pointed out that ten 
years previously it would have been very unlikely that a Chinese head of state would 
address the Australian Parliament: ‗It would be no exaggeration to say that 10 years ago 
an event such as this would have been seen as not only unlikely but indeed highly 
improbable‘. In making such a claim Howard alluded to the advances that have taken 
place in Australia–China relations as well as within China itself. China had not only 
become a major importer of Australian raw materials, but within the decade, China had 
experienced a profound shift in its economic character. China had adopted various 
liberal market ideals: promoting the individual work ethic, connecting personal 
prosperity to national wealth, increasing domestic savings and substantially boosting its 
foreign reserves. Within the ten-year period, China had also become integrated into the 
international trading system through gaining membership to groups like the World 
Trade Organization, while also emerging as a key international stakeholder.
45
 
Like Hu, Howard made it clear that mutual interest and economic complementarity are 
the forces that have built a co-operative bilateral relationship: Australia, rich in natural 
resources, has supplied China with the mineral and energy resources to fulfil its 
development needs. However, while Howard identified this complementarity, his 
welcoming remarks were preoccupied with identifying the perceived differences 
between Australia and China. In what was a short speech, Howard used the word 
different six times … ‗We are different societies. We have different cultures, we have 
different traditions and we have different histories. No purpose is served in pretending 
                                                                                                                                              
the Taiwan Straits, after China conducted missile tests to threaten Taiwan. While China 
was openly critical of Australia, for being too closely tied to the United States, there were 
no long term repercussions for the bilateral relationship. For a more complete description 
of the character of John Howard‘s pragmatic bilateralism see: Paul Kelly, Howard’s 
decade: an Australian foreign policy reappraisal, Lowy Institute paper 15, Longueville 
Media, Sydney, 2006 and Michael Wesley, The Howard Paradox: Australian diplomacy 
in Asia, 1996–2006, ABC Books, Sydney, 2007. 
45. In response to concerns raised by the Member for Cowan, Graham Edwards, about the 
anticipated length of President Hu‘s address and the travel arrangements for those who 
live in ‗distant states‘, the Leader of the House, Tony Abbott, responded that he had not 
been informed of a specified period of time but that he imagined that ‗a ceremonial 
address of this nature would not go for an inordinate length of time‘ and that he was 
confident that members could book a lunchtime or an afternoon flight. At which point the 
Member for Banks, Daryl Melham, interjected: ‗Castro does four hours!‘. The Leader of 
the House responded, ‗I think the President of China is a reformed member of a certain 
political party, and I think that the member would be safe to catch an early afternoon 
flight back to Perth‘, ‗Address by the President of the People‘s Republic of China‘, 
House of Representatives, Debates, 16 October 2003, p. 21657. 
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otherwise‘. Howard proceeded to speak of people-to-people links; he cited the role 
China has played in nuclear disarmament negotiations with North Korea, before 
concluding that it is Australia‘s aim to promote constructive dialogue between China 
and the United States—countries with whom Australia has ‗different but nonetheless 
close‘ relations.  
Given the setting, the uniqueness of the occasion and the symbolic and political weight 
attached, one would anticipate that Hu‘s presence would have been marked by a lively 
speech which brought the significance of proceedings into focus. Instead, Howard 
offered a speech which was cold and devoid of colour. It was uncrafted, employed 
plain, dispassionate language and was replete with awkward and unmemorable 
sentences, for example: ‗I would characterise the relationship between Australia and 
China as being both mature and practical and as being a relationship that is intensely 
built upon growing people-to-people links‘. Moreover, where Hu expressed some 
affection for Australia and its people—speaking of cultural exchange as a bridge of 
friendship between the two peoples—Howard failed to display either an interest in 
China or any affection for the Chinese people. Beyond this, Howard failed to deliver a 
message that is by any measure representative. He spoke of himself, and for his 
government, not once mentioning the Australian people. When Howard did refer to 
people-to-people links, he spoke of the number of Chinese-Australians in his seat of 
Bennelong. Despite the uniqueness of the occasion, the speech failed to reflect upon the 
character or beliefs of either the Australian or Chinese people and impled that the two 
countries (and their political leaderships) share little beyond complementary 
economies.
46
  
                                                 
46. Paul Kelly claims ‗Howard was inadequately prepared‘ and ‗failed, surprisingly, to seize 
the moment‘ while Annabel Crabb suggests that the speech was delivered ‗off the cuff‘, 
Paul Kelly, ‗Power at Stake‘, Weekend Australian, 25–26 October 2003, p. 17 and 
Annabel Crabb, ‗Off the cuff looking a little frayed‘, Age, 25 October 2003, p. 8. By 
contrast, Howard‘s speech to Sydney‘s Australian-Chinese community in December 
2004 is more successful in articulating what is common to the two nations, ‗We seek 
friendship with the Chinese people but very particularly I want to take the opportunity 
today of expressing my admiration to the Chinese Australian Community for the 
contribution it has made to our nation over a very long period of time. You‘ve brought to 
Australia … your strong sense of family unity, your hard work, your thirst for education, 
your business acumen, your willingness whilst preserving your own cultural identity to 
become part of the broader Australian community‘. John Howard, ‗Address to Sydney‘s 
Australian Chinese Community, Golden Century Chinese Restaurant‘, Sydney, 
22 December 2004.  
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14. Prime Minister John Howard introduces President Hu Jintao to the Shadow Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and International Security, Kevin Rudd, image courtesy Peter West/ Auspic. 
Howard‘s coolness became more apparent when these welcoming remarks are 
compared with those made for President Bush on the previous day. Howard‘s personal 
affection for Bush, his celebration of the nations‘ common values and his honouring of 
the shared military history, resulted in a speech with a contrasting content, rhythm, 
tenor, language, sentence structure and an overwhelmingly different range of 
temporalities.
47
 Bush‘s speech conveyed a similar—albeit folksy—sense of closeness 
                                                 
47. This disproportion is also reflected in the official gifts presented to the two presidents 
and their wives. President Hu was given a hand-blown cobalt blue freeform vessel & 
jarrah wine presentation box (value: $332.00) and a jackaroo akubra hat (value: $127.27) 
while the President‘s wife, Madame Liu, was presented with black emu and cow leather 
handbag (value: $91.00). President Bush was given a cobalt blue glass platter (value: 
$240.00), Helen Hewson‘s 300 Years of Botanical Illustration—limited edition (value: 
$267.27), and he and his wife were given his-and-her drizabone short coats with fleece 
liners (value: $503.64). The President‘s wife, Laura Bush, was also given a standard 
edition of Helen Hewson‘s 300 Years of Botanical Illustration (value: $65.45) and a 
signed copy of Geoffrey Blainey‘s Black Kettle and Full Moon (value: $76.36)—total 
values: $550.27 (President Hu) and $1144.42 (President Bush). ‗Questions in Writing: 
Official Gifts‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 10 May 2005, p. 72. The total cost of 
the Hu visit was $211,456.60 (travel: $47,662.35, accommodation: $43,945.54, security: 
$2,492.07, other expenses: $117,356.64) Daryl Melham, ‗Question in Writing: President 
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and affection and Bush reminded the Parliament that when Howard recently visited the 
Bush ranch in Texas he dubbed him, a ‗man of steel‘.  
The welcoming address delivered by the Leader of the Opposition, Simon Crean, 
succeeded, in many instances, where Howard‘s failed. Drawing upon the Labor Party‘s 
China-legacy, Crean borrowed the aphorism used by former Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin, when visiting Australia in 1999—‘There is an old Chinese saying: when you go 
to the well to draw water, remember who dug the well‘. Crean paid tribute to the old 
well-diggers: Gough Whitlam, who was sitting in the public gallery, his father Frank, 
who accompanied Whitlam during his first visit to China as Prime Minister in 1973, 
and the Chinese Premier of that time, Zhou Enlai. In elaborating upon this shared 
history, Crean was able to honour the relationship in a way that Howard, with his 
fixation on difference, commonsense and practicality, could not. Crean also created a 
sense of affection and intimacy through congratulating the Chinese, on behalf of the 
Parliament, and the Australian people, on their recent manned space flight.
48
 Crean‘s 
speech avoided the cool, guarded, uncompromising and values-focused perspective that 
is offered by Howard and he made a better attempt at demonstrating what the political 
leaderships might have in common.  
Practical Realism  
If we consider foreign policy speeches as a political and diplomatic mechanism for 
overlooking, or even overcoming, cultural and ideological difference, it seems odd that 
Howard would use this opportunity to draw attention to the differences between the 
nations. So why did Howard offer a speech so clearly focused upon the difference 
between Australia and China? It could be argued that Howard wanted to remind people 
not to become unrealistic about a relationship which is forged by countries who hold 
different values. Moreover, Howard attempted to use ‗difference‘ strategically; he 
employed it to operate as a buffer between the two nations, a strategic space from 
which Australia can enter into ‗open and frank discussions‘ with China.49 
                                                                                                                                              
of the People‘s Republic of China: Travel Costs‘ House of Representatives, Debates, 
5 September 2006, p. 122. 
48. It should also be noted that Crean refers to ‗this parliament of the Australian people‘.  
49. Howard‘s address avoids the question that lingers at its heart: how do two countries with 
‗distinctive yet different traditions‘ manage their differences in times of disagreement or 
conflict? For surely the ‗maturity‘ of any transactional relationship is tested not in times 
of progress, but in times of strife.  
Chapter Three: Foreign Policy and ‘Identity Stuff’ 
97 
In order to fully understand this focus on difference we need to place it within the 
context of Howard‘s foreign policy vision. Howard described his approach to foreign 
policy as ‗positive realism‘.50 Positive realism suggests a strategy of maintaining a 
realistic appreciation of the difference between societies and cultures while positively 
focusing on shared interests and mutual respect; elsewhere Howard called it ‗pragmatic 
engagement‘. Howard‘s foreign policy realism was positive, because it could benefit 
from shared interests, but it was also predicated upon observing difference. 
Nevertheless, Howard‘s position was not without contradiction, for elsewhere he had 
claimed: 
The basis of the way in which I have conducted Australia‘s relations with China in 
the time that I have been Prime Minister has been to build on the things that we have 
in common and not become obsessed with the things that make us different.
51
 
Throughout his speech Howard was at pains to make clear that while we have a value-
convergence with the United States and a value-difference with China, the value 
discrepancy does not prevent Australia from effectively engaging China.
52
 For the 
theory of positive realism enables Australia to maintain two types of foreign policy 
relationships: those which evolve from common history and shared values and those 
based on mutual respect and shared interests—what Michael Wesley has termed, 
‗organic‘ and ‗transactional‘ relationships.53 
It is possible that the values-focused speech for Bush and the difference-focused speech 
for Hu are sufficiently co-dependent that they can be read as one. The common values 
that are identified as being shared between Australia and the United States are directly 
equivalent to the differences that are identified to exist between Australia and China. 
The pairing, sequencing and juxtaposition of the speeches reinforces this. In reading the 
                                                 
50. See, for example, John Howard, ‗Australia‘s International Relations—Ready for the 
Future‘, National Convention Centre Canberra, 22 August 2001, p. 7.  
51. Quoted in Dennis Shanahan, ‗Howard feels the squeeze‘, Australian, 22 July 2005, p. 17. 
52. In spite of the fact that each speech is framed around the notion of value-convergence or 
value-difference, we are given little sense of what a value is: how is a value constituted, 
who these values might represent, who they exclude, or how an Australian value is 
similar to an American value or different from a Chinese one. Perhaps the 690,000 
Australians who claim Chinese ancestry or who have emigrated from the People‘s 
Republic might feel that the differences between Australia and China are not as 
comprehensive or as absolute as the Prime Minister suggests. 
53. Michael Wesley: ‗Howard‘s way: northerly neighbours and western friends‘ in Griffith 
Review, Up North, Edition 9, pp. 97–106, p. 101.  
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two speeches together, we can identify at least three important and complex foreign 
policy statements that Howard appeared to be making. In the first instance, Howard 
used the shared interests/different values template in an attempt to place China near the 
centre of Australian foreign policy, while signalling to the United States what the 
Australia–China relationship is not. In the second instance, Howard alerted the 
domestic audience to the fact that his government was not singularly focused on its 
alliance with the US; that he could simultaneously honour the alliance with the United 
States and ‗get on‘ with Asia. Thirdly, in offering a closing comment that Australia 
wants to see ‗calm and constructive dialogue between the United States and China on 
those issues which might potentially cause tension between them‘, Howard sent the 
message to the Chinese that—despite President Bush‘s claim that ‗Australia‘s agenda 
with China is the same as my country‘s‘—Australia does not see China in exactly the 
same way as the United States.
54
 
In summary, if we focus exclusively on the content of the welcoming remarks for 
President Hu, it could be argued that Howard‘s preoccupation with difference resulted 
in a message which was impersonal, awkward and lacking in diplomatic finesse. 
However, if we focus upon the context of the comments, reading the welcoming 
remarks for Hu alongside those offered for President Bush, Howard‘s speech appears to 
have a clearer purpose and a more recognisable foreign policy objective. Howard drew 
upon the powerful symbolism that was attached to the sequencing of the visits, while 
successfully communicating a highly complex and nuanced trilateral foreign policy 
position. 
Relational Politics and Practical Realism  
As a nation we‘re over all that sort of identity stuff. We‘re far more self-possessed 
and self-confident and self-believing and sure of our place in the world. And it is a 
very identifiably Australian place.
55
 
Howard appeared, almost intuitively, to develop certain policy positions in a very 
relational or oppositional manner—he regularly defined and promoted policy positions 
against that which they were not. Consistent with this pattern, Howard‘s positive 
realism emerged in contradistinction to the model for Asian engagement that was 
developed by the Hawke and Keating Governments. In claiming that the Australia–
                                                 
54. President Bush made this comment during his address on the previous day, George 
Walker Bush, ‗Joint Meeting‘, Senate, Debates, 23 October 2003, p. 16720. 
55. John Howard as quoted by Greg Sheridan, ‗Foreign Regions‘, Weekend Australian,  
27–28 September 2003, p. 17. 
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China relationship should not be ‗burdened by the kinds of unrealistic expectations that 
featured so prominently at certain times in the past‘, Howard made it clear that he did 
not approach China with what he saw as the romanticism and ‗unrealistic‘ expectations 
of the ALP.
56
 Moreover, Howard always believed that the Labor model for Asian 
engagement was predicated upon trading Australia‘s history, heritage and traditions for 
a seat at Asia‘s table.  
In April 1995, shortly after assuming the leadership of the Federal Parliamentary 
Liberal Party for the second time, John Howard delivered the Fifth Asialink Lecture. 
This wide-ranging lecture was Howard‘s first foreign policy address since regaining the 
leadership of the Liberal Party. The views expressed are remarkably consistent with 
those articulated during eleven years of government. Speaking with a voice charged 
with the activism of opposition, Howard attacked the notion that the ALP is the only 
political party that can effectively engage the region. In promoting the Coalition‘s Asia 
credentials, Howard cited John McEwen‘s negotiation of the Australia–Japan 
Agreement on Commerce (1957), Malcolm Fraser‘s response to the Indochinese 
refugee crisis of the 1970s and the commitment of generations of Liberal prime 
ministers/foreign ministers to Australia‘s engagement with the region. Howard then 
went on to deride Paul Keating and Gareth Evans‘ ‗self-serving, partisan re-writing of 
history‘, rejecting the idea that the Labor Party discovered Asia, before committing 
himself to a new and independent model for Asian engagement.  
Even though China hardly rates a mention, the 1995 Asialink address was the 
originating point for some of Howard‘s classic formulations about Australian identity 
and Australian foreign policy:  
We [the Coalition] do not believe that Australia faces some kind of exclusive choice 
between our past and our future, between our history and our geography. We see such 
a choice as a phoney and irrelevant one proposed by those with ulterior motives. 
Australia must meet the regional challenges of the future, in Asia and elsewhere, with 
the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances but with pride in our history, our 
values and our institutions … Once we start disavowing our history, or disowning our 
values or changing our institutions simply because we think regional countries will 
respect us more for doing so, then we will be badly mistaken …57 
                                                 
56. John Howard, ‗Australia‘s International Relations—Ready for the Future‘, National 
Convention Centre Canberra, 22 August 2001, p. 7. 
57. John Howard, ‗Australia‘s Links with Asia: Realising Opportunities in our Region‘, Fifth 
Asialink Lecture and Asialink Birthday Celebrations, 12 April 1995. 
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Whether or not the Australian Labor Party really wanted to renounce Australian 
identity or forswear Australian traditions in the way Howard suggested, Howard had 
continually used this suggestion to structure his model for positive realism. Australia‘s 
engagement with Asia would be based upon mutual respect and mutual interests and 
not upon any ‗phoney‘ recalibration of Australian identity.  
Howard did not simply reject Keating‘s foreign policy vision; he rejected Keating‘s 
domestic cultural vision for Australia, wholesale. Howard believed Keating‘s cultural 
agenda plunged the nation into a cultural malaise, resulting in ‗unwarranted act(s) of 
national self-abasement‘ and an intellectual culture of self-hatred.58 Howard would go 
on to replace Keating‘s culture of ‗self-abasement‘ with an equally authoritative version 
of the past. Predicated upon the rejection of what he characterised as the ‗black-
armband‘ view of Australian history, the refusal to apologise to indigenous Australia 
and an entrenched distrust of multiculturalism, Howard‘s white cultural nationalism 
mobilised the legacy of the Anzac, promoted the monarchy and celebrated culturally-
specific values such as mateship and the fair go.
59
 
In honouring such values—and in getting over ‗all that sort of identity stuff‘—Howard 
believed he could be realistic about the differences between Australia and the nations of 
Asia. This would help forge relationships of mutual respect, which in turn would help 
in the development of relationships built upon mutual self-interest. 
                                                 
58. ibid. 
59. In 1996 Howard claimed, ‗I profoundly reject with the same vigour what others have 
described, and I have adopted the description, as the black armband view of Australian 
history. I believe the balance sheet of Australian history is a very generous and benign 
one. I believe that, like any other nation, we have black marks upon our history but 
amongst the nations of the world we have a remarkably positive history. I think there is a 
yearning in the Australian community right across the political divide for its leaders to 
enunciate more pride and sense of achievement in what has gone before us. I think we 
have been too apologetic about our history in the past. I think we have been far too self-
conscious about what this country has achieved and I believe it is tremendously 
important that we understand, particularly as we approach the centenary of the 
Federation of Australia, that the Australian achievement has been a heroic one, a 
courageous one and a humanitarian one. Any attempts to denigrate that achievement I 
believe will derive the justifiable ire and criticism of the Australian community; however 
people may lie in the political spectrum‘. John Howard, ‗Racial Tolerance‘, House of 
Representatives, Debates, 30 October 1996, p. 6155.  
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For Howard, the pairing of the Bush and Hu visits offered proof that Australia need not 
choose between its history and geography. Howard made this clear in a comment made 
in the weeks leading up to the presidential addresses: 
… it‘s a wonderful message to communicate to our friends and to our own people 
that we can be close to the Americans yet develop a very constructive relationship 
with China, a very different country and one that will be enormously important to us 
in the years to come.
60
  
Plain and measured rhetoric became a hallmark of Howard‘s governance. Howard was 
particularly deliberate in the language he chose to describe the Australia–China 
relationship. Howard claimed, ‗I‘ve always sought to build our relationship with 
countries like China, not [with] overblown rhetoric, but through realistic engagement in 
areas where we have common interests‘.61 Yet beyond this, Howard created a new 
vocabulary for describing Australia–China relations. The speech welcoming Hu is 
flushed with words from Howard‘s foreign policy lexicon: he claimed that the 
relationship had a ‗commonsense character‘; that it was ‗practical‘, ‗mature‘, 
‗constructive‘ and ‗wholly positive‘.  
In Howard‘s terms, plain language helps keep the relationship ‗realistic‘ and ‗sensible‘. 
Yet Howard also used plain language to differentiate himself from his Labor 
predecessors, who he argued have often made inflated claims about the Australia–
China relationship. Even where there was little or no difference between Labor and the 
Coalition‘s foreign policies, Howard could be found to create a language system that 
suggests difference. Keating‘s ‗immature‘ foreign policy was replaced by a ‗mature‘ 
foreign policy; the Labor Party‘s ‗special‘ relationship with China was transformed into 
a ‗sensible‘ relationship and so on. As recently as April 2006, Prime Minister Howard 
introduced Premier Wen Jiabao by claiming: ‗Now I don‘t seek to invoke language 
such as special relationships and so forth, but I simply make the point that the 
transformation of the relationship with China has been remarkable‘.62 
                                                 
60. Prime Minister John Howard, Interview with John Laws, Radio 2UE, 13 October 2003. 
61 . John Howard, ‗Press conference announcing the liquid natural gas export deal with 
China‘, Sydney, 8 August 2002.  
62. ‗Joint Press Conference with His Excellency Mr Wen Jiabao Premier of the State 
Council, People‘s Republic of China‘, Parliament House, Canberra, 3 April 2006. 
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Charm Offensive 
Joshua Kurlantzick‘s Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Changing the 
World (2007), argues that as the People‘s Republic emerges as an international power it 
seeks to influence nations who are critical to its economic, political and strategic 
interests, through employing soft power. Borrowing from the Harvard academic Joseph 
Nye‘s notion that ‗soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others … 
attracting others to do what you want‘, Kurlantzick identifies Chinese soft power as: 
… anything outside the military and the security realm, including not only popular 
culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers 
like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations.
63
  
‗High‘ soft power targets elites through exploiting the gravitational pull of the Chinese 
market, while ‗low‘ soft power targets the public through events like the Olympic 
Games, the promotion of Chinese language studies, through sponsoring Chinese New 
Year celebrations and through offering student scholarships.
64
 Within such an 
argument, these forms of influence or co-option are considered to have replaced past 
forms of grey diplomacy—more explicit in their coerciveness.65 Some have argued that 
President Hu‘s speech can be read as an example of China‘s soft power diplomacy, 
                                                 
63. Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Changing the World, 
Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, p. 6.  
64. In Australia we have seen Chinese influence emerge through the partial funding of 
Confucius Institutes at the universities of Western Australia, Adelaide, Melbourne and 
Sydney. Former Australian diplomat to China, Jocelyn Chey, has warned that Australian 
universities need to understand the political and strategic motives behind the 
establishment of such institutes, adding that any move by the institutes to promote 
academic research was ‗fundamentally flawed‘ because of their close association with 
the Chinese Communist Party. Professor Chey adds that Australia has become a ‗special 
target for soft power diplomacy‘ because of its large ethnic Chinese community, natural 
resources and close relations with the United States. As quoted by Tom Hyland, 
‗Confucius say … universities at risk in link-up with Chinese Government‘, Sunday Age, 
18 November 2007, p. 7. 
65. Charm Offensive was one of two books Kevin Rudd presented President George Bush 
during their meeting at APEC in September 2007. Through the gift, Rudd appeared to 
send a message to the President about the way in which nations like China and the 
United States are understood to assert their influence. (The other was David Day‘s 
biography of John Curtin.) 
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particularly when juxtaposed against President Bush‘s uncompromising declarations 
about war and terror.
66
 
Kurlantzick, an American journalist, juxtaposes the parliamentary and community 
responses to President Bush and President Hu‘s addresses in October 2003 to develop 
his argument about the way China‘s soft power has improved its public image: 
Protected by an enormous security cocoon, Bush planned to address the Australian 
Parliament. Bush could barely get rolling on his speech—in which he planned to tell 
the story of how American and Australian World War II troops together saved 
Australia from Japanese invasion—before Australian senators began heckling him. 
Two senators from Australia‘s Green Party yelled at Bush, screaming that America 
should follow international law and stop human rights abuses like those at the US 
prison compound at Guantánamo Bay … (Bush quipped) ‗I love free speech‘ as 
police pushed the senator-hecklers out of the chamber.    
Only days later, Australia offered Chinese president [sic] Hu Jintao a vastly different 
welcome … Hu toured Australia like a hero … Even Australian Tibet campaigners, 
normally angry about China‘s treatment of Tibetans, went out of their way to be 
polite to Hu. One Tibetan group purchased a full-page advertisement in a leading 
Australian newspaper telling Hu, we welcome you to Australia and wish you a 
successful and pleasant visit …67 
In comparing the reception of the two presidents, Kurlantzick overstates the 
differences—almost to the point of misrepresentation. Kurlantzick‘s analysis, which 
does not include any consideration of the welcoming remarks by Prime Minister 
Howard, also contains numerous interpretative and factual errors. In the above extract, 
Kurlantzick claims that the two Greens Senators were pushed from the chamber by 
police. As explained earlier, the Senators defied the orders of the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives and refused to leave the Chamber—police are not permitted to enter 
the chambers of the Australian Parliament. Significantly, the Bush and Hu addresses 
were sequenced to occur on consecutive days—not as Kurlantzick claims, days apart. 
The toadying ‗Tibet campaigners‘ Kurlantzick refers to are, in actual fact, the Australia 
Tibet Council—who produced an advertisement that lobbied for dialogue between Hu 
Jintao and the Dalai Lama and which, as we have seen, included several hundred 
signatures, including those of a number of federal parliamentarians.
68
 In his attempt to 
                                                 
66. See for example, Paul Kelly, ‗Power at Stake‘, Weekend Australian, 25–26 October 
2003, Inquirer, p. 17. 
67. Joshua Kurlantzick, op. cit., pp. 2–3. 
68. Kurlantzick also stretches the results of the Lowy Institute poll to claim that 69% of 
Australians (rather than respondents) viewed China positively.  
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expose the transformation that has taken place in the way Australia understands China, 
Kurlantzick also suggests that as recently as the 1980s, China was a ‗pariah‘ in 
Australia, ‗Australia‘s responses to the Bush and Hu visits reflected shifts in Australian 
public opinion. Only twenty years ago, Australia viewed China as coldly as it greeted 
American [sic] warmly‘—a statement clearly at odds with the description of the Hawke 
Government‘s China policy in Chapter Two.69 Finally, while continuing to be cavalier 
about political events ‗Down Under‘, Kurlantzick goes on to overstate the closeness of 
Australian politicians to China by suggesting booming Chinese markets have seen 
Australian politicians ‗back away from ANZUS‘.70 
It is likely that Howard would respond to Kurlantzick by suggesting that he needs to 
stop seeing China‘s rise in ‗zero-sum terms‘:  
Many of our critics said a closer relationship with the United States would come at a 
cost to our relationships in Asia. Nothing could be further from the case. 
Relationships are not a zero sum game. Our relationship with China has flourished at 
the same time as we have strengthened the US alliance.
71
  
Yet more than this, in hosting the two presidents on successive days, Howard was 
seeking to develop a different type of position. In a somewhat clumsy closing 
statement, Howard—rather ambitiously—suggested that Australia might have a role as 
a facilitator to promote ‗constructive and calm dialogue‘ between China and the United 
States: 
… it is self-evident that the relationship between Australia, the United States and 
China respectively, on a two-way basis—that is, our relationship with the United 
States and then again our relationship with China—will be extremely important to the 
stability of our region. Our aim is to see calm and constructive dialogue between the 
United States and China on those issues which might potentially cause tension 
between them. It will be Australia‘s aim, as a nation which has different but 
nonetheless close relationships with both of those nations, to promote that 
constructive and calm dialogue. 
                                                 
69. Joshua Kurlantzick, op. cit., p. 3. In Chapter Two we observed the way the Hawke 
Government was committed to growing the relationship and that by the mid-1980s more 
Ministers were visiting China than ever before. This was also a time when an 
unprecedented 70,000 Australians—one in every 200—visited China, Peter Cole-Adams, 
‗China‘s Favourite Barbarians Need to Avoid Self-delusion‘, Age, 14 September 1985. 
70. Joshua Kurlantzick, op. cit., p. 215. 
71. Prime Minister John Howard, ‗Address to the ASPI ‗Global Forces 2007‘ Conference, 
Hyatt Hotel, Canberra‘, 5 July 2007. 
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Conclusion  
Chapter Two examined J. G. Latham‘s Eastern Mission of 1934, describing it as a key 
precursor to Australia‘s engagement with the region. In the report detailing the 
activities of the Mission which was tabled in Parliament in July 1934, Latham 
explained that when the President of the National Government of China, Dr Lin Sen, 
recently visited Canberra, he was accorded a seat on the floor of the House of 
Representatives.
72
 This was typically the way the Australian Parliament honoured a 
visit by a foreign head of state at the time. This chapter has observed how, seventy 
years later, the strength of the Australia–China relationship was acknowledged through 
an even more significant act of parliamentary diplomacy. In examining this historic 
moment, this chapter has offered an account of how the bilateral relationship developed 
under the prime ministership of John Howard. It also gives preliminary consideration to 
the way the Chinese government manages its international relations. In so doing, the 
chapter provides context for the following chapter which turns to examine how the 
bilateral relationship developed during the 41
st
 Parliament of Australia. 
 
                                                 
72. J. G. Latham, ‗The Australian Eastern Mission, 1934: Report of the Right Honourable 
J. G. Latham‘, 1934‘, Parliamentary Papers for 1932–34, Number 236, p. 11.  
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Chapter Four: A Virtuous Circle? The 41st Parliament of 
Australia and the People’s Republic of China 
The Governments in both countries are closely working together to achieve a virtuous 
circle in the Sino–Australia relationship.1 
During the period of the 41
st
 Parliament, November 2004–October 2007, there was 
considerable growth and diversification in the Australia–China relationship. The 
economic complementarities which became a hallmark of the relationship during the 
previous Parliament provided an impetus for the signing of a number of agreements in 
areas such as the transfer of nuclear materials, mutual legal assistance, extradition and 
prisoner exchange and cooperative research on bio-security. Such agreements were 
accompanied by new capacity building projects focusing on water resource 
management, legal governance and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS in China. High-
level bilateral visits were utilised to mark a number of significant landmarks in 
relations. During a visit to Beijing in April 2005, Prime Minister Howard announced 
that Australia and China would commence talks with China on a Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA), while in April 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Australia and signed a 
bilateral safeguards agreement on the transfer of nuclear material between Australia and 
China.
2
 The Chinese Premier‘s visit was followed by John Howard‘s ‗important, 
symbolic visit‘ to southern China in June 2006, to witness the first delivery of 
Australian liquefied natural gas. The Chairman of the National People‘s Congress, Wu 
Bangguo, also visited Australia during the period to claim, in a speech in the Great Hall 
at Parliament House, that ‗China–Australia relations are in their best shape in their 
history‘.3  
The developing multilayered character of the bilateralism was underscored by the 
agreement signed by President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister John Howard during the 
                                                 
1. ‗Ambassador Fu Ying Addresses Australian Parliament on China‘s ―Anti-Secession 
Law‖ ‘, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China, 22 March 2005, 
http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/sgjs/t188395.htm (accessed 28 July 2007) 
2. Wen Jiabao‘s visit was followed by the ratification of two nuclear safeguard agreements 
between Australia and China in January 2007. 
3. This was the first instalment resulting from the single largest trade agreement in 
Australia‘s history. John Howard, Doorstop interview, Shenzhen, China, 28 June 2006, 
Wu Bangguo‘s comment is found at: ‗Australia–China relations are better than ever‘, 
China Daily, 25 May 2005. 
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15
th
 Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders‘ meeting in Sydney in 
September 2007 which committed the two nations to an annual senior-level strategic 
dialogue to facilitate bilateral coordination on important international issues.
4
 The 
growing closeness between the two countries was further emphasised by President Hu‘s 
four-point proposal for enhancing bilateral relations. Hu‘s plan outlined a program for 
promoting closer high-level exchange between legislative bodies and political parties, 
building deeper bilateral economic and trade cooperation, increasing people-to-people 
links and increasing dialogue on regional and international issues.
5
 There was a 
corresponding shift in the tone of statements made by Prime Minister Howard. No 
longer preoccupied with the differences between Australia and China, a more 
comfortable Howard surrendered the shared interests/different values platform, 
relinquishing the descriptors: mature, practical and sensible. The sense of optimism and 
goodwill between Australia and China was ultimately consecrated by the loan of two 
giant pandas—Wangwang and Funi—to a South Australian zoo.6 From a parliamentary 
perspective, the foundations were laid for increased contact between the two 
legislatures. On 20 August 2006, the Department of the House of Representatives 
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the National People‘s 
Congress in order to establish a framework of exchange between the two parliamentary 
institutions. The framework of exchange provided for regular exchanges of information 
between the legislators and parliamentary officials.
7
  
Perhaps the most serious challenge to the relationship over the period of the 
41
st
 Parliament was the ‗defection‘ of the Consul for Political Affairs at the Chinese 
                                                 
4. During Hu‘s visit the single largest export deal for an Australian company was signed 
committing Woodside Petroleum to exporting up to $45 billion worth of gas to 
PetroChina. 
5. Oxford Analytica, ‗Australia/China: Canberra faces China, US dilemma‘, 17 September 
2007. 
6. This symbolic gesture surpasses the three-month loan of the pandas Fei Fei and Xiao 
Xiao for Australia‘s Bicentennial celebrations in 1988. In an act which some have 
described as an act of great obsequiousness—the Presiding Officers of the Parliament, 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives (David Hawker), and the President of the 
Senate (Alan Ferguson), called on President Hu Jintao at the Hyatt Hotel, during his 
stopover in Canberra prior to APEC. 
7. The MOU was signed in Beijing, at the Great Hall of the People, by Sheng Huaren, Vice-
Chairman and Secretary of the Standing Committee of the National People‘s Congress 
(NPC), and Mr Ian Harris, the Clerk of the House of Representatives. A delegation from 
the NPC, led by Mr Sheng Huaren, visited Australia as part of the MOU exchange 
framework from 28 May to June 2007. 
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Consulate in Sydney in June 2005. Chen Yonglin‘s application for political asylum, and 
his allegations of extensive Chinese espionage activity in Australia, had the potential to 
seriously damage bilateral relations. Another event that threatened to disrupt bilateral 
goodwill was Australia‘s hosting of the inaugural ministerial-level Trilateral Security 
Dialogue (April 2006) involving Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, US Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice and Japanese Foreign Minister, Taro Aso. China expressed 
serious concerns about such a dialogue (later renamed the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue) 
taking place and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer regularly sought to reassure 
Beijing that the talks were committed to discussing general regional concerns, and not 
the containment of China.
8
 The Dalai Lama‘s visit to Australia during June 2007 was 
another subject of possible friction. The visit was accompanied by the Chinese 
Government‘s customary expressions of disapproval and by the cautious consulting of 
diaries by the leaders of the major political parties. 
Statements and speeches that were made in Parliament offer a snap-shot of the China-
related issues that arose during this period. Some related to themes that had continued 
over successive parliaments, such as human rights in China, opportunities attached to 
China‘s economic development, information about high level visits and matters related 
to Taiwan.
9
 Emerging concerns focused upon Australia‘s Nuclear Safeguards 
Agreement with China and Australia‘s intention to export uranium to China; the fate of 
Chen Yonglin and the government‘s handling of his application for protection; the 
status of Free Trade negotiations; the effect of climate change and global warming in 
China and the quality of Chinese exports to Australia. In contrast to some of the China-
related debates that took place during earlier parliaments, the character of the debate 
during the 41
st
 Parliament was largely bipartisan.  
This chapter has two primary objectives. Firstly, it offers an analysis of the attitudes of 
members of the 41
st
 Parliament towards the Australia–China relationship, through 
drawing upon the results of a questionnaire that was distributed to all members of 
Parliament during 2007. Secondly, through examining the major China-related outputs 
of the Parliament—committee and delegation reports, parliamentary debates and policy 
                                                 
8. Patrick Walters, ‗Containing China a big mistake: Downer‘, Australian, 16 March 2006, 
p. 1 and Greg Sheridan, ‗Rice contains Downer on handling of China‘, Australian, 
17 March 2006, p. 2.  
9. In this instance the Governor-General‘s visit to China and Premier‘s Wen Jiabao‘s visit 
to Australia; Taiwan‘s application to participate in the World Health Assembly and 
China‘s passing of the anti-secession law. 
Chapter Four: A Virtuous Circle? 
110 
and legislative material—the chapter examines the specific contributions of the 41st 
Parliament to the development of the bilateral relationship.  
 
15. President Hu Jintao visits Bywong Sheep Station near Gundaroo, north of Canberra, prior to 
APEC, 5 September 2007, image courtesy Peter West/Auspic. 
Parliamentary Questionnaire Methodology 
The majority of the twenty-four questions contained in the parliamentary questionnaire 
were clear and unambiguous ‗closed questions‘ which utilised preset response options. 
Preset response options were chosen in the expectation that the data could be 
aggregated to reflect cross-party attitudes. Some questions asked respondents to 
attribute, on a rating scale, the level of importance they attached to a particular issue or 
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event and in some instances respondents were also given the option of adding 
comment. Other response options were dichotomous and sought YES or NO answers. 
On one occasion a dichotomous question was followed by an open question: ‗Do you 
believe that the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade and 
the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade can influence 
Australian foreign policy‘, YES or NO, and if YES could you please provide an 
example‘. A final question asked for additional comment about the Australia–China 
relationship. While some questions related to Australia‘s foreign policy priorities, or the 
influence that the Opposition and minor parties may have on the nation‘s foreign 
policy, the questionnaire was primarily concerned with identifying parliamentary 
attitudes to past, present and future aspects of the Australia–China relationship. Beyond 
the temporally-specific material, there were numerous questions addressing matters of 
trade, human rights, the export of Australian uranium to China and the China-related 
issues that are raised by constituents. Respondents to the questionnaire were instructed 
that their views would remain confidential and non-attributable. 
The response rate to the questionnaire was 26%, with 59 of 226 parliamentarians 
responding. The majority of respondents represented a self-selected group of 
parliamentarians who appeared to have an active interest or involvement in the 
Australia–China relationship. A high proportion had visited the People‘s Republic 
(66%) or the Republic of China (58%) and 83% were members of either the Australia–
China Parliamentary Friendship Group, the Australia–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship 
Group or the All-Party Parliamentary Friendship Group for Tibet.
10
 Results from the 
questionnaire offer useful, balanced and representative cross-party data which has not 
previously been compiled. The results from the questionnaire can also be read as a 
useful complement to other recent surveys on Australia‘s foreign policy: the 2007 
United States Studies Centre National Survey Results, ‗Australian attitudes towards the 
United States: Foreign Policy, Security, Economics and Trade‘ (University of Sydney), 
                                                 
10. 21% belonged to the Australia–China Parliamentary Friendship Group (only); 17% 
belonged to the Australia–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group (only); 3% belonged 
to the All-Party Parliamentary Friendship Group for Tibet (only). In terms of cross or 
multiple memberships: a further 26% belonged to the Australia–China and the Australia–
Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group and 16% belonged to the Australia–China, the 
Australia–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group and the All-Party Parliamentary 
Friendship Group for Tibet. An All-Party Parliamentary Group for Tibet was established 
in 2005 with Michael Danby as Chair and Bob Brown, Peter Slipper and Natasha Stott 
Despoja as vice-chairs. The Group supports the Dalai Lama‘s ‗Middle Way Approach‘ 
which would see Tibetans holding responsibility for managing internal matters, such as 
health and education, while China retained control of foreign affairs and defence.  
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the Lowy Institute polls surveying public opinion and foreign policy (2005 and 2007) 
and Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley‘s survey of Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT) employees, ‗The Perception of Australia‘s Foreign Policy Makers‘.11 
Overall, 42% of respondents were Labor, 41% were Liberal, 10% were Nationals, 3% 
were Democrats, and 2% were Greens, while 2% chose not to disclose their party. 
When matched against party representation in the 41
st
 Parliament, responses were 
received from 18% of Liberals; 27% of Nationals, 22% of Labor, 50% of Democrats (2 
in 4) and 25% of Greens (1 in 4). On a House–Senate comparison, 64% of respondents 
were from the Lower House and 36% were from the Upper House. As a rule, 
respondents tended to have longer records of service, for example, 26% had served for 
more than 15 years while 25% had served between nine and 12 years.  
Quantitative data from the questionnaire was supplemented by qualitative data obtained 
through interviews conducted over the course of 2007. Interviews were conducted with 
over a dozen parliamentarians with specific interests in the Australia–China 
relationship. They were conducted with an equal number of Liberal and Labor 
parliamentarians as well as with representatives from both the Nationals and the minor 
parties. Interviews were also carried out with relevant parliamentary and government 
officials. These interviews presented an opportunity to expand upon aspects of the 
parliamentary questionnaire while also allowing for discussions about the interaction 
that takes place between the Parliament and the Chinese Embassy, the notion of 
Chinese ‗soft power‘ and parliamentary perceptions of the future character of the 
bilateral relationship. In order to preserve confidentiality, the comments of interviewees 
have not been attributed.  
The generally sanguine attitude towards Australia–China relations that emerges from 
questionnaire data and interview responses appears to be predicated upon a number of 
features: the benefits that have resulted from a thriving bilateral trade relationship; a 
continuing period of comparatively stable Sino–United States relations; and the 
prevailing attitude that the rise of China will be positive for the international 
community. Each feature has combined to create a period of unparalleled growth, 
confidence and sense of opportunity for Australia–China relations. Nevertheless, this 
                                                 
11. The two Lowy polls are titled: Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign 
Policy (2007) and Australians Speak 2005: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. Gyngell 
and Wesley‘s survey is found in the appendix to Making Australian Foreign Policy 
(2003); Gyngell and Wesley sent their questionnaire to more than 800 DFAT employees 
and received 242 responses, or approximately 30%.  
Chapter Four: A Virtuous Circle? 
113 
general sense of optimism does not extend across all areas of the relationship. Some 
parliamentarians expressed concern about China‘s human rights record, the export of 
Australian uranium to China, the potential repercussions of a Free Trade Agreement, 
relations between the Chinese Government and the Republic of China (Taiwan), and 
lack of parliamentary attention given to China‘s military expenditure. However, one of 
the most emphatic findings to emerge from this research is that there is great diversity 
in the way Australian parliamentarians view the Australia–China relationship. This 
diversity operates across the Parliament and within the parties; there is no one 
parliamentary model, nor one party model.  
Parliament and Foreign Policy  
There is a dominant perception that the Australian Parliament has an extremely 
restricted capacity to influence foreign policy.
12
 In Making Australian Foreign Policy 
(2003) Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley offer the following assessment:  
Under the United States constitution, Congress has important roles in the foreign 
policy process: treaties made can only be ratified by a Senate vote; Congress has 
formal roles in the declaration of war and the appointment of diplomatic agents; and 
both houses have been highly active in setting the parameters for the exercise of 
executive powers in making foreign policy. The Australian Parliament has none of 
these formal powers. Rarely does the conduct of Australian foreign policy require 
enabling legislation; and the debate and discussion of foreign affairs is more often 
than not relegated behind domestic political issues that call on the legislative powers 
of both houses of Parliament. Parliamentary debates on foreign affairs are relatively 
rare, and often scheduled around the discussion of domestic matters … it is hard to 
find any significant role played in the formulation of Australian foreign policy by 
Federal Parliament. In addition to lacking the capacity to contribute or [sic] a formal 
role in the foreign policy process, Parliament is constrained by the lack of interest (or 
of incentive to take an interest) in foreign affairs by the majority of 
parliamentarians.
13
  
                                                 
12. See John Knight and W. J. Hudson, Parliament and Foreign Policy, Australian Institute 
of International Affairs, Australian National University, Canberra 1983; B. L. Hocking, 
‗Parliament, parliamentarians and foreign affairs‘, Australian Outlook, Vol. 30. No. 2, 
1976, pp. 280–303; J. D. B. Millar, ‗The role of the Australian parliament in foreign 
policy‘, The Parliamentarian, Vol. 50, No. 1, 1969, pp. 1–6; Kate Burton, Scrutiny or 
Secrecy? Committee Oversight of Foreign and National Security Policy in the Australian 
Parliament, Australian Parliamentary Fellow Monograph, Parliamentary Library, 2005. 
13. Allan Gyngell & Michael Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, Cambridge 
University Press, Melbourne, 2003, pp. 173–177. Following Australia‘s participation in 
the invasion of Iraq, Malcolm Fraser called for laws to prevent future governments from 
going to war without a vote in the Parliament.  
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Such a statement does not augur well for a discussion of the Parliament and foreign 
policy; it draws attention to the absence of any parliamentary legislative mandate in 
foreign affairs while reinforcing that the executive has the prerogative in foreign policy. 
Moreover, this extract does not simply claim that parliamentarians are estranged from 
the foreign policy process, but that many are in fact uninterested in foreign affairs 
matters.  
In examining the role of the Parliament in foreign policy formation, Gyngell and 
Wesley focus on formal legislative power, rather than influence, facilitation, 
consultation or informal power. It is therefore worth noting other parliamentary 
activities that, while not directly or immediately contributing to legislated outcomes, 
can become critical to building parliamentary knowledge of, and influence in, foreign 
affairs. In addition to the parliamentary activities that Gyngell and Wesley identify—
parliamentary debate, Question Time, questions placed on notice and committee 
work—there are other activities which could be identified: representation at multilateral 
forums (including forums specifically for parliamentarians, such as the Inter-
Parliamentary Union), representation at specific issues forums (e.g.: environment, 
rights or labour forums), and participation in the activities of inter-party parliamentary 
delegations and parliamentary friendship groups. Then we might also consider non-
parliamentary activities such as contributing to public debate on foreign policy or 
working with non-government organisations in an attempt to influence foreign policy.  
The Parliament may also indirectly involve itself in foreign affairs in ways not 
envisaged by Gyngell and Wesley. Parliamentarians may explain the Australian 
parliamentary system to members of other legislatures; they may promote an 
understanding of other nations and other political systems; or alternatively, they may 
involve themselves in second-track diplomacy—ameliorating against breakdowns in 
government to government communication, or conversely, discussing difficult bilateral 
issues at a level below that of head of state or government. As the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives, Ian Harris, has suggested:  
The value of legislator-to-legislator contact is significant, especially in areas where 
negotiations at officer level have not produced satisfactory results. Occasionally, 
when there are tensions at a government-to-government level, the contact between 
parliaments provides a means of continuing communication.
14
 
                                                 
14. Ian Harris, ‗The Role of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia in 
International Affairs, Globally and in the Asia/Pacific Region‘, Address to the Canberra 
Branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 19 November 2003, p. 5.  
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In the above extract Gyngell and Wesley also suggest that few Australian 
parliamentarians have backgrounds predisposing them to foreign policy work. Such a 
suggestion is supported by Kate Burton‘s study of committee oversight of foreign and 
national security policy in the Parliament, in which she claims that her study of a 
database of nearly 600 current or former politicians revealed only 6 with diplomatic and 
foreign affairs backgrounds.
15
 While this figure is surprisingly low, if we were to add 
parliamentarians with academic backgrounds in allied areas such as International 
Relations or Political Science we would find more parliamentarians with relevant 
backgrounds. For example, in the 41
st
 Parliament, we find that Kim Beazley was a 
former Lecturer in Social and Political Theory at Murdoch University and Senator 
Russell Trood was formerly an Associate Professor in International Relations at Griffith 
University. Similarly, this number would be higher again were we to include younger 
generation parliamentarians who hold higher degrees and/or undergraduate degrees in 
International Relations.  
With regard to the matter of parliamentary interest in foreign affairs, it should be noted 
that the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade is the largest 
committee of the Parliament. As Ian Harris has reflected, ‗there is considerable 
competition amongst our Members and Senators to become members of the committee, 
reflecting, I think, its importance in their eyes‘.16 It could also be argued that across the 
Parliament the Australia–China relationship is accorded a great deal of significance and 
receives regular attention. Many Members and Senators remain well informed about the 
relationship through their work with committees, through the activities of parliamentary 
friendship groups, through official parliamentary visits, and in some instances, through 
leading business delegations to China. Other parliamentarians remain informed about 
China-related matters through their connection with their Australian-Chinese 
constituents. One only need consider the interests of constituents in the seats that form 
the ‗China-belt‘ that fans out around inner Sydney: Watson (Tony Burke, ALP), 
Bennelong (John Howard, LP), Barton (Robert McClelland, ALP), Lowe (John 
Murphy, ALP), Parramatta (Julie Owens, ALP) and Reid (Laurie Ferguson, ALP). 
According to 2001 Census data (with 2003 electoral boundaries) the numbers of 
                                                 
15. Kate Burton, Scrutiny or Secrecy? Committee Oversight of Foreign and National 
Security Policy in the Australian Parliament, Australian Parliamentary Fellow 
Monograph, Parliamentary Library, 2005, p. 61.  
16. Ian Harris, ‗The Role of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia in 
International Affairs, Globally and in the Asia/Pacific Region‘, Address to the Canberra 
Branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 19 November 2003, p. 4.  
Chapter Four: A Virtuous Circle? 
116 
Chinese-born in these electorates are: Watson—9.6%, Bennelong—7.5%, Barton—
6.8%, Lowe—6.2 %, Parramatta—6% and Reid—7.5%.17  
41st Parliament and Foreign Policy  
The parliamentary questionnaire contained preliminary questions about the Parliament 
and foreign policy. These contextual questions focused on two areas: Australia‘s 
foreign policy priorities and the perceived influence of the Opposition and minor 
parties on Australian foreign policy. In the first instance respondents were asked what 
level of importance they ascribed to six different interests or values when determining 
Australia‘s foreign policy: trade, defence and strategic interests, the advancement of 
human rights, the promotion of Australian political ‗values‘ and the establishment of 
strategic alliances with world powers. Overwhelmingly, priority was given to those 
matters of national self-interest which maximise Australia‘s influence and power: trade, 
defence and strategic interests and the maintenance of security alliances. 
Correspondingly, less emphasis was given to values-based priorities such as human 
rights, the promotion of democracy or even the slightly nebulous notion of Australian 
political ‗values‘. Advancing human rights and advancing democracy tended to be 
accorded important rather than highly important status, while unequivocal importance 
was placed upon trade, defence and strategic interests. 
                                                 
17. Figures include those born in Hong Kong but do not include those born in Taiwan; at the 
time of writing the results from the 2006 Census were unavailable. I thank Tony Kryger 
from the Statistics and Mapping Section of the Parliamentary Library for these figures. 
Chapter Four: A Virtuous Circle? 
117 
Figure 1—Indicate the importance you attribute to the following interests or values in 
determining Australia’s foreign policy: 
 
Given Australia‘s historic reliance upon security alliances, it is surprising that 
respondents did not attach higher importance to Australia‘s strategic alliances with 
world powers. However, this may be interpreted as representing a high level of 
confidence in the current state of the alliance with the United States, rather than 
reflecting any diminution or abrogation of its value.  
Figure 2—How much influence do you believe the Opposition and minor parties have 
on foreign policy? 
 
In turning to the question of what influence the Opposition and the minor parties are 
understood to have over foreign policy, we observe that the view of parliamentarians is 
more optimistic than that expressed by Gyngell and Wesley. While as many as 34% of 
respondents claimed that the Opposition and minor parties had negligible influence, the 
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majority believed that the Opposition and the minor parties could exert some influence 
on foreign policy.  
Revealingly, 47% of Coalition respondents claimed the Opposition and minor parties 
have negligible effect on foreign policy—as opposed to 24% of Labor respondents and 
0% of minor party respondents. Several respondents differentiated between the 
Opposition and the minor parties, claiming that the Opposition has some influence but 
that the influence of the minor parties is negligible, while one interviewee, endorsing 
the comments of Gyngell and Wesley, claimed that when it comes to foreign affairs, 
‗The Parliament is merely a spectator‘.  
The following section of the chapter draws upon questionnaire data and interview 
responses to five themes: influential historical milestones in the bilateral relationship, 
economic relations, sources of information about China, travel to China and 
parliamentary attitudes toward Chinese ‗soft power‘. This attitudinal study is followed 
by an examination of the major China-related committee inquiries that were undertaken 
during the 41
st
 Parliament.  
Influential Historical Milestones in the Australia–China Relationship 
Increasingly, both major parties seek to promote the histories of their achievements in 
foreign policy in Asia.
18
 The Coalition does this through promoting John McEwen‘s 
negotiation of the 1957 Australia–Japan Trade Agreement, Malcolm Fraser‘s 
Indochinese refugee policy and the Coalition‘s dismantling of the white Australia 
policy. Similarly, Labor leaders identify the activism of figures like Evatt, Whitlam and 
Gareth Evans in pursuing multilateral engagement, their commitment to engaging the 
Asia-Pacific—as well as their contribution to the dismantling of the white Australia 
policy. In the battle over which side of politics has best negotiated Australia‘s foreign 
policy towards East Asia, China has emerged as a critical battleground. Both sides 
promote their China credentials—Whitlam‘s recognition of China, Hawke‘s ‗special 
relationship‘ versus Fraser‘s bipartisanship and the development of a ‗mature‘ and 
‗practical‘ relationship under Howard. The increased impetus to claim China for one‘s 
party is reflected in the assertion of one Labor parliamentarian, ‗The ALP‘s China 
credentials are pure—the ALP has always considered Asia our future‘. 
                                                 
18. See, for example, John Howard, ‗Australia‘s Links with Asia: Realising Opportunities in 
our Region‘, Fifth Asialink Lecture and Asialink Birthday Celebrations, 12 April 1995 
and Laurie Brereton, ‗An Outlook for Australian Foreign Policy: a Labor Perspective‘, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2001, pp. 343–349. 
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While the ALP appears more proficient at selling the history of their engagement with 
the region, the ALP also romanticises this engagement. The visit of the ALP Opposition 
delegation to China in July 1971, Prime Minister William McMahon‘s claim that Zhou 
Enlai was playing Whitlam as a fisherman plays a trout, Gough Whitlam‘s recognition 
of China in 1972 and Whitlam‘s meeting with Mao in 1973—each has a central place in 
ALP folklore. Over time, a narrative about the ALP‘s custodianship of the relationship 
has developed. Within such a narrative, and here I paraphrase it, the ALP is on the cusp 
of recapturing that which is rightfully theirs and the all-China-knowing Kevin Rudd 
will re-deliver China to the ALP. In prophesying a new golden age in Australia–China 
relations, one adherent to this narrative claims, ‗The Chinese are very aware of the 
history of Labor‘s engagement with China—they respect it—and they know that Gough 
went there before any other Western leader‘. When a Liberal parliamentarian was asked 
for an opinion about this ALP China-tenure narrative, he identified it as both ‗self-
serving and absurd‘. Both these responses help to illustrate how China has continually 
been used within Australian domestic politics for party differentiation.  
Respondents to the parliamentary questionnaire were asked to rate, from an historical 
perspective, how influential a series of milestones have been in contributing to the 
character of the current Australia–China relationship. The questionnaire was interested 
in determining the weight accorded to certain milestones, from the Whitlam 
Government‘s recognition of China in 1972 to Hu Jintao‘s recent address to the 
Australian Parliament in 2003. With regard to the Whitlam Government‘s recognition 
of China, 65% nominated this landmark event as highly influential, 19% claimed it as 
moderately influential while 10% claimed it as only marginally influential. (92% of 
ALP respondents nominated recognition as highly influential.) That 35% regarded 
recognition as anything other than highly influential may suggest that some 
parliamentarians have very partisan political memories. The liberalisation of the 
Chinese economy under Deng Xiaoping, an influence that engendered bipartisan 
response, rated highest.  
The importance attributed to the Howard Government‘s management of the relationship 
solicited an even more partisan response. While 74% of Coalition respondents 
identified the Howard years as highly influential, only 9% of ALP respondents did the 
same.
19
 Parliamentarians provided more varied responses to the level of importance 
accorded to Hu Jintao‘s address to the Australian Parliament in October 2003. The level 
                                                 
19. Correspondingly 23% of respondents from the Coalition attached moderate influence to 
bilateral relations under the Howard Government as opposed to 70% of Labor 
respondents.  
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of influence was evenly spread with: 22% highly influential, 36% moderately 
influential, 28% marginally influential and 14% not influential. Overall, however, 
President Hu‘s address was considered the least influential historical milestone. See 
Figure 6—Influential Historical Milestones.  
Australia–China Economic Relations 
Over the course of the 41
st
 Parliament the bilateral economic relationship developed 
exponentially. In 2006 China, combined with Hong Kong, overtook Japan as 
Australia‘s largest trading partner. By mid-2007, China alone overtook Japan as 
Australia‘s largest trading partner, with trade between the two nations exceeding $50 
billion a year. With Australia benefiting from fast-growing commodity demand as a 
result of simultaneous growth in China and India, one would expect the vast majority of 
respondents to the parliamentary questionnaire to be extremely optimistic about the 
status of Australia–China economic relations. 
In order to provide some context for parliamentary opinions about the growth in 
economic relations, respondents were asked two questions about the current status of 
the economic relationship. These were supplemented by two further questions about the 
possible effect of Australia‘s fast-growing economic enmeshment with China. The 
sense of optimism about the trade relationship was supported by the fact that 76% of 
respondents considered Australia well-positioned to protect and promote Australian 
interests in China. Only 22% of respondents believed that Australia has become too 
reliant upon China for its economic prosperity. Relatively few (19%), felt that 
Australia‘s economic reliance will negatively impact upon Australia‘s political dealings 
with China. However, there were those who envisaged this reliance resulting in 
complex challenges for Australian policy makers. One Liberal Senator commented on 
the possibility of a more coercive China: 
Australia has become increasingly economically dependent on Chinese resource 
imports but the growing power of China will change the geo-political power 
relationships in this region and Australia may find China demanding that Australia 
follow their policy objectives in the future.  
A Liberal Member of the House of Representatives suggested such reliance has already 
resulted in political and moral acquiescence: ‗We have surrendered our principles 
because of trade and jobs‘.  
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Figure 3—Given the importance of China to Australia’s economic prosperity, do you 
feel that: 
 
Of these four questions, the one which elicited the greatest disparity in response, on a 
cross-party basis, was that asking whether the Howard Government had achieved the 
right balance between economic and non-economic aspects of the relationship—with 
61% of respondents suggesting it had. However, any question about the performance of 
the Howard Government generated extremely partisan data. If we examine this 
response on a cross-party basis, we find that 96% of Coalition respondents claimed the 
Howard Government had struck the right balance, as opposed to only 28% of Labor and 
0% of minor party respondents. 
In May 2005 Australia and China began negotiations on an Australia–China Free Trade 
Agreement (AUCFTA). While there had been great expectation attached to such an 
agreement, throughout 2007 the negotiations struck numerous hurdles: Australia‘s 
desire for the Agreement to include access for the service export markets of education 
(Australia‘s leading service export to China), telecommunications and finance; and 
China‘s desire for access for unskilled labour, were among the sticking points. Added 
to this have been differences in the way the nations approach policy negotiations. Yet, 
in spite of the limited progress, and the Minister for Trade Warren Truss‘ description of 
the negotiations as ‗tortuous‘, parliamentarians were still favourably disposed towards 
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the prospect of an FTA with China.
20
 In fact, 79% of respondents claimed that an FTA 
would be in Australia‘s interests. 
There was generally strong support for the preferential access to Chinese markets that 
an FTA would deliver. However, concern was expressed over the effect an FTA might 
have upon Australia‘s manufacturing sector. 42% of respondents believed an FTA 
would damage Australia‘s manufacturing sector while 37% of respondents were 
concerned that it would substantially contribute to Australia‘s trade deficit.21  
Figure 4—Do you believe a Free Trade Agreement with China would: 22 
 
Members of the House of Representatives were asked the associated question of how 
businesses in their electorate have responded to the economic ‗rise of China‘. A 
                                                 
20. Graeme Dobell, ‗China Trade Negotiations ‗Tortuous‘ Says Truss‘, ABC News, 16 June 
2007, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/06/16/1953209.htm (accessed 2 August 
2007) 
21. China has been negotiating Free Trade Agreements with some of Australia‘s commercial 
competitors since 2001 and Australia needs to complete its FTA negotiations if it is to 
secure some competitive advantage. No respondent made mention of the need to reach 
agreement soon or before the deadline of April 2008. 
22. The use of closed questions with regard to the FTA did not work as effectively as in 
other instances. This was largely because the precise terms of the FTA are yet to be 
decided. 8% of respondents suggested that their answer was dependent on the terms and 
comprehensiveness of such an agreement. Others qualified their responses by explaining: 
they were ‗wary of all bilateral treaties and trade agreements‘ or that a ‗FTA would 
change rather than damage Australia‘s manufacturing sector‘. 
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resounding 85% claimed that the business community in their electorate view it as a 
significant opportunity, with a clear majority welcoming an FTA with China.  
Figure 5—How does the business community in your electorate consider the economic 
‘rise of China’? 
 
(House of Representatives only) 
The data on constituents‘ attitudes towards the proposed FTA with China is almost 
identical to the response to a similar question in the Lowy Institute poll, Australians 
Speak 2005. Asked ‗On balance, do you think signing a Free Trade Agreement with 
China would be good or bad for Australia or would it make no difference‘ 51% thought 
an FTA with China would be good, 20% thought it would be bad and 29% were either 
unsure or thought that it would make no difference.
23
 However, in contrast with these 
findings, one Labor parliamentarian claimed that at the ALP state branch level there 
exists a great deal of discontent over an FTA with China which has been ignored by 
Caucus members who favour an FTA; he stated—‗The further you get away from the 
Parliament the more concern there is over an FTA with China‘. For a more detailed 
analysis of different sectorial attitudes to the FTA see the Senate Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade References Committee report, Opportunities and Challenges. The 
                                                 
23. Ivan Cook, Australians Speak 2005: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Lowy Institute 
for International Policy, 2005, p. 2. In the Lowy Institute Poll of 2007 outright support 
for an FTA with China reduced with 38% identifying it as good, 27% bad and 25% 
considering that it makes no difference, Allan Gyngell, Australia and the World: Public 
Opinion and Foreign Policy, 2007, p. 12. 
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report suggests that while the agricultural sector is supportive of an FTA with China, 
the horticultural, manufacturing, and textile, clothing and footwear sectors were all 
apprehensive about an FTA with China.
24
 
The issue of intellectual property (IP) rights has become a significant sticking point in 
the FTA negotiations with both countries seeking substantially different chapters on IP. 
In April 2007 the United States filed two WTO cases against China over the inadequate 
protection of IP rights. While China has made it clear that it would not enter into 
bilateral discussions with any country that joined the United States in these cases, 
Canada, the European Union, Japan and Mexico have joined one or both of these cases 
as third parties. On 7 October 2007 Minister Warren Truss, announced that Australia 
would participate as a third party in this dispute. However, it should be noted that while 
IP protection and issues of pirating and the production of counterfeit goods are of 
concern to Australian business, in contrast with the manufacturing sector in the United 
States, exporters of minerals and energy in Australia are less affected by matters of 
intellectual property protection—copyright, patents and trademarks. With regard to the 
possible influence of IP issues on Australia–China relations into the future, 42% of 
respondents to the parliamentary questionnaire identified that enforcement of 
intellectual property rights will be moderately influential in determining the future 
character of the Australia–China relationship while 40% identified IP as marginally 
influential (see Figure 12—Influences on the future character of the relationship).  
Sources of Information about China 
In an attempt to gauge where parliamentarians obtain their information about China, the 
questionnaire asked which sources parliamentarians accessed for information about 
China and the frequency of this access. The questionnaire offered fourteen response 
options ranging from the local media to government departments to the Chinese 
Embassy. Responses to this question reveal a heavy reliance upon the Australian media 
and, perhaps unsurprisingly, a very low utilisation of Chinese language materials. 
Parliamentary activity—committee work and interactions with parliamentary 
colleagues—also emerge as influential or common sources. Additional sources of 
information included: state governments, personal and business contacts, visits to 
China, family, Chinese friends and the Chinese business sector (see Figure 7—Sources 
of Information about China). 
                                                 
24. ‗Attitudes to the proposed FTA‘, Senate References Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade, Opportunities and Challenges (November 2005), pp. 209–229. 
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Feedback from interviews suggests that many parliamentarians gain information about 
China through their involvement in parliamentary friendship groups. Parliamentary 
friendship groups promote bilateral relations, host delegations, create cross-
parliamentary dialogue and provide a network of parliamentarians who can work with 
ambassadors and other country representatives. While friendship groups do not directly 
influence policy, they are considered to function as ‗chambers of ideas‘ for advancing 
the bilateral relationship. Friendship groups often gain high level access to foreign 
leaders—representatives from the Australia–China Parliamentary Friendship Group had 
the opportunity to meet with President Hu Jintao. The Australia–China Parliamentary 
Friendship Group and the Australia–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group both have 
extremely high levels of support in the Australian Parliament. At the time of writing, 
membership of the Australia–China Friendship Group was just short of 100 while 
membership of the Australia–Taiwan Friendship Group had recently surpassed 100. 
The role of parliamentary friendship groups is addressed further when the chapter turns 
to examine whether parliamentarians have observed any discernable change in the way 
China engages diplomatically. 
  
Figure 6—Influential historical milestones—From an historical perspective rate how influential each of the following milestones has been in 
contributing to the character of the current Australia–China relationship 
 
* At least one respondent marked between moderately and highly influential for these fields. 
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Figure 7—Sources of information about China—Indicate which sources you access for information about China and frequency of this 
access 
 
One respondent to the questionnaire claimed Chinese language skills, two respondents identified their staff as having any Chinese language 
skills and a minority identified themselves as utilising Chinese language resources for information about China. 
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Travelling to China 
Australian parliamentarians are travelling to China and they are doing so with 
increasing frequency. A high proportion of respondents to the questionnaire had visited 
the People‘s Republic (66%) or the Republic of China (58%). Of these, 59% had 
travelled to the People‘s Republic during the 41st Parliament, while 41% had travelled 
to the Republic of China. A total of 68% of those who had travelled to China during the 
term of the 41
st
 Parliament had done so in an official capacity—either as a member of a 
parliamentary or party delegation, a parliamentary friendship group, as a guest of the 
Chinese Government, or as a result of an individual study trip.  
Visits to China offer parliamentarians an opportunity to build relationships with 
members of the National People‘s Congress; they expose parliamentarians to high-level 
Chinese perspectives on important local and international issues; they allow for 
bilateral issues to be discussed at a legislator-to-legislator level, while also exposing 
parliamentarians to various aspects of Chinese social, cultural and political life. The 
increased traffic between Australia and China is one of the benefits of a strong bilateral 
relationship, a benefit that extends beyond the receipts for steel, iron ore or uranium. 
During the 41
st
 Parliament two official outgoing delegations visited China. The first 
visit took place during April 2005 (and was followed by a bilateral visit to Mongolia)—
members of the delegation included: the Speaker of the House, David Hawker MP, 
Senator Nick Bolkus, Luke Hartsuyker MP, Senator Linda Kirk, Margaret May MP, 
Peter Slipper MP, and Senator Judith Troeth. The second official parliamentary delation 
visited China in June–July 2007 and included Peter Slipper MP, Kim Beazley MP, 
Senator John Watson, Harry Quick MP and Alby Schultz MP. During May–June 2007 
Australia also hosted an incoming official parliamentary delegation from the People‘s 
Republic.  
Many parliamentarians who travel to China do so through the provision of an Overseas 
Study Entitlement. Senators and Members are entitled to financial assistance to enable 
them to travel outside the Commonwealth of Australia to undertake studies and 
investigations of matters related to duties and responsibilities as members of 
Parliament, after completing three years service.
25
 Like the official inter-parliamentary 
delegations, individual parliamentarians who utilise their Overseas Study Entitlement 
                                                 
25. Clause 9.2(b) of the Remuneration Tribunal Determination No. 14 of 2003 requires all 
parliamentarians to provide a statement reporting on usage of their Overseas Study 
Entitlement. 
Chapter Four: A Virtuous Circle? 
129 
are required to report to Parliament on the purposes and outcomes of visits. Overseas 
Study Entitlement reports are released biannually and tabled in Parliament at the 
discretion of the Special Minister of State. If we look at 2005, as an example, we find 
that the following trips were undertaken. 
Senator/ Member  Purpose of visit Place(s) visited 
Simon Crean ALP 
Gavan O‘Connor ALP 
Warren Snowdon  ALP  
Kate Lundy ALP 
ALP Trade Delegation to China, 
hosted by the Chinese Government 
and focusing on bilateral trade, 
economic relations and the 
possibility of a Free Trade 
Agreement with China (February–
March) 
Beijing, Qingdao, 
Shanghai 
Peter Slipper Liberal Travelled to China and Mongolia 
before and after the Parliamentary 
Delegation visit to China and 
Mongolia (April) 
Hong Kong, Macau 
Guangzhou, Beijing  
Michael Johnson Liberal Attended the 2005 Boao Forum for 
Asia Annual Conference (April) 
Guangzhou, Hainan 
Island, Qingdao, 
Beijing 
Duncan Kerr ALP Minor Overseas Study Entitlement 
contribution to visit Nanjing to 
research the Sino-Japanese 
conflicts over interpretations of the 
Nanjing Massacre (otherwise 
privately funded) (May) 
Shanghai, Nanjing 
Annette Ellis ALP Attended 88
th
 Lions Club 
International Convention in Hong 
Kong (June–July) 
Hong Kong 
Trish Crossin ALP Examining education as an export 
industry (July) 
Shanghai, Chongqing 
Harry Quick  ALP No report (August) No report 
John Watson Liberal Chaired the Second Asian 
Conference on Pensions and 
Retirement Planning in Hong Kong 
(November) 
Hong Kong 
Peter Slipper Liberal Discussions on trade and other 
bilateral issues (December) 
Beijing, Xiamen, 
Guangzhou, Hong 
Kong 
 
Of the two official inter-parliamentary delegations that visited China, only one reported 
to Parliament, the delegation of April 2005. The delegation report, which was written 
by a parliamentary officer, outlines the delegation‘s program, offers a synopsis of the 
activities undertaken and presents a commentary on the observations of the travelling 
group. Like many of the reports made by official delegations, this report presents as a 
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wide ranging and erratic amalgam of materials—notes from high-level meetings are 
accompanied by political and historical descriptions, which are uncomfortably linked 
by tourist observation and travelogue. This lack of clarity of purpose is also reflected in 
the speeches that accompany the presentation of reports to Parliament. More often than 
not such speeches descend into romantic hyperbole about visits to world heritage sites:  
As a tourist, I was extremely grateful for the opportunity to view the terracotta 
warriors, which must be one of the most amazing sights on this earth, as well as parts 
of the Great Wall of China, one of the greatest engineering feats ever executed by 
man.
26
  
Parliamentarians who undertake specific issues-based travel are more likely to produce 
informative reports about economic, political or cultural change in China.
27
 
Nevertheless, many reports are so profuse with traveller‘s descriptions that it is difficult 
to determine whether they are written by overzealous tourists or federal legislators on 
official parliamentary business. (It is interesting that in the above quotation the Senator 
who participated in an official inter-parliamentary visit, actually refers to herself as a 
tourist.) Florid descriptions of the tomb of Emperor Qin Shi Huang, the scenery of 
Guilin, the experience of visiting the Forbidden City, do not appear to satisfy 
parliamentary reporting requirements or fulfil any national interest criteria.  
In fulfilling their reporting obligations, some parliamentarians risk reinventing 
themselves as B-grade travel writers, modern-day Marco Polos, regurgitating 
hackneyed statistics about economic growth, providing potted and arcane histories of 
tourist sites and even describing the views afforded from the upper terraces of hotels. 
An extract from a report written by a Senator who participated in the ALP delegation 
visit to China in 2005 offers a case in point: 
The celebration of the Chinese Lunar New Year gives a glamorous impression to a 
first-time visitor to China such as myself. Beyond the visual impact this visit has 
confirmed to me that China is a truly enigmatic nation, with a cultural mystique and 
growing economic power … I have been struck by the sublime symbolism that 
                                                 
26. Senator Judith Troeth, ‗Delegation Reports: Parliamentary Delegation to China and 
Mongolia‘, Senate, Debates, 7 November 2005. 
27. Senator Brett Mason offers an informative report about democratisation and legal and 
judicial independence in Hong Kong; Senator Trish Crossin produces a report on 
education as an export industry focusing on the vocational and educational sector in 
China; other meaningful reports produced during this period were by: Byrne, Faulkner, 
Gash, O‘Connor, Payne, Ray and Rudd. See ‗Parliamentarians‘ Overseas Study Travel 
Reports‘, Department of Finance and Administration, January to June 2005, July to 
December 2005, January to June 2006, July to December 2006. 
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pervades all aspects of Chinese etiquette, social mores and physical environment. It 
makes one‘s immediate environment and personal interactions a book to be read. I 
think being able to read this ‗book‘ and drawing its meaning will help me to 
understand how things work in China.
28
 
There has long been a deep-seated cultural compulsion for the Western traveller to 
attempt to speak authoritatively about China. In this manifestation we observe the type 
of western fantasy that often stands in for China. It renders China a place of the 
imagination, indeed a ‗book‘, peopled by those who are at once sublimely cultured, 
mysterious and inscrutable.
29
  
Charm Offensive or Offensive Charm?  
The notion of soft power that was introduced in the previous chapter can facilitate a 
discussion of whether parliamentarians consider China to be exercising a new, 
sophisticated and nuanced form of diplomacy—or soft power. It can also be employed 
to ask whether parliamentarians consider this power assists China achieve its hard 
objectives. In an attempt to answer such questions this section of the chapter considers 
the interaction that takes place between members of the Australian Parliament and the 
Chinese Embassy. In examining feedback from the parliamentary questionnaire, it turns 
to examine the types of representations that are made to Australian politicians by 
Chinese Government officials about social and political events in China and Australia.  
In late May 2005 the Consul for Political Affairs at the Chinese Consulate in Sydney 
walked into the Sydney office of the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs and asked to urgently speak to the State Director. Unable to arrange 
an appointment, Chen Yonglin departed—leaving behind two letters requesting 
political asylum. In the days that followed, and once the request for territorial (political) 
asylum was rejected, Chen Yonglin offered his sensational story to the media. He 
claimed that, for the last four years, he had been responsible for the monitoring and 
harassment of Chinese political dissidents in Australia, including members of the Falun 
Gong movement. He also alleged that the Chinese Government had developed a 1000–
                                                 
28. Senator Kate Lundy, ‗ALP Delegation Visit to China‘, 20 February to 1 March 2005, 
Parliamentarians‘ Overseas Study Travel Reports: January to June 2005, pp. 138–148. 
29. There is an anecdote that when Henry Kissinger first visited China in 1971, he remarked 
to Zhou Enlai that he thought it wonderful that he was finally able to visit Zhou‘s 
‗mysterious country‘. To which Premier Zhou is said to have replied, ‗There‘s nothing 
especially mysterious about China, Dr Kissinger, once you know a little about it.‘ As 
cited by Paul Monk in a Radio National interview, ‗China—Thunder From the Silent 
Zone‘, 18 September 2005. 
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member spy ring across Australia and that these spies were involved in government-
sponsored kidnappings.
30
 Claiming that his life was in danger and that he would be 
jailed and possibly executed if he was returned to China, Chen applied for Australia‘s 
protection.  
China‘s Ambassador to Australia, Madame Fu Ying, emerged to reject Chen‘s claims 
that he would be executed if he returned to China. In suggesting that the death sentence 
in China was reserved for the most brutal murderers she suggested, ‗China has moved 
on. It‘s not the 1970s. China is not behind the bamboo curtain. I feel very 
uncomfortable people still think that way. I‘m very surprised‘.31 In response to her 
handling of Chen‘s allegations, journalists and China-watchers alike began to talk about 
a new style of Chinese diplomacy, one which was conciliatory, cooperative, self-
confident, tolerant of criticism, even humorous. The Australian Financial Review 
identified Madame Fu as an exemplar of this new diplomacy describing her as ‗a 
paradigm of the new elite Chinese diplomat who has learned from the West the 
disarming arts of issues management and public diplomacy based on personal charm 
                                                 
30. The Senate committee that inquired into DIMIA and DFAT‘s handling of Chen‘s request 
for political asylum expressed concern about the allegation regarding Chinese 
surveillance carried out in Australia. The committee expressed a desire that the 
Australian government state publicly that it ‗takes very seriously its obligations to protect 
those resident in Australia and will not tolerate its laws being disregarded‘. In adding 
further comment to the report, Senator Bob Brown claimed: ‗The overall picture 
presented to this committee is one of largely unchecked surveillance and, at times, 
harassment of Australian citizens in Australia by agents of the Peoples [sic] Republic of 
China. The Australian government is not responding to this unacceptable intrusion of a 
foreign government into domestic life and freedoms of our country‘. Senate Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Mr Chen Yonglin’s request for 
political asylum, September 2005, pp. 56, 59. Since Chen‘s allegations there has been 
widespread concern over the extent of Chinese military, political and economic 
espionage activity in Australia. China, which relies heavily on human intelligence, is said 
to draw upon three categories of spy, ‗professional spies‘ paid to collect information, 
‗working relationship‘ spies operating in business circles and ‗friends‘, frequently 
Chinese nationals or expatriates, who operate in less formal networks. In alleging 1,000 
spies, Chen is probably referring to this later group.   
31. Malcolm Farr, ‗Australia can give defector a visa: China‘, Daily Telegraph, 7 June 2005, 
p. 2. The sense that China has moved on and developed a better sense of its international 
obligations was reinforced by a statement by Alexander Downer. When asked about the 
Chinese reaction to street violence in Burma during September 2007, Downer claimed: 
‗This isn‘t the China of old. The China of new is a China that listens to its friends and its 
neighbours, and listens to them a lot‘. Alexander Downer, ‗Doorstop Interview—
Washington DC, United States of America‘, 27 September 2007.  
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and the appearance of openness‘.32 For those who subscribe to the soft power thesis, 
Madame Fu emerged as a key instrument in China‘s charm offensive.33 
Former Ambassador Madame Fu Ying is described by some parliamentarians as having 
run ‗Canberra‘s most active embassy‘, one which regularly engaged parliamentarians 
on a range of issues. Madame Fu is also described as building strong relationships with 
members of the Australia–China Parliamentary Friendship Group.34 She would invite 
members of the Friendship Group to ‗test‘ sensitive issues—such as the status of Falun 
Gong or Taiwan‘s desire to join the World Health Organization and she would draw on 
members of the Friendship Group for advice about China‘s domestic issues: reducing 
poverty in rural areas, increasing China‘s environmental protection and energy 
efficiency. In what may be characterised as a period of openness and exchange between 
the Embassy and members of Parliament, Madame Fu also built relationships with 
those outside the Friendship Group and is credited with engaging parliamentarians with 
whom she differed: friends of Taiwan, supporters of Falun Gong and those lobbying for 
Taiwanese representation at non-governmental regional forums. 
There are also parliamentarians who are considerably less effusive in their praise for the 
diplomacy of Madame Fu, or for what one parliamentarian described as Madame Fu‘s 
‗silken assurances‘. Another parliamentarian, critical of the way the Chinese monitor 
statements made in Parliament, spoke of being ‗hauled over to the Embassy for a 
breakfast with Madame Fu‘ and ‗rapped over the knuckles‘ for comments made about 
Taiwan. Another described a similar act of ‗robust diplomacy‘—being approached by a 
Councillor from the Chinese Embassy, quizzed on why he visited Taiwan, and told ‗to 
pull [his] head in‘.35 Each rebuke suggests that the Chinese Embassy commits 
substantial diplomatic resources to monitoring the contact that takes place between 
members of Parliament and the Taiwanese. It is not simply that the Chinese Embassy, 
                                                 
32. Geoffrey Barker, ‗Diplomacy personified‘, Australian Financial Review, 10 June 2005, 
p. 20. 
33. Kurlantzick claims, ‗China has aggressively wooed Australia, sending its finest 
diplomats, building up cultural exchanges, offering a strategic partnership, and 
aggressively promoting the importance of China‘s demand for natural resources to the 
Australian economy,‘ Charm Offensive, p. 214.  
34. Another interviewee claimed that the Israeli Embassy was the most active, another, the 
Taipei Economic and Cultural Office.  
35. While there are many friends of Taiwan across the Parliament all parties accept the terms 
of the 1972 Joint Communiqué or Paris Agreement, signed by Australia and China on 21 
December 1972 as outlined in Chapter Two.  
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which sits just 500 meters from Parliament, may reprimand parliamentarians who are 
supportive of the Taiwanese, or keep updated membership lists for the Australia–
Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group, but parliamentarians claim that whenever a 
motion is raised in the Parliament about Taiwan you can look into the public galleries, 
in either chamber, and you are guaranteed to be observed by a representative from the 
Chinese Embassy.  
In an environment where an increasing number of parliamentarians may be cautious 
about adopting positions which may offend the Chinese Government, one would 
assume that it would be difficult for the Taiwanese to gain the attention of 
parliamentarians. Friends of Taiwan claim ‗China‘s rise is a real challenge for Taiwan‘ 
and ‗it is more difficult for Taiwan than ever before‘. Nevertheless, a number of 
interviewees reported that the Taiwanese had become extremely active and skilful 
advocates who have been successful in brokering the support of parliamentarians. 
There is a perception that while the Chinese appear to target foreign policy elites (the 
executive or certain members of the Friendship Group), the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Office (TECO) is much more successful in building relationships across the 
Parliament. The success of the TECO is underscored by the fact that there are more 
members of the Australia–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group than the Australia–
China Parliamentary Friendship Group.
36
 
It is clear that the Republic of China, through the diplomatic contrivance of the TECO, 
spends a good deal of money developing sympathetic ears within Parliament House. In 
fact, to the current generation of parliamentarians, Gough Whitlam‘s mantra—‘Never 
take the Taiwan trip‘—appears to have lost its force with many parliamentarians 
enjoying generously funded trips to Taiwan.
37
 The friends of Taiwan employ a neutral 
language to describe the TECO‘s ‗skilful advocacy‘ or their duchessing of Australian 
parliamentarians: ‗The Taiwanese work very hard with Australian politicians‘, ‗The 
Taiwanese have a reputation for being very generous towards politicians‘, ‗Taiwan has 
an enormous number of friends in the Australian Parliament‘. One interviewee went 
                                                 
36. There is a suggestion, which was both endorsed and rejected by different interviewees, 
that when parliamentarians are appointed to a position of parliamentary secretary or 
above, they are tapped on the shoulder by the Prime Minister and told to quit their 
association with the Australia–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group.  
37. Rowan Callick claims that when Michael Danby spoke to his then colleagues Laurie 
Brereton and Mark Latham about visiting Taiwan, Latham related to Danby the advice 
Gough Whitlam gave him before he took his seat in Parliament—‘Never take the Taiwan 
trip‘, see ‗Caught in the eye of the dragon‘, Australian Financial Review, 20 August 
2005, p. 24.  
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further to claim, ‗Taiwan is a like-minded democracy and the relationship between the 
Taiwanese and the Parliament is stronger than any other relationship‘.  
This is not to say the Chinese are not engaged in the same type of diplomacy, albeit 
more targeted, and one interviewee claimed that while ‗The Taiwanese are active 
lobbyists, the Chinese are more successful lobbyists‘. One interviewee claimed that the 
Chinese aggressively court members of the Government—‘they send them to China and 
give them access at all levels‘.38 This is certainly true of the Senate‘s Foreign Affairs, 
Trade and Defence Committee, which in undertaking a comprehensive inquiry into the 
Australia–China relationship, accepted an invitation to visit China as guests of the 
Chinese Government. In many instances, there is a good deal of hypocrisy at play. For 
while some parliamentarians are critical of the way the two Chinas conduct their 
diplomacy in the Pacific, in the local version of cheque-book diplomacy, many 
parliamentarians enjoy the benefits of generously funded China trips. 
In March 2005 China passed an anti-secession law making it ‗illegal‘ for Taiwan to 
secede from China—and mandating military action by the People‘s Liberation Army 
should Taiwan formally declare independence. The passing of this law received little 
attention in Parliament. While it could be argued that the anti-secession law represented 
a rearticulation, rather than a change of position, it is possible that any misgivings 
parliamentarians might have had about the law were shelved by Ambassador Madame 
Fu Ying, who on 15 March 2005, addressed a cross-party meeting at Parliament House 
to explain the law.
39
 On the same day Senator Bob Brown presented a motion opposing 
the law.
40
 The motion was only supported by 7 Greens and Democrats senators. In the 
House the only MP to note the passing of the anti-secession law was marked by a 
                                                 
38. Former member of the Victorian Parliament, Victor Perton, indicates that this is also 
taking place at state level and that many Victorian parliamentarians are seduced by 
‗lavish‘ official hospitality and sponsored trips to China, see Tom Hyland, ‗Hard Power, 
Soft Targets‘, Age, 11 November 2007, p. 15.  
39. While the Chinese Embassy would later release a statement suggesting that ‗The 
Members of Parliament felt Fu Ying‘s speech was of great help to facilitate their 
understanding of China‘s position in [sic] Taiwan question‘, White House spokesman 
Scott McClellan described the law as ‗unhelpful and something that runs counter to 
recent trends toward a warming in cross-strait relations‘, ‗Ambassador Fu Ying 
Addresses Australian Parliament on China‘s Anti-Secession Law‘, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China, 22 March 2005, and ABC Radio ‗China‘s 
anti-secession law ‗empty‘: experts‘, PM, 9 March 2005.  
40. The motion read, ‗That the Senate opposes China‘s ―anti-secession‖ laws which would 
mandate the use of military force if the Taiwanese people opt for independence‘, 
‗Foreign Affairs: China‘, Senate, Debates, 15 March 2005, p. 50.  
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speech by Michael Danby.
41
 The Chinese were clearly attuned to the parliamentary 
reaction for when the official Australian Parliamentary Delegation visited China in 
April 2005, a month later, the Chinese expressed their appreciation that Australia had 
adhered to the one China policy and it was ‗noted‘ that the Senate had rejected Senator 
Brown‘s motion opposing the law.42  
The question of Chinese Government influence is occasionally given consideration at 
Senate Estimates, when Opposition and minor party representatives can probe ministers 
and departmental officials about the interaction that takes place with the Chinese 
Government. We see an example of this during a hearing in May 2007, in which ALP 
Senator for New South Wales, John Faulkner, quizzes the First Assistant Secretary of 
DFAT‘s North Asia Division, Peter Baxter, about the representations that were made to 
the Department in the lead up to the Dalai Lama‘s visit in 2007: 
Senator FAULKNER—What, if any, involvement has DFAT had in the pending 
visit of the Dalai Lama? In other words, are officials assisting in organising the Dalai 
Lama‘s visit? 
Mr Baxter—No. Officials are not assisting in organising the Dalai Lama‘s visit in 
terms of organising or facilitating his program. The Dalai Lama is visiting Australia 
in his position as a significant religious leader and his visit is being organised by 
Tibetan support groups within Australia. 
Senator FAULKNER—Are you aware of any engagements that have been made or 
scheduled with the Prime Minister, ministers or other government officials? 
Mr Baxter—I can only speak for our portfolio. The Minister for Foreign Affairs 
said, a little over a week ago, that he would not be available to meet the Dalai Lama 
on this visit. In terms of the Prime Minister, that is outside our portfolio 
responsibilities. 
Senator FAULKNER—Was a meeting requested with the foreign minister by the 
Dalai Lama? 
Mr Baxter—Yes, it was. As we understand it, the Tibetan affairs office in Australia 
has approached a number of political leaders on both sides of politics. 
                                                 
41. In March 2006, the Chairman of the Australia–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group, 
Margaret May, also spoke at a seminar in Taiwan to mark the one-year anniversary of the 
anti-secession law coming into effect.  
42. Report of the Australian Parliamentary Delegation to China and Mongolia, Parliament 
of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, October 2005, p. 26. 
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Senator FAULKNER—Yes, I think that is true. Has the government received 
representations from the Chinese in respect of the Dalai Lama‘s visit? 
Mr Baxter—Yes, we have. 
Senator FAULKNER—Could you indicate the nature of those representations? 
Mr Baxter—The Chinese position on the Dalai Lama is well known. The Chinese 
have raised with us in bilateral meetings their concerns about the visit, and on 17 May 
in a press conference in Beijing China‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson 
restated Beijing‘s well-known position on the Dalai Lama and the Tibet question, 
opposing meetings by political leaders with the Dalai Lama. In those comments the 
ministry of foreign affairs in Beijing did not mention Australia specifically, or 
Australian leaders. 
Senator FAULKNER—But in terms of direct contact with DFAT itself, has that 
been quite substantial? 
Mr Baxter—There have been a number of representations made by Chinese 
representatives in Australia and during visits to China by Australian ministers and 
officials.
43
 
While the matter was not pursued by Senator Faulkner, it would have been interesting 
to know more about the nature of these representations.  
Respondents to the parliamentary questionnaire were asked whether they had received 
representations from Chinese officials about the political status of Taiwan, the rights of 
workers to collectively organise in China, the activities of Falun Gong practitioners in 
Australia or the political status of Tibet.
44
  
                                                 
43. Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Budget Estimates, 
28 May 2007, p. 15. 
44. In the week prior to the distribution of the questionnaire, the Dalai Lama visited 
Canberra, giving renewed attention to China‘s human rights record in Tibet.  
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Figure 8—Have you ever received representations from Chinese Government officials 
about: 
 
These responses suggest the Chinese Government, or Chinese Embassy in Canberra, is 
an active advocate when it comes to the political status of Taiwan and the activities of 
Falun Gong practitioners in Australia. When asked if the Chinese engaged 
parliamentarians any differently from nationals from other countries it was suggested 
that, with the Chinese (PRC), ‗there is no unofficial line and that the Chinese do not 
deviate from the set text‘; ‗what is reported in the news is what is said in meetings; the 
message is unchanged‘. 
While some interviewees consider the notion of Chinese soft power an aberration, or 
the ultimate oxymoron, others feel that some parliamentarians have become so well-
disposed towards China that they are no longer objective. It is argued by some that 
China‘s image is now so positive that ‗the message about human rights cannot get 
through‘ or that ‗people with commitments to human rights are losing the battle‘. 
Others claim that China‘s image is so positive that Parliament has overlooked China‘s 
rising military expenditure.  
The majority of parliamentarians envisage China‘s rise as peaceful. By and large it is 
considered that China‘s central concerns are domestic—maintaining growth, dealing 
with inequities in the distribution of wealth and maintaining internal political stability. 
A number of interviewees made a point of stating that they did not consider China‘s 
rise a threat and numerous interviewees identified China as a non-expansionary power: 
‗Modern China is not a threat, China is now being led by a class of very well-educated 
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officials‘; ‗China is primarily concerned with developing standards of living‘.45 In 
regard to increased Chinese military expenditure, another interviewee claimed: ‗Even if 
it‘s increased by 17.6% it is developing from such a low base that it is of little concern‘. 
Some went further and suggested, ‗China does not get enough credit for its work as a 
peacemaker (principally in North Korea)‘.  
Numerous respondents to the questionnaire offered comment about important 
collaborative exchanges that have been taking place between the two nations. These 
extended from the interaction between education sectors (and the positive effect of 
overseas Chinese students in Australian schools and tertiary institutions), to cooperative 
endeavours surrounding preparations for the Beijing Olympics, to the contribution 
being made by CPA Australia to accounting professional services and standards in 
China/Hong Kong. Another respondent drew attention to the interaction that takes place 
with China through the United Nations (UN), particularly through the United Nations 
Security Council.  
Committee Work 
Respondents to the parliamentary questionnaire were asked whether they believed that 
the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade or the Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade can influence Australian 
foreign policy.
46
 A total of 57% of respondents felt that these two committees can 
influence policy. Those who held this view were asked to provide an example. Many 
respondents identified the general capacity of the committees to influence ministerial or 
                                                 
45. However, this sentiment is not universal. Senator Christine Milne claims, ‗In my view, 
we are going to see pressure for territorial expansion from China because of the huge 
weight of population and the consequent environmental scarcity‘. ‗Delegation Reports: 
Parliamentary Delegation to China and Mongolia‘, Senate, Debates, 7 November 2005. 
46. In December 2003 the Senate‘s Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References 
Committee released a report titled, The (not quite) White Paper: Australia’s foreign 
affairs and trade policy, Advancing the National Interest. The report advocates for the 
increased parliamentary participation in the foreign policy process through JSCFADT. 
Recommendation 1 proposed, ‗The Committee recommends that upon the 
commissioning of any future White Paper, the Minister for Foreign Affairs shall refer the 
proposal to the parliament‘s Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade (JSCFADT). The Joint Committee shall undertake broad public consultations 
regarding the proposed content of the White Paper, and shall report its findings to the 
parliament. The report shall inform the development, by government, of the White Paper, 
and shall be published along with the White Paper as an accompanying document‘. This 
recommendation was not accepted by the government. 
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government thinking; alternatively, numerous respondents saw committee work as an 
opportunity to feed into the policy process. Some cited examples where these 
committees had contributed to specific policy development: these included areas such 
as regional security, relations with Latin America, the development of free trade 
agreements and the cross-referencing of issues with the Joint Standing Committee on 
Treaties. Others suggested that these committees offer parliamentarians an avenue to 
record human rights concerns or an opportunity to contribute to policy development in 
less politically sensitive or controversial areas.  
During the 41
st
 Parliament the Australia–China relationship often became the object of 
parliamentary interest and the subject of parliamentary analysis. This interest was 
demonstrated by the work of parliamentary committees. The major China-related 
inquiry undertaken during the period was conducted by the Senate‘s Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade References Committee.
47
 This resulted in a significant two-part 
report on the Australia–China relationship: Opportunities and Challenges (November 
2005) and China’s Emergence: Implications for Australia (March 2006). Additionally, 
the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry and Resources 
undertook a major inquiry examining the development of the uranium industry and the 
possibility of exporting Australian uranium to China (November 2006).
48
 As mentioned 
above, the Senate‘s Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee also 
inquired into the Government‘s response to Mr Chen Yonglin’s request for political 
asylum (September 2005) and the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade (Human Rights Subcommittee) inquired into Australia’s Human 
Rights Dialogue Process (September 2005). 
The first part of the major Senate report, Opportunities and Challenges offers a detailed 
analysis of trading, commercial, social and cultural links with China. The second 
focuses on the geo-political and strategic aspects of the bilateral relationship. The terms 
                                                 
47. It should be noted that this committee travelled to China as guests of the Chinese 
Government.  
48. Titled, Australia’s uranium—Greenhouse friendly fuel for an energy hungry world, a 
case study into the strategic importance of Australia’s uranium resources for the Inquiry 
into developing Australia’s non-fossil fuel energy industry. The Joint Standing 
Committee on Treaties would also go on to ratify a treaty on the transfer of nuclear 
material between Australia and China: Report 81—Agreement between the Government 
of Australia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Transfer of 
Nuclear Material and the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy (December 2006). 
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of reference for the inquiry focused on Australia‘s economic and political relations with 
China and Australia‘s response to China‘s emergence as a regional power. In keeping 
with this, the report is largely concerned with examining the bilateral relationship 
through a trade prism.
49
 The first 245 pages of the 349-page report (part one) examines 
the incentives and obstacles to trade with China across a number of industry sectors, 
while the remaining 100 pages focus upon non-economic matters: human rights, the 
promotion of ‗China literacy‘ in Australia, public diplomacy, science and technology 
and political links. Part two examines China‘s foreign policy and China‘s relationships 
in East Asia and the Pacific.
50
 In presenting the first of the reports to Parliament, the 
Chair of the committee, Labor Senator for New South Wales, Steve Hutchins, identified 
factors that the committee considered possible of derailing China‘s economic progress: 
… the Chinese government‘s ability to manage effectively a rapidly expanding 
economy; the potential for social and political unrest as the country opens up to new 
ideas and its people‘s expectations change; the gap between rich and poor; China‘s 
growing appetite for energy resources; and environmental degradation. There are also 
external threats that could disrupt China‘s economic progress, such as the conflict 
between Taiwan and China over the One China policy; tensions between China and 
Japan over sensitive issues such as their differing interpretations of history; and the 
trade deficit with the United States.
51
 
Drawing from the report, Senator Hutchins identified three further concerns attached to 
the development of Australia–China relations: corruption in local government and the 
need for improved corporate governance in China; China‘s flagrant violation of 
intellectual property standards; and human rights and labour rights.
52
 These three 
concerns provided the basis for many of the committee‘s recommendations.  
                                                 
49. Former China-related Senate inquires: Foreign Affairs and Trade References Committee, 
Australia–China Relations (1996) and the Senate Standing Committee on Industry and 
Trade, Australia–China Trade (1984) took similar approaches.  
50. With regard to the Pacific the report recommended that the Australian government, 
through the Pacific Islands Forum, encourage China and Taiwan to adhere to the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) principles on 
development assistance, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References 
Committee, China’s Emergence: implications for Australia, Recommendation 7, p. 182.  
51. Senator Hutchins, ‗Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee Report‘, 
Senate, Debates, 10 November 2005, p. 16. 
52. The committee was concerned that the Australian government ‗places too much weight 
on the trading relationship … and ignores the human rights abuses occurring in the 
country‘. Senator Steve Hutchins, ‗Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References 
Committee Report‘, Senate, Debates, 10 November 2005, p. 16.  
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One of the themes to emerge from the inquiry was that Australia needed to develop 
experts ready to advise government and business leaders on China-related matters. One 
professor after another came before the committee and spoke of Australia‘s limited 
capacity to deliver China-literacy. Numerous witnesses spoke about a missing 
generation of Asianists and about the effect that this deficiency would have on 
Australia‘s commercial, strategic, security and cultural interests. The evidence received 
by the committee was embodied in the remark by Professor David Goodman, a remark 
which shattered the illusion of a China-literate nation: ‗We do not have the educational 
and intellectual infrastructure for dealing with China‘.53 As a result of such evidence 
the committee recommended ‗that the Australian government place high priority on 
encouraging China literacy in Australia by: working with state and territory 
governments to promote the study of Asia at both primary and tertiary levels; provide 
more support for in-country language training; establish scholarships for ‗double 
degrees‘ incorporating language studies; and provide scholarships to encourage Chinese 
students to apply for courses in Australia in the humanities and social sciences.
54
 
Despite the overwhelming evidence provided, the Government responded to this 
recommendation by outlining its commitment to Asian language learning in Australia, 
suggesting that it had done enough to promote Asia/China-literacy in Australia‘s 
primary, secondary and tertiary education sectors.
55
 
                                                 
53. Professor David Goodman, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References 
Committee, Opportunity and Challenges: Australia’s relationship with China, November 
2005, p. 274. Stephen Morgan claimed if there was ‗a crisis in the legitimacy of the 
Chinese Communist Party, we may find that Australia would not have sufficient people 
able to provide advice to intelligence agencies, your committees and defence services, let 
alone provide advice to business and civilian interests‘, p. 274. Senate Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade References Committee, Opportunity and Challenges: Australia’s 
relationship with China, November 2005, p. 274. Also see comments from John 
Fitzgerald and Robin Jeffrey. 
54. See ‗China literacy‘, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, 
Recommendations, 15, 22 and 23. 
55. See responses to Recommendation 15 (‗ensure there is a pool of highly skilled China 
experts in Australia ready to advise government and business leaders on developments in 
that country‘) in ‗Government Response to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Committee‘s Inquiry into Australia’s Relations with China‘, pp. 22–24. 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/fadt_ctte/china/govt_response.pdf (accessed 
2 August 2007). Kevin Rudd has committed the ALP to investing in Asia-literacy, ‗What 
an enormous badging and branding opportunity for this country in terms of how we 
market ourselves into the region from Europe and from North America to be able to say: 
‗We know most about this country and most about this region compared with any other 
Western culture and Western economy. We have the largest number of Japanese 
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Exporting Uranium to China 
Over the course of the 41
st
 Parliament there was a significant shift in debate about 
Australia‘s uranium resources. The decline in global energy security and the growing 
concerns over the world‘s rising global greenhouse gas emissions combined to focus 
attention on Australia‘s uranium deposits. Following the advice of the Uranium Mining, 
Processing and Nuclear Energy Review Inquiry, chaired by Ziggy Switkowski (2006), 
and the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry and Resources 
Inquiry into Developing Australia’s Non-fossil Fuel Energy Industry (2006), the 
Howard Government announced a new strategy for the development of uranium mining 
and nuclear power in Australia. This strategy sought to remove the structural and 
legislative barriers that would stymie the development of a substantial export industry 
while seeking to promote uranium for its clean energy capacities.
56
  
Prior to this announcement, Australia and China entered into a bilateral safeguards 
agreement on the transfer of nuclear material (April 2006), an agreement opening the 
way for the sale of Australian uranium to China. This was followed by the ratification 
of two nuclear safeguard agreements between Australia and China in January 2007. The 
800–page House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry and Resources 
report gives consideration to the practical, strategic, economic, security and 
                                                                                                                                              
speakers, we have the largest number of Chinese speakers, and we have these deeply 
inculcated programs in our education and schools system‘. Kevin Rudd, ‗Australia–Japan 
Foundation (Repeal and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2006‘, House of Representatives, 
Debates, 9 August 2006, p. 160. Before leaving the Parliament to take up her post as 
Australia‘s Ambassador to Italy, Amanda Vanstone, called for a nationwide language 
program that would see every child in Australia learn Mandarin or Bahasa until year 12. 
The ALP intends to spend $68 million to promote the study of languages in Australian 
schools through re-establishing the National Asian Languages and Studies in Australian 
Schools program (NALSAS). The NALSAS program had an intergenerational 
commitment to equipping young Australians with the Chinese, Japanese, Indonesian and 
Korean linguistic and cultural skills. It was abolished by the Howard Government in 
2003. As Stephen FitzGerald, Australia‘s first Ambassador to China and long-time 
advocate for Asian studies in Australian schools and universities says, Asia-literacy is 
about ‗changing the intellectual universe of Australians‘; it is about developing a 
psychologically and socio-linguistically deeper and more stable understanding of the 
societies we are dealing with, from which in turn could come a different kind of foreign 
policy and a different kind of relationship with Asian countries that would be good for 
Australia‘. Luke Slattery, ‗Neighbours we choose to ignore‘, Weekend Australian,  
2–3 July 2005, p. 22. 
56. John Howard, ‗Uranium Mining and Nuclear Energy: A Way Forward for Australia‘, 
Media Release, 28 April 2007.  
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environmental debates for the development of a uranium industry, with a section of the 
report dealing explicitly with the export of uranium to China. The statement of the 
committee reveals that it did not have substantial concerns about the security of 
Australian uranium exported to China and it was supportive of the use of nuclear power 
in reducing global greenhouse gas emissions:  
While the Committee understands the concerns expressed by some submitters about 
the added risks for export of uranium attendant upon the absence of a fully ‗open 
society‘ in China and its allegedly poor proliferation record, the Committee 
nonetheless concludes that such concerns should not prevent sales of Australian 
uranium to China … the Committee‘s support for sales of uranium to China is 
underpinned by the fact that use of nuclear power will aid in China‘s development 
and help to address the global energy imbalance, while also earning export income 
for Australia. Use of Australia‘s uranium will fuel the generation of base-load 
electricity in China in a manner that is far less carbon intensive than the alternatives 
and this will be of unquestionable global environmental benefit‘ adding that it was 
confident that ‗sales of uranium will not, either directly or indirectly, contribute to 
any military purpose in China‘.57 
Given the position taken by the committee, and that documented in the Switkowski 
report, it was surprising that individual members expressed a higher level of concern 
about the export of uranium in the parliamentary questionnaire. Respondents were 
asked whether they were concerned about the export of Australian uranium to the 
People‘s Republic. Just under half, or 42%, expressed concern over the effect the 
export of uranium would have on nuclear proliferation and security. If we look at the 
responses on a cross-party basis we find that concern was expressed by 100% of minor 
party respondents, 65% of ALP, 25% of Liberal Party and 0% of the National Party 
respondents. Respondents were also asked if they had any other concern. Concern was 
expressed over whether China would honour the safeguard agreements (and not use 
uranium for weapons), while others questioned how China would manage its nuclear 
waste. Some parliamentarians raised general concerns about the environmental impact 
of nuclear power and the effect that uranium exports would have on Australia‘s 
international reputation as a responsible international citizen. 
                                                 
57. House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry and Resources, Australia’s 
uranium—Greenhouse friendly fuel for an energy hungry world, A case study into the 
strategic importance of Australia’s uranium resources for the Inquiry into developing 
Australia’s non-fossil fuel energy industry, November 2006, pp. 469–470. 
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Human Rights 
When concern was expressed over the Australia–China relationship by members of the 
41
st 
Parliament, it most often focused on China‘s handling of human rights. Of all the 
unsolicited comments that were offered at the end of the parliamentary questionnaire 
the most candid focused on the Parliament‘s, or the Government‘s, position on human 
rights in China. While one respondent claimed that ‗The rights of Falun Gong 
practitioners, and others, do not receive enough attention in our bilateral relationship‘, 
other respondents were more vociferous in their criticism of the Howard Government: 
‗The Federal Government gives zero significance to human rights and promoting 
democracy. This is not good enough‘ while one member of the ALP claimed, 
‗Alexander Downer and Kevin Rudd don‘t care two hoots about human rights issues in 
China‘. 
Figure 9—Do you receive representations from individual constituents or 
organisations about any of the following human rights issues: 
 
The parliamentary questionnaire sought to identify what representations Australian 
parliamentarians receive about human rights matters in China. The results reveal the 
type of issues raised and the reach of different advocacy groups. When compared with 
the feedback on the question about representations from Chinese Government officials 
they also illustrate the multiple and often competing representations that are received 
on politically sensitive matters.  
Of the 81% who had received representations from individuals or organisations about 
human rights issues in China almost all, or 96%, had been approached about the rights 
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of Falun Gong practitioners. It also appears that the extensive representations from the 
Falun Gong movement have also drawn attention to the practice of so-called organ 
‗harvesting‘.58 Beyond these five fixed categories respondents were also given the 
option of specifying any other representations received about human rights. Those 
included approaches made about the status of Taiwan, or threats made against Taiwan, 
while a further 8% of respondents identified approaches about Tibet or Tibetans 
(something which may have been interpreted by other respondents as ‗rights of ethnic 
and religious minorities‘). Other parliamentarians noted approaches about such issues 
as: employment rights, the death penalty, democracy in China and the fate of pro-
democracy advocates, while one interviewee stated their personal concern about the 
growing incidents of child abduction in China.  
Figure 10—The China-related matters raised by your constituents relate to: 
 
A total of 53% of respondents had been approached by their Australian-Chinese 
constituents about specific China-related issues. Of these, 83% had been approached 
about human rights, 67% had been approached about immigration matters and perhaps 
surprisingly, only 40% had been approached about commercial or trade matters. 
These results suggest that Australian parliamentarians consistently receive 
representations about a variety of human rights matters in China. Yet despite the 
frequency of these representations, few parliamentarians appear committed to 
                                                 
58. In May 2007, after sustained international advocacy over organ harvesting, the Chinese 
Government introduced new regulations which ban organ trading, requiring all transplant 
recipients to have the written consent of donors. 
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highlighting human rights in the Parliament. Those who do include: Senators Bob 
Brown, Christine Milne and Kerry Nettle (Greens); Senators Andrew Bartlett and 
Natasha Stott Despoja (Democrats) and Chris Bowen MP, Carmen Lawrence MP, 
Martin Ferguson MP and Michael Danby MP (ALP). Michael Danby alone spends 
more time documenting human rights abuses in China, in Parliament, than do the other 
225 parliamentarians combined.
59
  
A number of interviewees considered that giving voice to such issues was part of their 
parliamentary mandate—‘parliamentarians should focus on the international 
citizenship; human rights are indivisible and parliamentarians can play a role here‘. 
Similarly, when speaking about raising human rights matters in Parliament, another 
interviewee claimed—‘my role is to put pressure on government, to speak to the people 
of Australia, and to make Australia‘s position known to foreign governments‘.60 
Nevertheless, human rights advocates claim to be marginalised from parliamentary 
debate: ‗Those members of Parliament who do not solely focus on the economic aspect 
of the Australia–China relationship are excluded from the debate‘. Another 
parliamentarian committed to highlighting human rights in China claimed that as a 
result of the thriving economic relationship, ‗an impenetrable wall has gone up around 
issues of human rights in China‘. Some argue that the Parliament is extremely reticent 
in taking a position which may offend the Chinese and that this results in various acts 
of self-censorship.
61
 One such criticism relates to the failure of the Speaker of the 
House to formally acknowledge the presence of two visiting dignitaries—Former 
                                                 
59. Michael Danby consistently highlights human rights issues in China through Questions 
in writing on issues including: Chinese labour camps, conditions for coal mining 
workers, harassment of Tibetan minorities, Chinese aid to Sudan, democracy in Hong 
Kong, organ harvesting and the barring of goods manufactured in forced labour camps in 
China. 
60. When discussing human rights abuses in China a number of interviewees suggested that 
it was important not to be seen as lecturing foreign governments while others were 
mindful to recognise Australia‘s own failures in protecting human rights. Another 
interviewee, who spoke of raising his concerns about the treatment of political dissidents, 
Falun Gong practitioners and trade unionists during a meeting in the Great Hall of the 
People, claimed that the Chinese ‗anticipated these questions and simply brushed them 
aside‘. 
61. Claiming ‗fatuousness has always been a strong element of the Australian response to 
China‘, Greg Sheridan suggests that senior politicians deliberately avoid issues of human 
rights abuses in China: What‘s that? Labour rights in China? I think I‘m washing my 
hair. Chinese prison conditions? Not my bailiwick. The future of democracy? What if we 
talk about the future of trade instead.‘ Greg Sheridan, ‗Agents of change see a free 
China‘, Weekend Australian, 31 March 2007, p. 29. 
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Canadian cabinet minister David Kilgour and European Parliament member Edward 
McMillan-Scott—who were in Canberra in August 2006 to attend a parliamentary 
forum drawing attention to the alleged ‗harvesting‘ of organs from Falun Gong 
practitioners. Despite the numerous approaches that were made by Carmen Lawrence, 
Speaker David Hawker, in possible contravention of parliamentary protocol, failed to 
acknowledge their presence in the public gallery. When quizzed about his actions, the 
Speaker claimed, ‗While there are not firm guidelines (about recognising the visits of 
dignitaries), there are clear rules if you like that I try to follow and given the precedents 
that have been here for many years, I continue to follow those‘ ...62 
Another way in which human rights matters in China are brought to the attention of the 
Parliament is through petitions. Petitioning facilitates a direct link between the public 
and the Parliament and provides the only means by which a citizen can directly place a 
matter before the Parliament. There were 743 petitions submitted to the House of 
Representative during the 41
st
 Parliament (to 21 June 2007). If we are to identify these 
petitions on a portfolio basis, the greatest number related to: Health and Ageing (170), 
Foreign Affairs (164) and Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 
(106).
63
  
During the 41
st
 Parliament there was an average of one China-related petition received 
by the House each sitting week. (There were 53 China-related petitions presented in the 
House of Representatives over 53 sitting weeks.) Of these, 35 related to Falun Gong 
and 12 to the alleged practice of organ ‗harvesting‘. Other China-related petitions 
during the 41
st
 Parliament included: Taiwan‘s application to be represented in the 
World Health Assembly and the World Health Organization (four), the treatment of 
bears in China (one), and a petition alleging the persecution of the Chinese human 
rights lawyer, Gao Zhisheng (one).
64
 It is extremely likely therefore that the Falun 
Gong movement was the single most active petitioner to the 41
st
 Australian Parliament. 
In terms of the number of signatories they were also extremely well represented.
65
  
                                                 
62. Nick Leys and Andrew Fraser, ‗Fragile China‘, Australian, 17 August 2006. 
63. The total number of petitions presented to the House was: 2005—235; 2006—276; as at 
21 June 2007—148. Making a Difference: Petitioning the House of Representatives, 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Procedure, August 2007, p. 8. 
64. By comparison, eight petitions about Falun Gong and one on organ harvesting were 
presented to the Senate over the same period. 
65. As the petitions about Falun Gong decline there is a commensurate increase in the 
number of petitions received about organ harvesting. For example, between October 
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Figure 11—Number of Falun Gong petitions tabled in the House of Representatives 
during the 41
st
 Parliament: 
 
Human Rights Dialogue  
Prime Minister Howard proposed the establishment of a formal high-level bilateral 
dialogue on human rights with Premier Li Peng on his visit to China in March–April 
1997. The first talks were held in Beijing in August 1997 and initially involved officials 
from the two countries‘ foreign ministries. Australian participation in the annual 
meeting has grown to include representatives from the Attorney-General‘s Department, 
the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC). A wide-ranging number of issues have 
been discussed at the annual Dialogue. These include issues such as: freedom of speech 
and freedom of assembly in China, cultural and religious freedom in Xinjiang and 
Tibet, China‘s use of the death penalty, China‘s ratification of international 
conventions, China‘s use of re-education and the rights of people living in China with 
HIV/AIDS.
66
 In recent times the Dialogue has grown to include discussions about 
human rights in Australia: the human rights of indigenous Australians and the policy of 
mandatory detention for all illegal immigrants and asylum seekers.  
                                                                                                                                              
2006 and September 2007, there were 11 petitions concerning organ harvesting. It could 
be argued that while petitions may perform an important democratic function, they are 
more successful in strengthening community views on an issue than they are in bringing 
an issue to the consideration of the Parliament. 
66. See Appendix D—‘List of Topics Discussed at Australia‘s Human Rights Dialogue‘, 
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s Human 
Rights Dialogue Process, September 2005.  
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The Howard Government claimed that the Human Rights Dialogue was fundamental to 
its engagement with China and that official dialogue is the most practical and effective 
way of progressing discussions on human rights. The Howard Government was also 
keen to point out that Australia has the highest level dialogue of any nation—at the 
Assistant Minister level—and that the United States does not engage in any type of 
human rights dialogue with China. The Howard Government claimed that the Dialogue 
is the most effective mechanism for facilitating incremental change. However, critics 
suggest that Australia has traded the right to publicly criticise China on human rights, in 
exchange for an official dialogue, which has lacked transparency and failed to deliver 
any substantive outcomes.
67
 In criticising the Howard Government for its muted 
advocacy on human rights, numerous respondents to the Parliamentary questionnaire 
claim: ‗The Human Rights Dialogue is a sham … China‘s role reinforcing external, 
repressive regimes is of growing concern …‘, while another identifies the Dialogue as 
‗a device for obviating any real discussion on human rights‘.68 
                                                 
67. Journalist Greg Sheridan claims, ‗Our behind-closed-doors human rights dialogue with 
China has no effect on human rights and is not designed to. It allows us to satisfy our 
own values by making the representations we should without constant public brawling 
with Beijing‘, ‗Sensible diplomatic approach to China serves our interests‘, Weekend 
Australian, 25–26 July 2002, p. 17. Elsewhere Sheridan has written, ‗Our present official 
human rights dialogue exists solely so the Government will never have to say anything 
publicly about Chinese human rights‘, ‗Shamed by our silence‘, Australian, 2 June 2005, 
p. 11. Mike Steketee also claims, ‗The Howard Government has worked assiduously to 
push human rights to one side in the relationship with China‘, ‗The price is rights‘, 
Weekend Australian, 1–2 April 2006, p. 20. The Howard Government‘s response to these 
criticisms is that official discussions are a more effective way of engaging China on 
issues of human rights issues than by attempting to publicly shame China, Moreover, that 
the process is transparent as press conferences are held after meetings. The above 
mentioned Senate inquiry found it difficult to assess the effectiveness of Australia‘s 
Human Rights Dialogue with China because a lack of materials on the Dialogue‘s 
outcomes. Deputy Chair and Liberal Senator for Western Australia, David Johnston 
claimed, ‗the principal thing that I came away from this inquiry with was that China has 
no real history of transparency‘, ‗Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References 
Committee Report‘, Senate, Debates, 10 November 2005, p. 21. 
68. The abovementioned allegations by Chen Yonglin were not raised at the Dialogue. 
Alexander Downer claimed, ‗The law in Australia says that these matters must be 
considered by the Immigration Department and we wouldn‘t be raising the case in human 
rights talks with the Chinese …‘, ‗Transcript of a doorstop interview of the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs: Adelaide, 27 June 2005. The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
References Committee also received submissions which suggested that the Human 
Rights Dialogue was inadequate, see Opportunities and Challenges, p. 255. Here we find 
that Chen Yonglin himself describes the dialogue as having failed to make any progress. 
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In March 2004 the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade referred an inquiry into 
Australia‘s human rights dialogue process with China, Vietnam and Iran to the Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT). The terms of 
reference required that the committee ‗inquire into and report on the human rights 
dialogue process, with particular reference to: parliamentary participation and 
oversight; involvement of non-government organisations; the roles and obligations of 
participating agencies; reporting requirements and mechanisms; and the monitoring and 
evaluation of outcomes‘.69 The criticisms of the process, as identified in the 
submissions received by the committee, focused on three major themes: the lack of 
transparency and accountability and reporting function in the dialogue processes, that 
the Dialogue was process rather than outcome focused and did not deliver substantive 
outcomes, and the limitations of bilateral as opposed to multilateral dialogue on human 
rights.
70
  
In evidence provided to the committee by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
the Director of the China Political and External Section, East Asia Branch, Peter 
Roggero, offered the following assessment of human rights in China: 
Regarding human rights in China in the broad, I think our assessment is that the 
situation has, over a longer period, improved rather than worsened. Obviously there 
are instances on occasions where you would see two steps forward and one step back 
… but in the broad we do see an incremental improvement. I think a lot of that 
improvement has resulted from China‘s economic development feeding into legal 
reforms, which provide people with greater legal protections against abuses, and the 
growth in China‘s administrative capability. So there is increasing transparency in the 
way China is governing itself, and that flows into improvements in the way that 
human rights are observed in China. In our dialogue with China we try and tap into 
that improvement generally, point out areas where we think things are not improving 
or not improving as well as they could be or should be, and, in many cases, through 
the Human Rights Technical Cooperation Program, directly provide practical 
assistance to encourage those kinds of reforms and changes.
71
 
                                                 
69. Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s Human 
Rights Dialogue Process, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, September 2005, 
p. xiv. 
70. It was also suggested that, because of the dialogue, Australia is less likely to sponsor 
United Nations resolutions against human rights in China at the Commission of Human 
Rights in Geneva. 
71. Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into 
Australia’s Human Rights Dialogue Process, Transcript of Evidence, 14 March 2005, 
p. 48. 
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Asked if he could identify any instances where the human rights situation had worsened 
Peter Roggero replied: 
Unfortunately we do not have accurate figures for many issues, including, for 
example, the death penalty. It is possible that over some years there have been higher 
numbers of instances of death sentences, but we do not know that for a fact because 
China does not publish the figures. Some years ago, China devolved the authority for 
issuing death sentences to below the central level. It used to be the prerogative of only 
the Supreme People‘s Court. When they devolved that to the provincial level we fear 
that there may have been an increase in some of those death sentences being issued. 
We have raised that on many occasions with the Chinese government, including 
through the dialogue. I was pleased to hear at the most recent dialogue that China is 
reviewing that policy and looking at putting that authority back to at least the 
Supreme People‘s Court—at the central level, the top level—rather than allowing 
provincial level courts to make those sorts of decisions. That is an area where it may 
have become worse over some years. I could not say that for a fact because China 
does not publish those figures.
72
  
The JSCFADT report made five recommendations for improving the Human Rights 
Dialogue process (remembering that these also related to dialogues with Vietnam and 
Iran). Two related to increasing the level of parliamentary participation and oversight of 
the dialogue process, through formalising the participation of parliamentarians from 
Government and non-Government parties.
73
 One recommendation stated that the 
Government consider further involving NGOs through preceding each meeting (in 
Australia) with a forum where NGOs could brief members on their human rights 
concerns. The final two recommendations related to increasing reporting obligation 
requirements. This would entail the Minister for Foreign Affairs tabling an annual 
statement in Parliament on the status and proceedings of each meeting and having 
government departments and NGOs make more effective use of their websites to 
convey up-to-date information on the Dialogue. The Government accepted three of the 
five recommendations. Those that the Government did not accept related to preceding 
each bilateral dialogue with a forum involving NGOs and the recommendation 
suggesting that the Minister for Foreign Affairs table an annual statement on the status 
of the dialogue. In the first instance the Government argued that it had already 
established a number of effective mechanisms through which NGOs are able to relate 
their concerns. The Government claimed that the formal ‗tabling of a report in 
                                                 
72. ibid. 
73. The Howard Government notes that in the past the Minister for Foreign Affairs has 
written to the Leader of the Opposition and the Opposition Spokesperson for Foreign 
Affairs to nominate representatives for the dialogue but that the Opposition has never 
bothered to respond to these invitations. 
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Parliament would compromise the guarantees of confidentiality that have been so 
important in ensuring that the dialogues feature frank discussions of sometimes quite 
sensitive issues‘. However, the response also explained that ‗The Government is 
prepared to provide in camera briefings to Parliamentarians at their request‘.74 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a snapshot of the attitudes held by the members of the 41
st
 
Parliament towards the Australia–China relationship. It has sought to offer perspectives 
on issues ranging from where parliamentarians obtain their information about China to 
what types of China-related issues are raised by constituents. At the same time it has 
sought to contribute to an understanding of the way the Australian Parliament engages 
with foreign policy concerns through its committee work and through its interaction 
with members of other legislatures. Together with the material contained in Chapter 
Three, the chapter has also offered evidence of the way the Chinese Government and its 
officials engage in various diplomatic behaviours to influence members of the 
Australian Parliament on issues sensitive to Beijing.  
In concluding this chapter it is worth giving consideration to what respondents to the 
questionnaire believed to be influences on the future character of the Australia–China 
relationship. The categories assessed ranged from the economic (China‘s demand for 
energy resources), to the environmental (a climate change agreement with China), to 
the bilateral (Australia‘s human rights dialogue with China) to the international 
(China‘s emergence as a stakeholder in global/regional affairs).  
The responses to this question suggest that the greatest threat to the future prosperity of 
the bilateral relationship relates to the potential for the emergence of a less liberal 
approach to trade matters: including reduced market access or a stalled program of 
trade liberalisation. At least for now, China‘s human rights record, concerns over 
China‘s regional relations, or even its ‗chequebook diplomacy‘ in the Pacific—will 
only become important insofar as they have the capacity to affect either the economic 
baseline or the Australia-United States alliance. This is reinforced by comments made 
by interviewees who anticipated that the potential for change in Australia–China 
relations would likely emerge from a substantial economic downturn within China or 
                                                 
74. Australian Government Response to the Report of the Joint Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,  
 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/hrdialogue/govtresponse.pdf (accessed 
2 October 2007). 
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from a fundamental change in the power structure of the Chinese Communist Party. 
With respect to parliamentary attitudes towards democratisation in China, while there 
are those who are mindful not to overstate the likelihood of any movement towards 
democracy, there is a sizable number who believe that market liberalisation and 
economic growth will result in political change and democratic reform in China. 
The other issue most commonly nominated as a potential influence on the future 
character of the Australia–China relationship was cross-Strait relations. It was 
suggested that ‗conflict between China and Taiwan is constantly diminishing as the two 
sides come to better understand one another and they become more enmeshed—both 
through trade and people to people contact‘. Another parliamentarian described the 
cross-Strait situation as ‗a knot that cannot be untied‘. Speaking of the Taiwan Straits 
and the Korean Peninsula, one Senator stressed how important North Asian security 
was for Australia, claiming, ‗If there is a crisis in North Asia, Australia will starve!‘ 
Other anticipated areas of difficulty in bilateral relations included: China‘s relations 
with its North Asian neighbours; broader human rights abuses in China; the growing 
number of Chinese nationals making asylum or protection claims in Australia (and the 
possibility of an unsuccessful claimant being repatriated and executed
75
); and any 
incident involving the surveillance and harassment of Australian citizens by the 
Chinese Government. 
 
 
                                                 
75. Australia receives as many as 1000 applications for protection visas from Chinese 
nationals each year. Between 5–6% of these applications are successful. (See Senator 
Amanda Vanstone, ‗Questions without notice: Asylum Seekers‘, Senate, Debates, 
12 June 2005, p. 29.) 
  
Figure 12—Influences on the future character of the relationship—Using the contemporary Australia–China relationship as a starting point, 
indicate how influential you feel each of the following will be in determining the future character of the Australia–China relationship. 
 
* At least one respondent marked moderately to marginally influential; # At least one respondent marked highly to marginally influential; ^ At least 
one respondent marked marginally to not influential.  
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Postscript 
… Every time I‘m in China, they say ‗We‘ve just had a delegation here from Mr 
Rudd … But you know, I wouldn‘t say that he is doing something that the Prime 
Minister hasn‘t done. Or a whole host of Australian leaders. So I mean he‘s going to 
China. That‘s good and I‘m not critical of that, but he‘s not Marco Polo, not the first 
man to have gone to China. Peter Costello, April 2007
76
 
In February 2007, when asked to nominate his greatest strength as an alternative prime 
minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd emphasised his in-depth knowledge of China. Rudd 
spoke of having lived in China as a diplomat during the 1980s and of returning more 
than fifty times; he went on to suggest that this familiarity would be critical to engaging 
a nation destined to be at the centre of Australia‘s strategic and economic ‗gravity‘.77 In 
the following weeks, Treasurer Peter Costello sought to draw capital from Rudd‘s 
claim, making Rudd‘s China-literacy a subject of derision. This was played out in his 
Marco Polo quip—and here we assume that Costello meant to say Rudd was not the 
first westerner or western man to have gone to China—and during Question Time in 
early March 2007, when Rudd was attacked for meeting with the disgraced former 
premier of Western Australia, Brian Burke.
78
 To the great mirth of his Liberal and 
National Party colleagues, Costello rose to parody Rudd‘s inadvertent meeting with 
Brian Burke. SBS political correspondent, Karen Middleton, described the theatre in 
the following way: 
‗Brian Burke!‘ Costello continued in mock mimicry. ‗What a coincidence—down 
here at Perugino‘s on the first of August 2005! I didn‘t know you were going to be 
here, Brian. And while I‘m here I will make a speech on China.‘79 
                                                 
76. ‗Interview with Peter Costello‘, Insiders, ABC television, 1 April 2007. In response to a 
caller to John Laws‘ program on Southern Cross radio in which it was suggested that 
Julia Gillard—an alleged communist who did not own a skirt—would ultimately run the 
country while Mr Rudd was off in China ‗jabbering‘ in Mandarin, Rudd claimed, ‗If I 
can use whatever language skills I have got to boost the exports of Australian farmers to 
major emerging markets like China, let me tell you, I will yabber my way through any 
lunch speaking whatever language I can‘, ‗Rudd declines comment on Gillard skirt‘, 
Australian Associated Press, 15 November 2007.  
77. Christine Jackman, ‗ACTU not in control‘, Weekend Australian, 10–11 February 2007 
(The Nation, p. 4).  
78. Former Premier of Western Australia, Brian Burke was imprisoned in 1994 for rorting 
travel expenses and again in 1997 for misappropriating campaign donations. For years 
Burke had exercised influence both within the ALP and broader parliamentary circles. 
79. Karen Middleton, ‗Labor‘s wild west trips Rudd‘, Canberra Times, 3 March 2007, p. 7.  
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In what followed, the triumvirate of Costello, Abbott and Howard were vicious in their 
attack: Rudd was derided for supping with the devil; accused of entering into Faustian 
pacts with convicted felons; and lampooned for his snooty prolixity on China. For the 
first time since his election as Leader of the Opposition, Rudd encountered the full 
force of an acerbic Coalition struggling in the polls. And, after initially feigning 
disinterest, Rudd eventually recoiled from the venom that tacked its way across the 
chamber.
80
  
Having been variously labelled an ‗elite‘ and a ‗Manchurian candidate‘, unable to 
disagree with the latest dictum from Beijing, Rudd‘s China-literacy was put in the 
closet, where it remained until September 2007. Then, in something akin to a political 
coup, Rudd stood before the Chinese delegation at the 15
th
 Asia–Pacific Economic 
Cooperation leaders‘ meeting in Sydney, on the eve of the 2007 Federal Election, and 
offered a narrative about his family‘s affection for China, in Mandarin. As the first 
Australian political leader to address a visiting head of state in a language other than 
English, Rudd stole the show from Prime Minister John Howard; Rudd won praise 
from the Australian and Chinese language media and he received, from President Hu 
Jintao, a personal invitation to attend the Olympic Games in Beijing. Above all, 
however, Rudd‘s diplomacy strengthened his credentials as a new generation leader and 
future prime minister of Australia. As News Limited‘s Doug Conway suggested, the 
effect of Rudd‘s address—so different from the one offered by John Howard in October 
2003—‘could not have been greater had the family‘s precocious nine-year-old played a 
Chopin prelude perfectly for the visiting relatives after Christmas lunch‘.81 
Nevertheless, the praise was not unanimous and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer 
labelled Rudd a ‗parading‘ ‗show-off‘ before going on to promote his credentials as a 
speaker of French and student of Latin.
82
 
                                                 
80. Ultimately the attack backfired resulting in the resignation of Liberal Senator Ian 
Campbell, who had also met with Burke.  
81. Doug Conway, ‗Rudd addresses Chinese President in fluent Mandarin‘, 6 September 
2007, news.com.au. Rudd‘s address also resonated with Liberal Senator for New South 
Wales, Bill Heffernan, who in the following days, when quizzed about challenges to 
John Howard‘s leadership, curiously retorted, ‗I‘m not speaking in Manchurian or 
Mandarin or anything else, I‘m speaking in bush language. It‘s bullshit‘, Ben Worsley, 
‗Liberal MPs back Howard for PM‘, ABC, Lateline, 11 September 2007. 
82. See Caroline Overington, ‗I can speak French, says Downer‘, Weekend Australian,  
8–9 September 2007, p. 11; Clinton Porteous, ‗For clever Rudd, it‘s Chinese checkmate‘, 
Courier Mail, 8 September 2007, p. 5 and Malcolm Farr, ‗Achievements shouldn‘t be 
overlooked‘, Daily Telegraph, 10 September 2007, p. 8. 
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In an interview conducted with journalist Greg Sheridan shortly after APEC, Kevin 
Rudd outlined his foreign policy vision for Australia and sought to make it clear he 
does not view China through rose coloured glasses: 
Everyone knows Rudd‘s personal and political investment in China. But the view he 
expresses of China is balanced.  
‗I‘ve been studying China for 30 years. Over that time the transformation has been 
great. It is much more liberal than it was domestically, but human rights abuses 
continue. On the economic front, the statistics speak for themselves‘.  
Rudd is concerned, however, by China‘s military force modernisation and he 
suggests the Asian power and the US begin nuclear strategic arms talks ‗on the future 
of their strategic nuclear weapons programs‘. 
‗I don‘t view China through rose coloured glasses but I am fully prepared to accept, 
recognise and be positive about the changes that have occurred‖, he says. ‗Any 
student of the Chinese cultural revolution, contrasting 40 years ago with today, 
understands we‘re dealing with chalk and cheese‘. 
Rudd rejects the idea that he will be excessively sensitive to Chinese concerns or 
unable to disagree with Beijing. He points out he has twice met the Dalai Lama: ‗This 
would not have been entirely welcome in Beijing‘. 
On human rights diplomacy, he says: ‗When representations need to be made to the 
Chinese on human rights abuses I‘ll be making them‘. 
The advantage of his knowledge of China, he believes, is that it helps allow robust 
differences to be expressed within a framework of mutual respect.
83
 
On his first visit to China as Prime Minister, in April 2008, Kevin Rudd put ‗(t)he 
advantage of his knowledge of China‘ and his commitment to human rights diplomacy 
into practice. In a speech to an audience at Beijing University, Rudd stated that while 
Australia recognises China‘s sovereignty over Tibet, Australia also believes that there 
are ‗significant human rights problems in Tibet‘.84 In again using his China-literacy to 
great strategic effect, Rudd sought to position his remarks as those offered from a 
friend, with a long-standing interest in Chinese history and culture. After citing the 
contributions of Beijing University‘s alumni (Lu Xun, Cai Yuanpei and Chen Duxiu et 
al.) to the May 4 Movement, Rudd situated himself as a zhengyou to China—a sincere 
                                                 
83. Greg Sheridan, ‗Rudd the Rationalist: Rudd‘s Global Vision‘, Weekend Australian,  
22–23 September 2007, p. 19.  
84. ‗A Conversation with China‘s Youth on the Future‘, Peking University, 9 April 2008, 
http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2008/speech_0176.cfm (accessed 15 April 2008). 
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friend who is prepared to offer ‗unflinching advice‘, a true friend who is prepared to 
disagree.
85
 In publicly criticising China, from within China, zhengyou Rudd had 
differentiated himself from those friends of China who, for the sake of harmony and 
self interest, turn a blind eye to subjects which may provide grounds for disagreement.  
In locating the expression zhengyou within the context of modern Chinese friendship 
politics, China scholar Geremie Barmé explains: 
… ‗friendship‘ (youyi) has been a cornerstone of China‘s post-1949 diplomacy … To 
be a friend of China, the Chinese people, the party-state or, in the reform period, even 
a mainland business partner, the foreigner is often expected to stomach unpalatable 
situations, and keep silent in face of egregious behaviour. A friend of China might 
enjoy the privilege of offering the occasional word of caution in private; in the public 
arena he or she is expected to have the good sense and courtesy to be ‗objective‘, that 
is to toe the line, whatever that happens to be. The concept of ‗friendship‘ thus 
degenerates into little more than an effective tool for emotional blackmail and 
enforced complicity.
86
 
Rudd‘s comments were made within the context of the international Olympic torch 
relay. While the opportunity to host the Olympic Games was intended to symbolise 
China‘s modernisation, its global reach and its emerging status as a responsible member 
of the international community, in the lead up to Rudd‘s address, the preparations for 
the ‗Friendly Games‘ had degenerated into farce. As it moved across the cities of the 
world, the torch relay became synonymous with violence as protesters battled flag-
bearing Chinese students and the blue track suited ‗guardians of the flame‘. Moreover, 
in mobilising its citizens as part of the counter-demonstration, the Chinese Government 
reverted to the bellicose rhetoric of the Cold War era, speaking of a ‗reactionary clique 
of Dalai splittists‘, ‗the infiltration of anti-China elements‘ and the ‗Western spoilers 
and enemies of the Games‘.87  
                                                 
85. ibid. 
86. Geremie Barmé, ‗Rudd rewrites rules of engagement‘, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 April 
2008, p. 35. Liberal Senator for Queensland, Russell Trood, also noted: ‗The Prime 
Minister, Kevin Rudd, deserves considerable credit for the forthright way in which he 
has raised concerns about human rights abuses in China, and more especially in Tibet, 
during his visit to Beijing‘, ‗Hasten slowly on China human rights‘, Canberra Times, 
17 April, 2008, p. 19. 
87. For examples of such rhetoric see Rowan Callick, ‗Inflamed passions‘, Weekend 
Australian, April 26–27, 2008, p. 20 and Rowan Callick, ‗Forbidding city‘, Australian, 
6 May 2008, p. 11. During the Canberra leg of the torch relay, there were accounts of 
flag-smothering Chinese students intimidating Australian nationals who were lawfully 
exercising their right to protest. Some 10,000 Chinese students came to Canberra 
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At a time when many were beginning to question—thirty years after Deng Xiaoping‘s 
economic reforms—the extent to which China had completed the transition to 
becoming a responsible member of the international community, Rudd used the speech 
at Beijing University as an opportunity to reiterate that he believed that ‗the Olympics 
are important for China‘s continuing engagement with the world‘. In so doing, he 
suggested that those in the audience, the educated youth of China, should look to 
facilitate China‘s integration into global society.88 Yet, in seeking to develop a position 
which allows Australia to speak openly to China about matters of pressing international 
concern, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd also demonstrated a belief that Australia has an 
active role to play in facilitating China‘s engagement. In taking such a position Rudd 
gestures towards a new and significant chapter in the Australia–China relationship. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
equipped with five-starred red flags, as part of a government bankrolled counter-
demonstration. Canberra resident Annie Acton reports ‗I attended the torch relay in 
Canberra carrying a small sign saying China sends weapons to Robert Mugabe. I was 
harassed by a group of Chinese students, in particular a tall man who followed me 
around trying to drape a large Chinese flag over me. I walked to another part of the relay 
route and stood by myself with my sign. A large group of Chinese students surrounded 
me and nearly smothered me with their flags. I tried to run away from them but they 
wouldn‘t let me go, they just made a tighter circle around me. In the end a policeman had 
to rescue me from them … ‘, ‗Seeing red: freedom of speech under attack from Chinese‘, 
Canberra Times, 26 April 2008. 
88. ‗A Conversation with China‘s Youth on the Future‘, Peking University, 9 April 2008, 
http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2008/speech_0176.cfm (accessed 15 April 2008). 
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Conclusion 
This monograph has explored the historical, political and cultural foundations of the 
Australian Parliament‘s dealings with China. In so doing, it has offered an account of 
the profound transformation that has taken place in the way Australian parliamentarians 
have viewed ‗China‘. The anxieties about economic competition and genetic corruption 
that prompted the first Parliament to pass legislation that sought to exclude the Chinese 
and other non-Europeans from Australia, was eventually replaced by one in which 
‗China‘ emerged as an indispensable economic and strategic partner, positioned near 
the centre of Australian‘s foreign policy. The monograph has sought to account for this 
transformation by exploring a series of landmark events in the development of bilateral 
relations, among them: J. G. Latham‘s visit to China in 1934, the Parliament‘s reaction 
to the establishment of the People‘s Republic in 1949, the Whitlam Government‘s 
recognition of China in 1972 and Hu Jintao‘s address to the Australian Parliament in 
2003.  
The full extent of the change in parliamentary attitudes towards China can be evidenced 
by contrasting the material that appears at both ends of the monograph. At Federation, 
one of the nation‘s first parliamentarians spoke of eschewing contact with the Chinese, 
for fear of electoral loss. Just over one hundred years later, the then Leader of the 
Opposition demonstrated his credentials—as a new generation leader and future prime 
minister of Australia—by addressing a visiting Chinese head of state in a Chinese 
language. Similarly, while Federation parliamentarians proclaimed that the more 
educated the ‗Oriental‘, the worse man he was likely to be, education has grown to 
become Australia‘s largest service export to China with some 90,000 Chinese nationals 
currently studying in Australia. Chapters Three and Four also demonstrate stages of 
development in Australia‘s relations with China that would have been unimaginable to 
the members of the first Parliament of Australia. They do this by considering the two 
addresses by the President of the United States and the President of the People‘s 
Republic; the commitment of the Australia–China Parliamentary Friendship Group to 
strengthening bilateral relations; the inquiries of the committees of the Parliament; and 
the recent initiatives that have created linkages between the two national legislatures.  
Beyond seeking to examine the way the bilateral relationship has been advanced 
through the processes, practices and outputs of the Parliament, the monograph has 
located the changes in parliamentary attitudes within a broader social, political and 
national context. It has identified the role the Parliament has played as an important 
Conclusion 
162 
knowledge producing institution, one which has variously come to reflect and affect 
community understandings of China. The study has also documented the role China has 
played, in both times of fear or friendship, in Australia‘s domestic politics. The calls for 
the containment and isolation of China which dominated Australia‘s experience of the 
Cold War; the spectre of international communism which helped consign the Australian 
Labor Party to decades in opposition; and the role that the recognition of the People‘s 
Republic played in the Whitlam Government‘s reformist policy agenda, each testify to 
the place accorded to China in Australia‘s post-War domestic politics.  
The second half of the study has outlined some of the social, economic and political 
transformations that have recently taken place within China. Chapters Three and Four 
have documented the way that such transformation has been accompanied by 
suggestions that China has altered the way it manages its external relations. Former 
Ambassador Madame Fu has been quoted suggesting that China has ‗moved on‘ from 
the 1970s; that it is no longer ‗behind the bamboo curtain‘, and that China has 
developed new ways of dealing with points of view with which it disagrees. Such 
comments have been supported by the former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Alexander Downer, who suggested that China has become a responsible international 
citizen which listens to members of the international community: ‗This isn‘t the China 
of old. The China of new is a China that listens to its friends and its neighbours, and 
listens to them a lot‘.89  
By contrast, however, the monograph has also suggested that this transformation is not 
as complete as these comments suggest. It has observed the way Chinese officials have 
attempted to influence the Australian media and transgress international standards of 
diplomacy by attempting to influence the operations of the Australian Parliament. 
Added to this have been examples of how the Chinese Government responds to 
statements made in the Parliament about the Republic of China (Taiwan); a critique of 
the way that the Chinese Government seeks to ‗duchess‘ Australian parliamentarians; 
and the extraordinary reaction of the Chinese to protests against the Olympic torch 
relay in March–April 2008.  
There is broad agreement across the Parliament that China will continue to change and 
change quickly. However, there is less certainty about the character of this change. 
Some parliamentarians interviewed for this study suggested that the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) will embark upon a program of major liberal political reform. 
                                                 
89. See discussion in Chapter Four and specifically footnote 31. 
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Some suggested that without liberal political reform the CCP may go into crisis. Others 
were more circumspect about predicting China‘s future political character. However, in 
spite of this divergence in opinion, there was agreement that managing the Australia–
China relationship would continue to be something of a balancing act for Australian 
legislators.  
When asked how they would like to see the bilateral relationship change or develop in 
the future, parliamentarians surveyed for this study made the following suggestions:  
• increasing cooperation between the two nations to reduce the adverse impacts of 
climate change and the environmental impact associated with China‘s 
development; 
• improving the capacity of Australian educators to understand the needs of Chinese 
students; 
• using ‗sports diplomacy‘ to facilitate deeper cultural and business links; 
• formalising the role of the Australia–China Friendship Group to involve the Group 
in matters of policy (possibly through developing specific sector-based study tours 
that focus on matters such as trade, education or the environment); 
• increasing parliamentarians‘ knowledge of China (this may be done through 
sending an annual delegation to China, possibly when the National People‘s 
Congress is meeting; or through encouraging parliamentarians to visit areas outside 
Beijing, Shanghai, Xian and Guilin); 
• giving ‗adequate‘ attention to alleged human rights abuses taking place in China; 
• developing more exchanges between the two legislatures and other policy makers; 
and 
• establishing a ‗more realistic‘ approach to China which does not result in the 
neglect of other North Asian relationships.  
In closing, it is also worth returning to J. G. Latham‘s caution to the House of 
Representatives in 1934. While Latham‘s comments are confined to matters of trade, 
they gesture towards developing a specialised knowledge which would facilitate 
Australia‘s engagement with China: 
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It has been usual in Australia to regard China as offering great potentialities for the 
marketing of Australian goods. This arises, no doubt, from our habit of thinking of 
China in terms of China‘s population … But perhaps no other market offers more 
difficulties, and no other market requires such specialized knowledge of local 
conditions and sales procedure. It can also be said that in no other eastern market is 
competition so keen, or is there such a concentration of international commercial 
representation, both business and official. Most countries have recognized the 
necessity for official trade representation, and the trade representatives are, generally 
speaking, men of extraordinary ability and acumen.
90
 
 
                                                 
90. J. G. Latham, ‗The Australian Eastern Mission, 1934: Report of the Right Honourable 
J. G. Latham‘, Parliamentary Papers for 1932–34, Number 236, p. 12. 
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Appendix 1: Address by the President of the People’s 
Republic of China 
Mr Howard (Bennelong—Prime Minister) (10.08 a.m.)—Mr Speaker and Mr 
President of the Senate, on behalf of the government and on behalf of all members, I 
extend to His Excellency Hu Jintao, the President of the People‘s Republic of China, a 
very warm welcome to our national parliament. I extend that welcome to his wife, 
Madame Liu, and to all the other members of the Chinese party. 
It would be no exaggeration to say that 10 years ago an event such as this would have 
been seen as not only unlikely but indeed highly improbable. Equally, I would not have 
thought 10 years ago that as Prime Minister of Australia and as the leader of a Western, 
Centre Right political party I would have—as I did in 2002—addressed the cadres of 
the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing. I think that says a 
number of things. It says something of the way in which our world has changed. It says 
something of the commonsense character of the relationship between Australia and 
China, because that event in 2002 occurred and this event today occurs without either 
of our two nations in any way abandoning their distinctive but different traditions. 
I would characterise the relationship between Australia and China as being both mature 
and practical and as being a relationship that is intensely built on growing people-to-
people links. We are different societies. We have different cultures, we have different 
traditions and we have different histories. No purpose is served in pretending otherwise. 
But might I say that that has never blinded successive Australian governments of both 
political persuasions to an endeavour to draw from the relationship those things that can 
be of great and enduring mutual benefit to our societies. So in those senses it is a very 
mature and practical relationship. 
The people-to-people links are immensely important. I can describe it this way: the 
most widely spoken foreign language in Australia today is a dialect of Chinese, and 
three per cent of the Australian population, no fewer than 550,000 people, claim 
Chinese ancestry. Speaking personally, 13.3 per cent of my own electorate of 
Bennelong in Sydney claim Chinese ancestry. There are 34,000 students from China 
studying in Australia. China is now Australia‘s third largest trading partner. Last year 
the signing of the natural gas contract for the supply, over 25 years, of natural gas to the 
Guangdong province was a veritable landmark in the evolution of the economic 
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relationship between our two nations. Two-way trade between Australia and China has 
trebled since 1996.  
Let me take the opportunity today of recording, on behalf of the government, our 
appreciation for the constructive, practical and wholly positive approach that China has 
taken in helping, in partnership with others, to resolve the challenging issue of North 
Korea‘s nuclear capabilities. No nation has more influence on North Korea than China. 
The resolution of that issue, which must necessarily involve other nations as well, is 
very important to the stability and the peace of our region. 
Finally, it is self-evident that the relationship between Australia, the United States and 
China respectively, on a two-way basis—that is, our relationship with the United States 
and then again our relationship with China—will be extremely important to the stability 
of our region. Our aim is to see calm and constructive dialogue between the United 
States and China on those issues which might potentially cause tension between them. 
It will be Australia‘s aim, as a nation which has different but nonetheless close 
relationships with both of those nations, to promote that constructive and calm 
dialogue. 
Mr President, you and your wife are greatly welcomed to our country. We thank you 
for coming. We wish you well. We know that you will receive a warm reception from 
many people in this country who will demonstrate their affection for the important 
relations between our two peoples.  
HIS EXCELLENCY Mr Hu Jintao (PO) (10.21 a.m.)—(Translation) The Hon. Neil 
Andrew, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Hon. Paul Calvert, President of 
the Senate, the Hon. John Howard, Prime Minister, distinguished members of the 
federal parliament, ladies and gentlemen: I am delighted to have this opportunity of 
coming to the Parliament House of Australia to meet with you and address such a 
distinguished audience. 
Let me begin by expressing, on behalf of the Chinese government and people, my best 
wishes to you and, through you, to the courageous and hardworking Australian people. 
Though located in different hemispheres and separated by high seas, the people of 
China and Australia enjoy a friendly exchange that dates back centuries. The Chinese 
people have all along cherished amicable feelings about the Australian people. Back in 
the 1420s, the expeditionary fleets of China‘s Ming dynasty reached Australian shores. 
For centuries, the Chinese sailed across vast seas and settled down in what was called 
‗the southern land‘, or today‘s Australia. They brought Chinese culture here and lived 
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harmoniously with the local people, contributing their proud share to Australia‘s 
economy, society and thriving pluralistic culture. 
More than three decades have passed since China and Australia established diplomatic 
relations. Our bilateral ties have stood the tests of time and international vicissitudes 
and made steady headway. To consolidate and develop its all-round cooperation with 
Australia is a key component of China‘s external relations. We have always viewed our 
friendly ties with Australia from a strategic and long-term perspective. To cultivate a 
deeper and all-round cooperation between the two countries is the common aspiration 
of the two governments and peoples.  
This afternoon I will have an in-depth exchange of views with Prime Minister Howard 
on bilateral ties and regional and international issues of mutual interest. We will also 
sign a series of bilateral documents on cooperation. This shows that China-Australia 
cooperation in various fields is going deeper and broader. I am convinced that China 
and Australia will shape a relationship of all-round cooperation that features a high 
degree of mutual trust, long-term friendship and mutual benefit—a relationship that 
makes our two peoples both winners. 
How should countries go about their relations with one another in this complicated and 
diverse world? It is a question that is very much on the minds of many people. We are 
of the view that, for smooth conduct of state-to-state relations and for lasting peace and 
common prosperity, all countries should act in compliance with the following 
principles. First, politically they should respect each other, seek common ground while 
putting aside differences and endeavour to expand areas of agreement. Our world is a 
diverse place, like a rainbow of many colours. Civilisations, social systems and 
development models, different as they may be, should respect one another, should learn 
from each other‘s strong points, amid competition and comparison, and should achieve 
common development by seeking common ground while shelving differences. By 
mutual respect politically we mean that the political system and the path of political 
development chosen by the people of each country should be respected. 
Democracy is the common pursuit of mankind, and all countries must earnestly protect 
the democratic rights of their people. In the past 20 years and more since China 
embarked on a road of reform and opening up, we have moved steadfastly to promote 
political restructuring and vigorously build democratic politics under socialism while 
upholding and improving our systems of people‘s congresses, multiparty cooperation 
and political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party, and regional 
ethnic autonomy. We have advanced the process of scientific and democratic decision 
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making and promoted grassroots democracy, protection of citizens‘ rights and 
freedoms, democratic elections, and democratic decision making, democratic 
management and democratic supervision by the people in our country‘s political, 
economic, cultural and social life according to law. 
We have stepped up the building of the legal system in China, making sure that there 
are laws to go by, that the laws must be observed and are strictly enforced and that 
violators must be prosecuted. As a result, the enthusiasm, initiative and creativeness of 
the Chinese people of all ethnic groups have been galvanised, providing an immense 
driving force for the country‘s development. In future, we will continue to move 
forward our political restructuring in a vigorous and cautious manner as our national 
conditions merit, improve our democratic institutions and legal system and build a 
socialist political civilisation. 
True, China and Australia are different in social systems. This is the result of different 
choices made by our people in light of their national conditions and the two countries‘ 
different historical evolution. As China-Australia relations prove, so long as they 
understand and treat each other as equals and respect their respective national 
conditions and circumstances, countries with different social systems may very well 
become partners of friendly cooperation with constantly increased common ground.  
Second, economically they should complement and benefit one another, deepen their 
cooperation and achieve common development. With economic globalisation 
developing in such depth, no country can expect to achieve economic development 
goals without going for effective economic and technological cooperation with other 
countries and actively participating in international division of labour, bringing in 
capital knowledge, technology and managerial expertise needed for development at 
home and in return providing products and know-how with comparative advantages for 
the development of others. This is how countries achieve common development 
through mutually beneficial cooperation. 
Right now, China has entered into a new stage of building a well-off society in an all-
round way and accelerating the socialist modernisation drive. We are engaged in 
developing a socialist market economy and opening the country still wider in more 
areas, with a higher level of sophistication. While speeding up strategic economic 
restructuring, we are vigorously implementing the strategies of revitalising China 
through science and education, of sustainable development, of development of the west 
and of renewal of the old industrial base of north-east China. China enjoys a vast 
market, abundant labour, social and political stability and a vibrant momentum for 
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development. A stronger and more developed China will bring growth opportunities 
and tangible benefits to other countries in the world. 
China and Australia are highly complementary economically. Blessed with vast 
territory and rich resources, Australia boasts economic and technological successes. 
The potential for China-Australia economic cooperation is immense. Past, present or 
future, we see Australia as our important economic partner. China-Australia trade has 
grown rapidly in recent years, from $US87 million in the early years of our diplomatic 
relations to $US10.4 billion in 2002. China has become Australia‘s third largest trading 
partner and fourth largest export market and, in fact, the fastest growing one. Australia 
is China‘s ninth largest trading partner and biggest supplier of wool. Over the years 
China has purchased large amounts of iron ore and aluminium oxide from Australia, 
which has such energy and mineral riches. Last year the two countries signed a 25-year, 
$A25 billion deal on the LNG project in Guangdong, thus laying a solid foundation for 
our bilateral energy cooperation. 
Also expanding steadily are the bilateral exchanges and cooperation in science and 
technology, agriculture and animal husbandry. By June 2003 Australia had invested in 
a total of 5,600 projects in China, with an actual investment exceeding $US3.1 billion. 
China has invested in 218 projects in Australia, with a contractual value of $US450 
million. We are ready to be your long-term and stable cooperation partner, dedicated to 
closer cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit. The trade and economic 
framework between China and Australia which will be signed today will mark the 
beginning of a brand-new stage of our trade and economic cooperation. I am convinced 
that this framework will help steer our bilateral cooperation in economic, trade and 
other fields to continuous new highs. 
Third, culturally countries should step up exchanges and enhance understanding and 
mutual emulation. Diversity in the world is a basic characteristic of human society and 
also the key condition for a lively and dynamic world, as we see today. The proud 
history, culture and traditions that make each country different are all part of human 
civilisation. Every nation, every culture, must have its strong points and advantages. All 
should respect one another, draw upon each other‘s strengths and strive to achieve 
common progress.  
China has a 5,000-year civilisation. Its people, of 56 ethnic groups, have worked 
together to shape the magnificent Chinese culture. The Chinese culture belongs not 
only to the Chinese but also to the whole world. It has flourished not only through 
mutual emulation and assimilation among its various ethnic groups but also through 
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interactions and mutual learning with other countries‘ cultures. With reform opening up 
and a modernisation drive pressing ahead in full swing, we are all the more eager to 
draw upon the useful achievements of all civilisations. We stand ready to step up 
cultural exchanges with the rest of the world in a joint promotion of cultural prosperity. 
Cultural pluralism is a distinctive feature of Australian society, a feature that embodies 
ethnic harmony in this country. Just as the national anthem goes, Australian people 
have come across the seas. Cultural exchanges have long served as important bridges 
for enhanced understanding and deepened friendship between our two peoples. Last 
year was the 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties between China and Australia. While 
Celebrate Australia 2002 delighted Shanghai citizens, Chinese performing artists had 
their debut in the famous Sydney Opera House. In recent years people-to-people 
exchanges between our two countries have grown rapidly, with annual visits well over 
100,000. China is the biggest source country of foreign students in Australia now. We 
should continue to expand our cultural exchanges, giving fuller play to culture‘s role as 
the bridge and bond in the building of friendship between the two countries and their 
peoples. 
Fourth, in security, countries should strengthen mutual trust, cooperate on an equal 
footing and endeavour to maintain peace. Peace and development remain the dominant 
themes of our times. Uncertainties affecting world peace and development have been 
on the rise. Traditional and non-traditional threats to security are mixed together, 
rendering some regions unstable and turbulent. Terrorism attacks from time to time and 
cross-boundary crimes have become more pronounced. How to meet these challenges, 
secure peace and development in the world and create a stable and harmonious 
homeland for all is a critical question that calls for serious consideration and effective 
solution. 
China advocates a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality 
and cooperation and strives to resolve disputes peacefully through dialogue and 
cooperation. We believe in democracy in international relations. The affairs of the 
world should be handled through consultation on an equal footing by all countries. 
Members of the international community should reaffirm their commitment to 
multilateralism and give full scope to the important role of the United Nations and its 
Security Council in maintaining world peace and security. 
China and Australia respect each other‘s sovereignty and territorial integrity and they 
stick to noninterference in each other‘s internal affairs and enjoy a growing mutual trust 
in the security field. Recent years have seen increasing exchanges between the two 
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militaries, as evidenced by the annual defence strategic dialogue for six consecutive 
years and frequent port calls by naval ships of both countries. China and Australia have 
shared interests in keeping the South Pacific and Asia-Pacific stable, easing regional 
tensions and promoting peaceful settlement of hot-spot issues. We are both against 
terrorism and hope for stronger counter-terrorism cooperation. We are both key 
participants in the ARF and other regional security mechanisms. China welcomes and 
supports a constructive Australian role in regional and international affairs. We, on our 
part, will stick to our independent foreign policy of peace, acting forever as a strong 
defender of world peace and a persistent proponent of common development. We are 
ready to join Australia and other countries in cultivating a secure and reliable 
international environment of lasting stability.  
Ladies and gentlemen, Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. The complete 
reunification of China at an early date is the common aspiration and firm resolve of the 
entire Chinese people. A peaceful solution to the Taiwan question serves the interests 
of all the Chinese people, including our compatriots on Taiwan. It also serves the 
common interests of all countries in the region, including Australia. The greatest threat 
to peace in the Taiwan Straits is the splittist activities by Taiwan independence forces. 
We are firmly opposed to Taiwan independence. The Chinese government and people 
look to Australia for a constructive role in China‘s peaceful reunification. 
Ladies and gentlemen, there have been frequent exchanges between our two 
legislatures in recent years. The Speaker, the Hon. Neil Andrew, and many law-makers 
here have visited my country and have seen China‘s changes and progress first-hand. 
Here I would like to extend this invitation to all of you: we look forward to receiving 
more of you in China. Looking back, I am gratified to see the fruitful past of our 
relations. Looking forward, I feel confident in where the relationship is headed. Let us 
join hands in writing a more luminous new chapter of the China-Australia relationship 
of all-round cooperation. Thank you. 
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Appendix 2: Parliamentary Questionnaire: Australia’s 
Relationship with China  
As the 2007 Australia Parliamentary Fellow I am conducting research on the ways the Australian 
Parliament views, or has viewed, the relationship between Australia and China. As part of this project, I 
am sending a questionnaire to all Senators and Members of Parliament.  
 
The following questionnaire seeks your response to a range of questions about the nature of the 
Australia–China relationship, Australia‘s foreign policy priorities and the China-related matters that are 
raised by your constituents. Your participation is important to the success of this project and the 
representativeness of the data. The questionnaire should take you approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
In order to facilitate the compilation of data please complete and return the questionnaire by 13 July 
2007. 
 
Your responses are confidential, non-attributable and will only be presented as aggregated data.  
 
Data from the questionnaire will be published by the Parliamentary Library as a component of the 2007 
Australian Parliamentary Fellow monograph.  
 
Please return this questionnaire in the reply paid envelope that has been supplied. 
 
1. Please indicate the political party of which you are a member (if any): 
 
a) Liberal Party    
b) Labor Party     
c) National Party  
d) Democrats    
e) Greens     
f) Independent      
g) Family First      
h) Prefer not to disclose      
 
2. Years of parliamentary service:  
 
a) Under 3 years       
b) 3–6 years     
c) 6–9 years     
d) 9–12 years      
e) 12–15    
f) Over 15 years    
 
China questions—sources of information 
 
I am interested in determining which sources you use to gain information about the People‘s Republic of 
China and how influential each source is in contributing to your understanding of China and the 
Australia–China relationship. 
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3. Please indicate which sources you access for information about China and the frequency of 
this access (please circle). 
 
 Regularly Sometimes Rarely Never 
a) The Australian media  1 2 3 4 
b) The overseas media 1 2 3 4 
c) Academic/ think-tank publications 1 2 3 4 
d) Parliamentary committee activity  1 2 3 4 
e) Government communication (eg: cables, 
intelligence, press statements) 
1 2 3 4 
f) Parliamentary colleagues  1 2 3 4 
g) Chinese language materials 1 2 3 4 
h) Members of your electorate  1 2 3 4 
i) Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade 1 2 3 4 
j) Chinese Embassy 1 2 3 4 
k) Parliamentary Library 1 2 3 4 
l) Your staff  1 2 3 4 
m) Internet sites 1 2 3 4 
n) Non-government organisations 1 2 3 4 
o) Other, please specify: 
______________________________ 
1 2 3 4 
 
China questions—travel to China  
 
4. (a) Have you ever visited the People’s Republic of China (not including the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region)?   
 
Yes      
No   (Please go to question 5) 
 
If YES: 
 
(b) How many times: ________ 
 
(c) Did you visit during the term of the current 41
st
 Parliament?  (16 November 2004–
present) 
 
Yes      
No    
 
(d) If you did visit during the term of the 41
st
 Parliament, in what capacity did you visit? 
(Please select all that apply)  
 
Personal/private (eg: holiday)    
Business/ trade representation  
Official   (Please go to question 4(e)) 
 
Appendix 2 
 175 
(e) If you visited in an official capacity, please tick the most appropriate category (if more 
than one, please select all that apply): 
 
As a member of an official Parliamentary delegation    
With a Parliamentary Friendship Group     
As a member of a party delegation  
Individual study trip    
As a guest of the Chinese Government or a Chinese 
Government agency    
 
5. (a) Have you ever visited the Republic of China/ Taiwan?  
 
Yes      
No   (Please go to question 6) 
 
(b) Did you visit the Republic of China/ Taiwan during the term of the 41
st
 Parliament?   
 
Yes      
No    
 
6. Are you a member of any of the following groups? 
 
a) The Australia–China Parliamentary Friendship Group    
b) The Australia–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group    
c) The All-Party Parliamentary Group for Tibet    
 
China questions—Chinese language skills  
 
7. Do you have any Chinese language skills?   
 
Yes      
No     
 
8. Do any of your staff have any Chinese language skills?   
 
Yes      
No    
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China questions—the character of the Australia–China relationship  
 
9. From a historical perspective, please rate how influential you feel each of the following 
milestones have been in contributing to the character of the current Australia–China 
relationship (please circle the relevant number for each event): 
 
 Highly 
Influential 
Moderately 
Influential 
Marginally 
Influential 
Not 
Influential 
Don‘t 
Know 
a) The liberalisation of the Chinese 
economy, from 1978, under Deng 
Xiaoping  
1 2 3 4 5 
b) The Whitlam Labor Government‘s 
recognition of China in 1972 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) The Fraser Government‘s bipartisan 
approach to relations with China 
1 2 3 4 5 
d) The building of bilateral ties under the 
Hawke Labor Government 
1 2 3 4 5 
e) The Tiananmen Square incident of 4 
June 1989  
1 2 3 4 5 
f) Bilateral relations under the Howard 
Government to date 
1 2 3 4 5 
g) President Hu Jintao‘s address to the 
Australian Parliament in October 2003 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. Using the contemporary Australia–China relationship as a starting point, please indicate 
how influential you feel each of the following will be in determining the future character of 
the Australia–China relationship? (please circle the relevant number for each item) 
 
 Highly 
Influential 
Moderately 
Influential 
Marginally 
Influential 
Not 
Influential 
Don‘t 
Know 
a) Increasing Australian exports to China 1 2 3 4 5 
b) A bilateral or multilateral climate-change 
agreement with China 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) A Free Trade Agreement with China 1 2 3 4 5 
d) China‘s emergence as a stakeholder in 
global/ regional affairs  
1 2 3 4 5 
e) China‘s role in arms control  negotiations 
with North Korea   
1 2 3 4 5 
f) The rights of Falun Gong practitioners in 
China 
1 2 3 4 5 
g) The enforcement of intellectual property 
rights in China 
1 2 3 4 5 
h) The character of Chinese diplomacy in the 
South Pacific  
1 2 3 4 5 
i) The political status of the Republic of 
China/ Taiwan  
1 2 3 4 5 
j) The Australia–United States alliance 1 2 3 4 5 
k) The political status of Tibet  1 2 3 4 5 
l) Australia‘s Human Rights Dialogue with 
China 
1 2 3 4 5 
m) China‘s demand for energy resources and 
raw materials 
1 2 3 4 5 
n) Other(s), please specify: 
___________________________ 
1 2 3 4 5 
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11. (a) In January 2007 Australia ratified two nuclear safeguard agreements in Beijing. These 
agreements were signed in preparation for the export of Australian uranium to the People’s 
Republic. Are you concerned about the export of Australian uranium to China? 
 
Yes      
No   (Please go to question 12) 
 
(b) If YES, please indicate which, if any, of the following issues reflect your concern (select 
all that apply) 
 
(i) Effect on nuclear proliferation/ security    
(ii) Effect on Australia‘s international reputation    
(iii) Other (please specify): 
______________________________________________________ 
 
12. Do you believe a Free Trade Agreement with China would:  
 
a) Be in Australia‘s interests  
Yes      
No    
b) Substantially contribute to Australia‘s trade deficit      
Yes      
No    
c) Damage Australia‘s manufacturing sector 
Yes      
No    
d) Create jobs and raise Australian living standards 
Yes      
No    
 
13. China recently overtook Japan as Australia’s largest trading partner. Given the importance 
of China to Australia’s economic development, do you feel that:  
 
a) Australia is well-positioned to protect and promote Australian interests in China 
Yes       
No     
b) Australia has become too reliant upon China for its economic prosperity  
Yes      
No    
c) Australia‘s economic reliance upon China will negatively impact upon Australia‘s 
political dealings with China         
Yes       
No     
d) The Howard Government has achieved the right balance between the economic and 
non-economic aspects of the relationship          
Yes       
No     
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14. Have you ever received representations from Chinese Government officials about: 
 
a) The political status of Tibet 
Yes      
No    
b) The activities of Falun Gong practitioners in Australia            
Yes      
No    
c) The rights of workers to collectively organise in China          
Yes       
No     
d) The political status of the Republic of China/Taiwan           
Yes       
No     
e) Other domestic political events in China (please specify): 
_____________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Foreign policy questions 
 
The following questions seek to determine what you believe Australia‘s foreign policy priorities to be 
and the degree to which, you believe, the Opposition and the minor parties can influence Australian 
foreign policy. 
 
15. Please indicate the importance you attribute to the following interests or values in 
determining Australia’s foreign policy: 
 
 Highly 
Important 
Important Unimportant 
a) Trade 1 2 3 
b) Advancing democracy 1 2 3 
c) Defence and strategic interests 1 2 3 
d) Advancing human rights 1 2 3 
e) Promoting Australian political 
‗values‘ 
1 2 3 
f) Strategic alliances with world powers 1 2 3 
 
16. How much influence do you believe the Opposition and the minor parties have on foreign 
policy?  
 
Substantial      
Some         
Negligible       
 
17. The Opposition and the minor parties can best influence foreign policy through (select all 
that you think apply): 
 
Parliamentary debate/ questions        
Policy       
Committee work/ reports       
The media/ public awareness    
Non-government organisations    
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18. a) Do you believe the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade / 
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade can influence Australian 
foreign policy: 
 
Yes     
No    (Please go to question 19) 
 
b) If YES, could you please provide an example: _________________________ 
 
Constituent matters  
 
19.  Members of the House of Representatives only, Senators please go to question 22) 
 
The number of Chinese-born people in any one Australian electorate may be as high as 
between 10–15%. Are you aware of the percentage of Chinese-Australians in your 
electorate?  
 
Yes   Could you please provide that percentage: _______%  
No    
 
20. Are the Chinese-Australians in your electorate largely (select all that apply): 
 
Australian-born Chinese  
Mainland (PRC)-born Chinese     
Hong Kong-born Chinese     
Ethnic Chinese from Southeast Asia     
Don‘t know    
 
21. How does the business community in your electorate consider the economic rise of China?  
 
a) They view it as a significant opportunity  
Yes       
No     
b) They worry about competing with Chinese imports  
Yes       
No     
c) They are concerned about the effect of a FTA with China  
Yes       
No     
d) They welcome a FTA with China  
Yes       
No     
 
22. a) Have your Chinese-Australian constituents raised China-related issues with you? 
 
Yes     
No   (Please go to question 23) 
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b) If YES, do the China-related matters raised by your constituents relate to: 
 
Policy     
Commerce/ trade    
Immigration     
Human rights      
Education     
Other (please specify): ________________________________ 
 
23. a) Do you receive representations from individual constituents or organisations about human 
rights issues in China?   
 
Yes       
No    (Please go to question 24) 
 
b) If YES, do these representations relate to any of the following (select all that apply): 
 
 (i) Falun Gong practitioners  
 (ii) Rights of ethnic and religious minorities  
 (iii) The forced repatriation of North Korean asylum seekers   
 (iv) Forced abortions and sterilisations  
 (v) ‗Organ harvesting‘   
 (vi) Other (please specify): 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
24. Would you like to make any additional comments; do you feel that there are important aspects 
of the Australia–China relationship that have not been mentioned?  
 
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________ 
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire—please return the questionnaire in the reply paid 
envelope that has been supplied. 
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